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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-109206

CVE-2026-109206: LogicalDOC Username Enumeration Vulnerability

CVE-2026-109206 is a username enumeration flaw in LogicalDOC Community Edition that allows attackers to identify valid user accounts through avatar comparison. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-109206 Overview

CVE-2026-109206 is a username enumeration vulnerability in LogicalDOC Community Edition through version 9.3. The flaw resides in the AvatarServlet endpoint at /avatar, which performs no session validation before responding to requests. Unauthenticated attackers can submit arbitrary usernames or numeric identifiers through the userId parameter and distinguish valid accounts by comparing the server's response against a known 1x1 transparent placeholder image. Valid accounts return real avatar images, while invalid accounts return the placeholder. The flaw is classified as [CWE-204: Observable Response Discrepancy] and affects the open-source document management platform maintained by LogicalDOC.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated attackers can enumerate valid usernames and harvest profile pictures from any internet-exposed LogicalDOC Community Edition instance, enabling targeted phishing and credential-stuffing campaigns.

Affected Products

  • LogicalDOC Community Edition versions through 9.3
  • The AvatarServlet component at /avatar endpoint
  • Deployments exposing the LogicalDOC web application to untrusted networks

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-12 - CVE-2026-109206 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-10-13 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-109206

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability exists in AvatarServlet.java within the logicaldoc-webapp module. The servlet accepts a userId query parameter that can contain either a username string or a numeric database identifier. The handler then looks up the matching account and returns the associated avatar bytes.

Because the servlet omits any session or authentication check, any remote client can issue requests. When the supplied identifier matches a real user with a configured avatar, the servlet returns the stored image. When the identifier does not match any account, the servlet returns the hardcoded TRANSPARENT_IMAGE (a 1x1 PNG) encoded as base64. This differential response gives attackers a reliable oracle for enumerating accounts.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing authentication on a resource that discloses account state. The AvatarServlet was designed to serve avatars to authenticated UI contexts but was deployed without a session filter. Combined with the deterministic placeholder image returned for invalid lookups, this creates an observable response discrepancy that leaks the existence of accounts to unauthenticated clients.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires only HTTP access to the LogicalDOC web interface. An attacker iterates through a list of candidate usernames or sequential numeric IDs by issuing requests such as GET /avatar?userId=admin. The attacker then compares each response body against the known transparent placeholder image. Responses that differ confirm valid accounts, and the returned image can be captured for use in social engineering. The attack scales efficiently and leaves no authentication logs on the target.

java
// Patched avatar handling in UserUtil.java
// Source: https://github.com/logicaldoc/community/commit/4e93a69526ae7fe50f670b85b3fc57181f3de3f7
private static final String TRANSPARENT_IMAGE = "";

// Visibility changed from private to public so callers can
// return a generic silhouette for both valid and invalid lookups,
// removing the oracle used to distinguish real accounts.
public static final String DEFAULT_AVATAR_IMAGE = "...";

The patch promotes DEFAULT_AVATAR_IMAGE to public so the servlet can serve a uniform silhouette instead of leaking a distinguishable placeholder for non-existent users.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-109206

Indicators of Compromise

  • High volumes of unauthenticated GET requests to /avatar with varied userId values from a single source
  • Sequential numeric iteration of the userId parameter indicating automated enumeration
  • Requests to /avatar originating from IPs that never authenticate to the application
  • Responses of identical small byte length (the 1x1 transparent PNG) interleaved with larger image payloads

Detection Strategies

  • Parse web server and reverse proxy access logs for repeated /avatar?userId= requests grouped by source IP
  • Alert when a single client requests the endpoint with more than a threshold of unique userId values within a short window
  • Correlate /avatar request bursts with the absence of a preceding successful login event for the same session

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward LogicalDOC application and web server logs to a centralized analytics platform for behavioral baselining
  • Create dashboards that track the ratio of transparent-image responses to real avatar responses by source IP
  • Monitor outbound firewall logs for scanning activity targeting the /avatar path across LogicalDOC hosts

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-109206

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network access to the LogicalDOC web interface so only trusted networks or VPN clients can reach /avatar
  • Place the application behind a reverse proxy that enforces authentication before forwarding requests to the servlet
  • Review access logs for prior enumeration attempts and treat any harvested usernames as exposed

Patch Information

The maintainers addressed the issue in commit 4e93a69. The fix normalizes the response so that both existing users without an avatar and non-existent users receive the same default silhouette image, removing the enumeration oracle. Administrators should upgrade to a build that includes this commit. Refer to the VulnCheck advisory and the LogicalDOC community discussion for release details.

Workarounds

  • Configure a web application firewall rule to require an authenticated session cookie on all requests to /avatar
  • Rate-limit requests to the /avatar endpoint per source IP to slow enumeration attempts
  • Deploy a reverse proxy rule that rewrites responses for /avatar to a uniform image when no valid session is present
bash
# Example nginx configuration to require session cookie on /avatar
location /avatar {
    if ($http_cookie !~* "JSESSIONID=") {
        return 401;
    }
    limit_req zone=avatar_zone burst=10 nodelay;
    proxy_pass http://logicaldoc_backend;
}

# Define rate limit zone in http context
# limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=avatar_zone:10m rate=5r/s;

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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