Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-109200 Overview
CVE-2026-109200 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in LogicalDOC Community Edition through version 9.3. The flaw resides in the default-enabled XMLConverter component, which fetches xml-stylesheethref URLs without scheme or host allowlisting. Authenticated users can upload XML documents whose stylesheet href references internal http, ftp, file, or jar URLs. The server then issues the request and applies attacker-controlled XSLT during conversion. The weakness is tracked as [CWE-918].
Critical Impact
Authenticated attackers can coerce the LogicalDOC server to issue requests to internal network resources and process attacker-supplied XSLT, enabling reconnaissance and limited interaction with internal services.
Affected Products
- LogicalDOC Community Edition through 9.3
- Instances running the default-enabled XMLConverter document conversion component
- Deployments permitting authenticated users to upload XML documents
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-12 - CVE-2026-109200 published to NVD
- 2026-10-15 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-109200
Vulnerability Analysis
The LogicalDOC Community Edition XMLConverter class parses uploaded XML documents and resolves any xml-stylesheet processing instruction encountered. When the stylesheet href attribute contains a URL, the converter fetches the resource and uses the returned XSLT to transform the document. The implementation performs no validation of the URL scheme or destination host, so an authenticated user can direct the server to arbitrary endpoints. The vulnerability maps to [CWE-918] Server-Side Request Forgery.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing allowlisting in the stylesheet resolution logic in XMLConverter.java. According to the vendor source references at lines 106 and 249 of the 9.3 branch, URLs supplied via the xml-stylesheet processing instruction are passed directly to the Java URL and XSLT handlers. These handlers accept http, ftp, file, and jar schemes by default. No origin or scheme policy constrains the fetched resource.
Attack Vector
An authenticated user uploads a crafted XML document to LogicalDOC. The document contains a stylesheet processing instruction whose href references an internal resource, for example an internal HTTP service, a local file via file://, or a jar: nested archive. During document conversion, the server issues the outbound request from its own network context and then applies the returned XSLT. The attacker observes conversion output or side effects to infer responses from internal services and to influence conversion through controlled transforms. See the VulnCheck Advisory for SSRF Vulnerability and GitHub XMLConverter Code Line 106 for technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-109200
Indicators of Compromise
- Uploaded XML files containing <?xml-stylesheet processing instructions referencing http, ftp, file, or jar URLs targeting internal or loopback addresses.
- Outbound connections from the LogicalDOC application server to internal IP ranges (RFC1918) that correlate with document conversion jobs.
- Unexpected read access to local files on the LogicalDOC host originating from the XMLConverter process.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect XML uploads at the application proxy or WAF for xml-stylesheet instructions and reject non-allowlisted schemes and hosts.
- Correlate authenticated upload events in LogicalDOC audit logs with outbound HTTP, FTP, or file/jar resource access from the server process.
- Monitor JVM-level network and filesystem calls originating from the com.logicaldoc.core.conversion.XMLConverter class.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Log and alert on egress traffic from LogicalDOC servers destined for internal subnets, cloud metadata endpoints, and localhost.
- Track volume anomalies in document conversion jobs per user to detect automated SSRF probing.
- Retain upload payloads for forensic review and signature-based retro-hunting of malicious stylesheet references.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-109200
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict document upload privileges in LogicalDOC to trusted users until a patched release is deployed.
- Place the LogicalDOC server behind an egress firewall that blocks outbound requests to internal networks, loopback, and cloud metadata services.
- Disable or isolate the XMLConverter component where XML conversion is not required.
Patch Information
At the time of publication, no fixed version is listed in NVD for LogicalDOC Community Edition. Track the GitHub LogicalDOC Community Repository and the GitHub Community Discussion #119 for remediation updates and apply upstream fixes once released.
Workarounds
- Configure the application-layer proxy to strip xml-stylesheet processing instructions from uploaded XML documents.
- Enforce a scheme and host allowlist for any URL dereferenced by the conversion pipeline, rejecting file, ftp, and jar schemes outright.
- Run the LogicalDOC JVM with a SecurityManager or network namespace policy that denies outbound connections to internal CIDR ranges.
# Example egress restriction using iptables on the LogicalDOC host
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner logicaldoc -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner logicaldoc -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner logicaldoc -d 172.16.0.0/12 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner logicaldoc -d 192.168.0.0/16 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner logicaldoc -d 169.254.169.254/32 -j REJECT
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

