Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-107567 Overview
CVE-2026-107567 is a DKIM signing flaw in Progressive Robot hMailServer versions 6.0.0 through 6.3.6. The server signs every message on its first delivery pass using the DKIM key of the domain named in the From header, without validating the message's origin or sender authentication. A remote unauthenticated attacker can send inbound mail with a forged From address at a hosted domain, and the server will sign it with that domain's DKIM key. When the message leaves the server through a forward, alias, Sieve redirect, mailing list, or quarantine release, the forged mail passes DKIM and DMARC at the receiving side. The issue is tracked as [CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source].
Critical Impact
Attackers can obtain valid DKIM signatures from hosted domains, bypassing DMARC enforcement at external receivers and enabling convincing email spoofing against third parties.
Affected Products
- Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6
- Deployments with DKIM signing enabled for any hosted domain
- Hosted domains that expose outbound paths through forwards, aliases, lists, Sieve redirects, journal copies, or quarantine release
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-107567 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-107567
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is an integrity flaw in hMailServer's outbound mail pipeline. When DKIM signing is enabled for a hosted domain, the signer treats the From header as the authoritative source for which key to use. The server signs the message on its first delivery pass, before local delivery, and does not verify that the submitter owns the address in From. Any sender on the Internet can submit a message addressed to a local recipient with a forged From matching a hosted domain. If that recipient has a forward, alias, mailing list, Sieve redirect, journal copy, or mirror that pushes the message to an outside address, the signed copy leaves the server with a valid DKIM signature aligned to the forged From. The signature holds whatever DMARC policy the forged domain publishes. A signed copy can also be replayed to other recipients while the DKIM selector key is unchanged.
Root Cause
The DKIM signer uses the message's own From header as the trust anchor for key selection, rather than the authenticated submitter identity or envelope sender. This matches [CWE-348], where the application accepts input from a source that should not be trusted for the security decision at hand. The SmtpAuthenticatedSenderCheck option that binds authenticated senders to their envelope address is off by default and does not cover the inbound path at all.
Attack Vector
The attack is network-reachable and requires no authentication. An attacker crafts a message with a forged From header pointing at a domain hosted by the target server, addressed to any local user whose account chains out to an external address via forward, alias, list membership, Sieve redirect, or quarantine release. The server accepts the inbound mail, applies the hosted domain's DKIM signature during first-pass delivery, and relays the signed copy to the external recipient. A second variant applies to authenticated SMTP: an account on one hosted domain can submit mail with a From naming a different hosted domain and have it signed with that domain's key.
No verified exploit code is published. See the GitLab hMailServer Work Item 84 for the maintainer discussion.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-107567
Indicators of Compromise
- Outbound mail bearing a DKIM-Signature header for a hosted domain where the message originated from an external IP during inbound receipt
- Mailbox forwards, aliases, or Sieve redirect rules on hosted accounts that point to external domains and have handled recent inbound mail with suspicious From headers
- Quarantine-release or journal-copy events producing signed outbound copies of messages that failed inbound SPF or had mismatched envelope and header senders
Detection Strategies
- Correlate inbound SMTP receipt logs with outbound DKIM signing events on the same message ID; flag cases where the inbound peer IP is not authorized for the signed domain
- Alert on hMailServer processes signing messages whose envelope MAIL FROM domain differs from the header From domain
- Review DMARC aggregate (RUA) reports from external receivers for pass results on messages that did not originate from the hosted domain's sanctioned infrastructure
Monitoring Recommendations
- Ingest hMailServer SMTP and delivery logs into a central analytics pipeline and retain for correlation across inbound and outbound events
- Monitor configuration changes to DKIM selectors, SmtpAuthenticatedSenderCheck, forwarding rules, and alias membership on hosted domains
- Track DMARC RUA and RUF feedback loops for anomalies in pass volume per selector
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-107567
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade hMailServer to version 6.3.7 or later, which addresses the signing logic per the hMailServer 6.3.7 release notes
- Audit all hosted domains with DKIM signing enabled and inventory every forward, alias, list, Sieve redirect, journal, and mirror that can send mail outside the server
- Rotate DKIM selector keys after patching so that any signed copies captured by attackers can no longer be replayed under the new selector
Patch Information
The maintainer released hMailServer 6.3.7 which fixes the untrusted signing source. See the hMailServer 6.3.7 release and the tracking work item for the change description.
Workarounds
- Disable DKIM signing on hosted domains until the upgrade to 6.3.7 is complete
- Remove or restrict outbound forwards, aliases, and list members pointing to external addresses on domains that must keep DKIM signing enabled
- Enable SmtpAuthenticatedSenderCheck to bind authenticated senders to their envelope address, reducing the authenticated-submission variant of the attack
- Publish a strict DMARC policy (p=reject) and narrow DKIM selectors so that compromised keys can be retired quickly
# Configuration guidance - rotate DKIM selector and tighten sender checks
# 1. In hMailServer Administrator, open each hosted Domain -> DKIM Signing
# and clear the "Enabled" checkbox until 6.3.7 is deployed.
# 2. After upgrading, generate a new DKIM key pair and publish a new selector
# in DNS, for example: selector2026._domainkey.example.com
# 3. Enable SmtpAuthenticatedSenderCheck in hMailServer settings so authenticated
# submissions are held to their own envelope addresses.
# 4. Publish a strict DMARC record:
# _dmarc.example.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com"
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

