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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-114474

CVE-2026-114474: hMailServer Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-114474 is an authentication bypass flaw in Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 that enables SPF and DMARC spoofing. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-114474 Overview

CVE-2026-114474 is an email authentication bypass vulnerability in Progressive Robot hMailServer versions 6.0.0 through 6.3.6. The flaw stems from how the server handles the envelope sender when downloading messages from external POP3 or IMAP accounts. The server adopts the address in the message From header as the envelope sender without validation, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to deliver forged mail that passes Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) checks at downstream receivers. This weakness is tracked under [CWE-348] Use of Less Trusted Source.

Critical Impact

Attackers can forge email in the name of any domain hosted by the server and have it delivered with aligned SPF and DMARC, with no non-default settings, host name record, or DMARC policy required.

Affected Products

  • Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6
  • hMailServer configurations using external POP3 or IMAP account download
  • hMailServer forwarding and redirect rules combined with Sender Rewriting Scheme (SRS) on hosted domains

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114474 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
  • Patch released - hMailServer v6.3.7 published via GitLab

Technical Details for CVE-2026-114474

Vulnerability Analysis

hMailServer collects mail from external mailboxes via POP3 or IMAP on behalf of local accounts. A message retrieved this way has no SMTP envelope of its own, because POP3 and IMAP do not carry the original SMTP transaction metadata. hMailServer resolves the missing envelope sender by copying the address found in the message From header. That address is attacker-controlled and untrusted.

When a local account forwards or redirects the downloaded message to an external recipient, hMailServer re-emits the mail with the attacker-supplied address as the envelope sender. The Sender Rewriting Scheme implementation leaves the envelope sender untouched when the domain is locally hosted. The receiver then performs an SPF check against the forged domain, which passes because the forwarding is treated as legitimate. DMARC alignment holds under strict mode because the From header domain and the envelope sender domain match.

Root Cause

The root cause is trust placed in a less trusted source, consistent with [CWE-348]. The server treats the message From header as authoritative for envelope sender derivation. No corroborating signal, such as the authenticated downloading account or a rewritten return path, is used.

Attack Vector

The attacker must know an external mailbox that an hMailServer account collects from and forwards to an outside address. The attacker sends a message to that external mailbox with a From header bearing a domain hosted by the target hMailServer. When hMailServer downloads and forwards the message, downstream receivers validate SPF against the forged domain and the forged mail passes. Where SmtpAuthenticatedSenderCheck restricts signed-in senders to their own addresses, an account holder who adds their own external account can still bypass that restriction by collecting from a server they control.

No verified exploit code is public. See the GitLab hMailServer Work Item #91 for the maintainer's technical write-up.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114474

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound mail where the envelope sender domain is hosted locally but the message originated from an external POP3 or IMAP download rather than authenticated SMTP submission.
  • Downstream bounce or Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) reports citing SPF-aligned mail that recipients classified as spoofed or phishing.
  • Forwarding chain log entries showing a downloaded external message immediately re-queued toward an outside recipient.

Detection Strategies

  • Correlate hMailServer download logs with outbound SMTP logs to flag envelope senders drawn from external-account From headers.
  • Monitor DMARC aggregate reports for your hosted domains and alert on passing records whose source IP maps to the hMailServer host without a corresponding user authentication event.
  • Baseline normal forwarding behavior per account and alert on rules that redirect downloaded external mail to third-party domains.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose SMTP and retrieval logging on hMailServer and ship logs to a centralized analytics platform for correlation.
  • Subscribe to DMARC aggregate and failure reporting for every hosted domain and review for unexpected pass results.
  • Track creation of new external POP3 or IMAP accounts and new forward or redirect rules through configuration change audits.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114474

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade hMailServer to version 6.3.7 or later, which contains the maintainer's fix published on GitLab.
  • Audit all accounts configured with external POP3 or IMAP retrieval and remove retrieval rules that are not business-justified.
  • Review forwarding and redirect rules on accounts that collect from external mailboxes and disable automatic forwarding to external domains where feasible.
  • Rotate credentials and review DMARC aggregate reports for any evidence of spoofed mail that cleared SPF and DMARC during the exposure window.

Patch Information

The maintainer released hMailServer v6.3.7 addressing the envelope sender derivation flaw. Technical context is documented in GitLab hMailServer Work Item #91. Administrators running any release in the 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 range should treat the upgrade as the primary remediation.

Workarounds

  • Disable external POP3 and IMAP account collection on hMailServer until the upgrade is applied.
  • Where retrieval is required, disable forwarding and redirect rules on the collecting accounts so that downloaded mail is not re-emitted outbound.
  • Enforce a restrictive DMARC policy at hosted domains and monitor aggregate reports so that any residual forgery attempts are surfaced quickly.
bash
# Configuration example: identify hMailServer accounts with external fetch plus forwarding
# Review via the hMailServer administrative console or COM API, for example:
#   For each Domain in Application.Domains
#     For each Account in Domain.Accounts
#       If Account.FetchAccounts.Count > 0 And Account.ForwardEnabled Then
#         Report Account.Address, Account.ForwardAddress
#       End If
#     Next
#   Next

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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