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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-114473

CVE-2026-114473: hMailServer SRS Authentication Bypass

CVE-2026-114473 is an authentication bypass flaw in hMailServer SRS that allows attackers to relay mail through the server without authentication. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-114473 Overview

CVE-2026-114473 is an incorrect authorization vulnerability [CWE-863] in the Sender Rewriting Scheme (SRS) implementation of Progressive Robot hMailServer versions 6.2.1 through 6.3.6. When SRS is enabled, the mail server treats any message addressed to a valid SRS address as local delivery, bypassing relay rules and the SMTP authentication they enforce. A remote attacker holding a valid SRS address can abuse this behavior to relay mail through the server to arbitrary external recipients for up to 21 days. SRS is disabled by default, which limits exposure to administrators who have explicitly enabled forwarding features.

Critical Impact

Attackers with a valid SRS address can turn hMailServer into an open relay, enabling spam distribution and reputation damage to the hosting domain.

Affected Products

  • Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.2.1 through 6.3.6
  • Deployments with Sender Rewriting Scheme (SRS) explicitly enabled
  • Accounts configured to forward mail to external mailboxes

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114473 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-114473

Vulnerability Analysis

The Sender Rewriting Scheme is designed to preserve Sender Policy Framework (SPF) alignment when a mail server forwards messages. hMailServer rewrites the envelope sender into a cryptographically signed SRS address so that bounce messages can be returned to the original sender through the forwarding domain. The flaw is in how inbound messages addressed to SRS addresses are classified.

The server categorized every message delivered to a valid SRS address as a local delivery operation. Local deliveries do not trigger relay rules, so the SMTP authentication requirements that normally gate outbound mail were not applied. The server then decoded the SRS address and delivered the message to the external mailbox the address encoded, functioning as an open relay for anyone in possession of a valid SRS token.

Root Cause

The root cause is an authorization logic error [CWE-863]. The SRS handler conflated "address format is valid and signature verifies" with "message is destined for a local user," skipping the policy checks that distinguish local delivery from relayed outbound mail. A valid SRS address encodes a routing instruction to an external address, so this classification error directly produced the relay condition.

Attack Vector

An attacker needs a valid SRS address issued by the target server. Two realistic sources exist. First, any recipient of a forwarded message receives one in the envelope sender, giving external parties persistent abuse material. Second, an account holder on the server whose account forwards to an outside mailbox can mint SRS addresses for arbitrary destinations. SRS addresses remain valid for 21 days, giving an attacker a durable window to submit messages that the server will deliver to the encoded external recipient without authentication.

No verified public exploit code is available. See the GitLab hMailServer Work Item #94 for the technical discussion of the fix.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114473

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound SMTP traffic from the hMailServer host to external domains without a corresponding authenticated submission in the logs.
  • High volumes of mail accepted for SRS-formatted recipient addresses (envelope recipients beginning with SRS0= or SRS1=).
  • Unexpected spikes in mail queue size, bounce traffic, or spam complaints targeting the server's sending reputation.

Detection Strategies

  • Correlate SMTP MAIL FROM and RCPT TO logs to flag messages where the recipient is an SRS address but the connection is unauthenticated and the final destination is external.
  • Monitor for the same SRS address being used as a recipient repeatedly over short intervals, which indicates reuse by a relaying party.
  • Track reputation feeds and real-time blackhole lists (RBLs) for listings of the server's sending IP that correlate with the 21-day SRS validity window.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose SMTP session logging and ship logs to a centralized SIEM for query against the recipient address pattern.
  • Alert when the ratio of unauthenticated inbound SMTP sessions resulting in outbound delivery exceeds a defined baseline.
  • Review forwarding configurations on all accounts and alert on new forwarding rules pointing to external domains.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114473

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade hMailServer to version 6.3.7 or later, which contains the authorization fix.
  • If upgrading is not immediately possible, disable SRS in the server configuration until the patched build is deployed.
  • Audit mail logs for the previous 21 days to identify SRS addresses that may have been abused and rotate or invalidate active SRS secrets after patching.

Patch Information

The fix is included in hMailServer 6.3.7. Release notes and the resolved work item are published on GitLab: GitLab hMailServer Release v6.3.7 and GitLab hMailServer Work Item #94.

Workarounds

  • Disable the Sender Rewriting Scheme feature until the server can be upgraded; SRS is off by default and only affects installations that enabled it.
  • Remove account-level forwarding rules that target external mailboxes to prevent new SRS addresses from being minted for arbitrary destinations.
  • Enforce outbound rate limits and recipient caps at the perimeter to constrain abuse during the patching window.
bash
# Configuration example: disable SRS via the hMailServer COM administration interface
# Run from an elevated PowerShell session on the mail server host
$app = New-Object -ComObject hMailServer.Application
$app.Authenticate("Administrator", "<admin-password>")
$app.Settings.SRSEnabled = $false
$app.Settings.Save()

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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