Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105944 Overview
Apache Pulsar Manager contains multiple authentication flaws that allow unauthenticated network attackers to take full control of the web console and the Pulsar clusters it administers. The initial superuser creation endpoint remains accessible after setup, and proxied requests to the Pulsar admin API bypass Pulsar Manager's authentication entirely. Attackers can also redirect proxied requests to arbitrary hosts, exfiltrating the configured Pulsar admin credential. Apache Pulsar Manager has been retired by the Apache Pulsar PMC and will not receive any security fixes.
Critical Impact
Any user who can reach Pulsar Manager over the network can create an administrator account, invoke Pulsar admin API operations, and steal the configured Pulsar cluster credential or token signing key.
Affected Products
- Apache Pulsar Manager versions 0.3.0 and later (unauthenticated admin account creation, no privilege separation)
- Apache Pulsar Manager version 0.2.0 (partial permission checks on proxied Pulsar admin API requests)
- All versions of Apache Pulsar Manager when configured with a Pulsar HTTP credential or token signing key
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-105944 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105944
Vulnerability Analysis
Apache Pulsar Manager is a web console that proxies administrative requests to a Pulsar cluster using a pre-configured HTTP credential or token. The product combines four distinct authentication weaknesses that compound into complete compromise of the console and the backend cluster.
First, the endpoint used to create the initial superuser account never deactivates after installation. An unauthenticated requester can create new administrator accounts at any time and log in. Second, requests that Pulsar Manager proxies to the Pulsar admin API are not gated by Pulsar Manager's own authentication layer. Version 0.2.0 enforces partial permission checks, but coverage is incomplete. Third, the proxied request destination is attacker-controlled, and Pulsar Manager attaches the configured credential before forwarding. This allows an unauthenticated caller to exfiltrate the credential to a host they operate. Fourth, in versions 0.3.0 and later, all accounts share full administrative privileges, so any account created through the first flaw inherits complete control.
Root Cause
The underlying defect is classified as Missing Authentication for Critical Function [CWE-306]. Sensitive operations, including initial account provisioning and admin API proxying, lack access control enforcement. The proxy design also fails to validate or restrict destination hosts before attaching the configured credential.
Attack Vector
The vulnerability is reachable over the network with no privileges and no user interaction. An attacker who can route traffic to the Pulsar Manager web interface can issue a request to create a superuser, authenticate as that account, and administer Pulsar Manager. The attacker can also issue proxied requests directed at the configured Pulsar cluster, or redirect the proxy to an attacker-controlled host to capture the Pulsar admin credential. When a token signing key is configured, an administrator of Pulsar Manager can mint arbitrary tokens for the cluster.
No verified exploitation code is published. Technical specifics are described in the Pulsar Security Advisory CVE-2026-105944 and the OpenWall OSS Security Discussion.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-105944
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected administrator accounts appearing in Pulsar Manager's user store, particularly accounts created without a corresponding administrator action.
- Requests to Pulsar Manager endpoints that initialize the superuser account after the deployment was previously provisioned.
- Proxied Pulsar admin API requests originating from Pulsar Manager with destination hosts that do not match the configured Pulsar cluster.
- Outbound HTTP connections from the Pulsar Manager host to unknown external addresses carrying the configured Pulsar admin token or credential.
Detection Strategies
- Audit Pulsar Manager application logs for unauthenticated calls to account creation and admin proxy endpoints.
- Correlate Pulsar broker audit logs with Pulsar Manager request logs to flag admin operations that lack a matching authenticated Pulsar Manager session.
- Alert on any Pulsar admin API call that uses the Pulsar Manager service credential but originates from a request chain without a valid user context.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor network egress from the Pulsar Manager host and alert on connections to destinations outside the Pulsar cluster allowlist.
- Track changes to Pulsar Manager's user database and generate alerts for new accounts or privilege assignments.
- Review Pulsar cluster activity for high-impact admin operations such as tenant, namespace, and token management events.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105944
Immediate Actions Required
- Stop using Apache Pulsar Manager and remove existing deployments, as recommended by the Apache Pulsar PMC.
- Rotate any Pulsar admin HTTP credential or token that was configured in Pulsar Manager, since it may have been exfiltrated.
- Replace any token signing key that was configured in Pulsar Manager to invalidate tokens that an attacker could have minted.
- Review Pulsar cluster audit logs for unauthorized tenant, namespace, topic, or token operations performed through the Pulsar Manager credential.
Patch Information
No patch is available. Apache Pulsar Manager is retired and completely unsupported. The Apache Pulsar PMC has stated that no further releases, fixes, or security updates will be published for any version. Users should migrate to a supported alternative described in the Pulsar Administration UI Guide. Additional detail is available in the Apache Mailing List Thread announcing retirement.
Workarounds
- Restrict network access to Pulsar Manager to a small set of trusted administrators until the deployment is removed.
- Do not expose Pulsar Manager to untrusted or internet-reachable networks under any circumstances.
- Place Pulsar Manager behind an authenticating reverse proxy or VPN that enforces strong identity controls on every request.
- Remove the configured Pulsar admin credential and token signing key from Pulsar Manager until it can be fully decommissioned.
# Example: block external access to Pulsar Manager and allow only a jump host
# Adjust interface, admin CIDR, and Pulsar Manager port (default 9527) to your environment
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 9527 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 9527 -j DROP
# Stop and remove a containerized Pulsar Manager deployment
docker stop pulsar-manager
docker rm pulsar-manager
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

