Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105935 Overview
Apache Pulsar contains a missing authorization flaw [CWE-862] in the Functions Worker REST API. The trigger endpoint publishes a caller-supplied value to a function's configured input topic using the Functions Worker's own broker-client credentials. When authorization is enabled, the endpoint verifies only that the caller may manage functions in the function's namespace. It does not verify that the caller may produce to the target input topic. An authenticated user with the functions permission in one namespace can publish attacker-controlled messages to topics in other tenants or namespaces, including topics they are not permitted to produce to.
Critical Impact
Authenticated users with function-management rights can forge messages into topics across tenants, undermining data integrity for downstream consumers.
Affected Products
- Apache Pulsar 2.0.0-rc1-incubating through versions before 4.0.14
- Apache Pulsar 4.1.0 through versions before 4.2.5
- Apache Pulsar Functions Worker component (REST API trigger endpoint)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE CVE-2026-105935 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105935
Vulnerability Analysis
The Pulsar Functions Worker exposes a REST endpoint that triggers a registered function by publishing a caller-supplied payload to one of the function's configured input topics. The Functions Worker performs this publish using its configured broker-client identity, not the identity of the API caller. The authorization check on the endpoint confirms only that the caller holds the functions permission on the function's namespace.
Function input topics are not constrained to the function's own tenant or namespace. Registering a function does not require the registrant to hold produce permission on its input topics. These two design choices combine with the missing produce check to let a limited user route messages through the Functions Worker's trusted identity. The function instance does not need to be running and no function code needs to execute for the publish to occur.
Impact is limited to data integrity on the targeted topic. Consumers may receive messages that originate from an unauthorized publisher but appear to come from the Functions Worker. The flaw does not alter the trust model for function code itself, which Pulsar operators are expected to treat as fully trusted.
Root Cause
The trigger endpoint implements an incomplete authorization model. Pulsar 2.4.0 and later check namespace-level function permissions but omit a produce-permission check on the destination input topic. Versions prior to 2.4.0 perform no caller authorization on the trigger endpoint at all. The server-side publish executes under the Functions Worker's broker-client credentials, which are typically a superuser in production deployments.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the Functions Worker REST API and authenticated credentials with the functions permission on any namespace. The attacker registers or identifies a function whose input topic list includes the target topic in another tenant. Calling the trigger endpoint causes the Functions Worker to publish the attacker-supplied payload to that topic under its own identity. The Functions Worker's broker-client identity must be authorized to produce to the target topic and, on Pulsar 2.3.0 and later, to list its subscriptions. Both conditions hold when the Worker runs as a superuser.
See the Apache Pulsar security advisory for the full technical description.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-105935
Indicators of Compromise
- Produce operations on topics performed by the Functions Worker's broker-client principal that do not correspond to a known running function instance.
- REST API calls to the Functions Worker trigger endpoint (/admin/v3/functions/{tenant}/{namespace}/{functionName}/trigger) referencing input topics outside the function's tenant or namespace.
- Function registrations whose inputs list includes topics in tenants the registering role does not own.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate Functions Worker access logs with broker produce audit logs to identify triggered publishes that cross tenant boundaries.
- Alert when a role with only the functions permission invokes the trigger endpoint against a function configured with cross-tenant input topics.
- Baseline the set of topics the Functions Worker publishes to during normal operation and flag deviations.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable Pulsar authentication and authorization audit logging and forward events to a central analytics platform.
- Track function create and update operations to detect additions of input topics outside the caller's authorized namespaces.
- Review broker-client identities used by the Functions Worker and monitor their produce activity for unexpected destinations.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105935
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Apache Pulsar 4.0.x deployments to 4.0.14 or later.
- Upgrade Apache Pulsar 4.1.x and 4.2.x deployments to 4.2.5 or later.
- Audit roles granted the functions permission and remove it from any role that does not require function management.
- Review the Functions Worker's broker-client identity and reduce its privileges where feasible.
Patch Information
Fixed versions enforce an additional authorization check: when authorization is enabled, the trigger endpoint now requires the caller to hold produce permission on the selected input topic before any message is published. Users on unsupported release lines should move to a currently supported line (4.0.x or 5.0.x) per the Apache Pulsar release policy. Additional details are available in the Apache mailing list discussion.
Workarounds
- On Pulsar 2.4.0 and later with authorization enabled, restrict the functions namespace permission to trusted roles only.
- On versions prior to 2.4.0, restrict network access to the Functions Worker REST API to trusted callers because the trigger endpoint performs no caller authorization check.
- Where possible, run the Functions Worker with a dedicated broker-client identity scoped only to topics that legitimate functions require, rather than a superuser identity.
# Example: limit the functions permission to a trusted admin role on a namespace
pulsar-admin namespaces grant-permission public/default \
--role trusted-functions-admin \
--actions functions
# Remove the functions permission from a role that should not manage functions
pulsar-admin namespaces revoke-permission public/default \
--role limited-user
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

