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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-105942

CVE-2026-105942: Apache Pulsar Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-105942 is an authentication bypass flaw in Apache Pulsar that allows proxied users to exceed permissions through flawed authorization checks. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-105942 Overview

Apache Pulsar contains an authorization flaw [CWE-863] in how the broker validates proxied requests. When a proxy role forwards a request on behalf of an original principal, the broker is designed to authorize both identities independently. Two defects weakened this check, allowing the original principal to inherit permissions tied to the proxy's authentication data.

The issue affects Apache Pulsar versions from 2.8.1 before 4.0.14 and from 4.1.0 before 4.2.5. Deployments using the MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider or configurations where a proxy role is listed as a tenant admin are most exposed.

Critical Impact

Users whose requests transit a vulnerable proxy can perform superuser or tenant administration operations without holding those permissions directly.

Affected Products

  • Apache Pulsar 2.8.1 through versions before 4.0.14
  • Apache Pulsar 4.1.0 through versions before 4.2.5
  • Deployments using MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider or proxy roles designated as tenant admins

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE CVE-2026-105942 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-105942

Vulnerability Analysis

Apache Pulsar's broker enforces a dual-authorization model for proxied requests. The proxy role and the original principal must each be authorized for the operation, preventing a client from exceeding its own permissions through a trusted proxy. Two independent defects undermined this control.

The first defect caused the broker to authorize the original principal using the proxy's authentication data rather than the principal's own credentials. On the admin REST API and functions worker, this behavior applied to every proxied request. On the Pulsar binary protocol, it applied when the proxy did not forward client credentials, which was the default configuration.

The second defect caused the tenant admin check on proxied admin REST API requests to succeed without evaluating the original principal when the proxy role itself held tenant admin status.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper authorization context separation between the proxy identity and the forwarded principal. With MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider, role claims are resolved from the token embedded in the authentication data. When the proxy authenticated to the broker with its own token containing superuser or tenant admin roles, those roles were applied to the original principal.

The tenant admin check logic additionally short-circuited when the proxy role matched a tenant admin, skipping evaluation of the forwarded user entirely.

Attack Vector

An authenticated low-privilege user sends requests through a Pulsar proxy whose role carries elevated permissions. The broker authorizes the original principal against the proxy's token claims or admin status instead of the user's own permissions. The attacker can then execute administrative operations against tenants or cluster-wide resources without holding those grants. The attack requires network access and valid authentication to the proxy. See the Apache Pulsar CVE-2026-105942 advisory for additional context.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105942

Indicators of Compromise

  • Admin REST API calls executing tenant administration operations from user principals that do not hold tenant admin roles in the authorization configuration
  • Successful privileged operations originating through a proxy where the forwarded principal lacks the required role
  • Unexpected namespace, topic, or tenant modifications correlated with proxy forwarding activity

Detection Strategies

  • Review broker audit logs for proxied admin API requests and compare the original principal's role grants against the operation performed
  • Inventory all proxy roles and identify any that are superusers or listed under adminRoles for a tenant
  • Correlate authentication tokens used by proxies with the roles asserted by MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose authorization logging on brokers and functions workers to capture both the proxy role and original principal for each decision
  • Alert on tenant admin operations performed by principals outside the configured admin role list
  • Monitor Pulsar binary protocol connections where the proxy does not forward client credentials

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105942

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Apache Pulsar 4.0.x deployments to at least 4.0.14
  • Upgrade Apache Pulsar 4.1.x and 4.2.x deployments to at least 4.2.5
  • Audit tenant adminRoles configurations and remove any proxy roles that appear in them
  • Review tokens used by proxies and remove unneeded superuser or admin role claims

Patch Information

Apache released fixed versions 4.0.14 and 4.2.5. In the patched builds, both the proxy role and the original principal are authorized for each request, and the original principal is evaluated only with its own authentication data. For MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider, forwarded token roles apply to the original principal only when that token authenticates as the original principal. Tenant admin checks now require both the proxy role and the original principal to be a superuser or tenant admin. See the Apache Pulsar security advisory and the Apache mailing list thread for release details.

Workarounds

  • Configure Pulsar proxies to forward client credentials to the broker on the binary protocol, avoiding the default behavior that triggered the first flaw
  • Switch away from MultiRolesTokenAuthorizationProvider to an authorization provider that resolves permissions from the role name alone, if operationally feasible
  • Ensure no proxy role is listed as a tenant admin in any tenant's adminRoles configuration
bash
# Verify Pulsar broker version and inspect tenant admin roles
./bin/pulsar version
./bin/pulsar-admin tenants get <tenant-name>

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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