Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105040 Overview
CVE-2026-105040 is a mass assignment vulnerability in the EnergizeLab Eilik NestJS authentication service. The service accepts a user-controlled user identifier in account update requests. A registered user can submit another account's identifier and take over that account. The flaw is tracked under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The vulnerability affects the backend auth service that supports the Eilik desktop robot companion product line.
Critical Impact
Any authenticated Eilik user can hijack arbitrary accounts by injecting a target user ID into an update request, resulting in full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the targeted account.
Affected Products
- EnergizeLab Eilik NestJS authentication service
- EnergizeLab Eilik backend account management endpoints
- Eilik companion robot cloud account ecosystem
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-105040 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105040
Vulnerability Analysis
The Eilik NestJS auth service exposes an account update endpoint that trusts a user identifier supplied in the request body. The server-side handler binds the submitted identifier directly to the account record it modifies rather than deriving the identifier from the authenticated session or JSON Web Token (JWT) claims. An authenticated attacker can therefore write to any account by swapping the identifier value.
This is a classic mass assignment pattern in NestJS data transfer objects (DTOs) that forward unfiltered input into an Object-Relational Mapper (ORM) update call. Because the authorization check only validates that the caller is logged in, not that the caller owns the target record, horizontal privilege escalation across the entire user base is possible.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper authorization keyed on user-controlled input [CWE-639]. The handler fails to enforce that the account identifier in the payload matches the identifier bound to the session principal. A whitelist DTO, an identifier derived from the JWT, or a server-side ownership check would prevent the override.
Attack Vector
The attack requires network access to the auth service and valid credentials for any registered Eilik account. The attacker authenticates normally, obtains a session or token, then issues an account update request containing the victim's user identifier. The service persists the attacker-supplied values against the victim record, which enables credential reset, email change, or privilege reassignment. The proof-of-concept is published in the GitHub PoC Repository. Additional context is available in the TAKEONME GCVE Analysis and The Verge coverage of the Eiliko robot hack.
No verified exploitation code is reproduced here. Refer to the linked PoC repository for the exact request structure.
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-105040
Indicators of Compromise
- Account update requests where the userId or equivalent identifier field in the request body does not match the identifier bound to the authenticated session or JWT subject claim.
- Unexpected changes to email address, password hash, or role fields on user records with no corresponding password-reset workflow events.
- Login activity on an account from a source IP address or device fingerprint immediately after a mismatched-identifier update request.
Detection Strategies
- Instrument the NestJS auth service to log the authenticated subject claim alongside the target identifier for every account mutation, and alert on any divergence.
- Deploy a web application firewall (WAF) rule that parses JSON bodies on /account or equivalent update routes and flags payloads containing identifier fields.
- Correlate account-field changes with the originating session to surface horizontal privilege escalation attempts in the Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) pipeline.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor backend application logs for sequential account update requests from a single session targeting multiple distinct user identifiers.
- Track email-change and password-change events per account and alert on volumes above a baseline threshold.
- Review authentication logs for successful logins that follow administrative-style field mutations on the same account within a short window.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105040
Immediate Actions Required
- Remove any user identifier field from account update DTOs and derive the target identifier server-side from the authenticated session or JWT subject claim.
- Add an ownership check in the account update handler that rejects requests where the resolved subject does not match the record being modified.
- Invalidate active sessions and force password resets for accounts that show evidence of unauthorized field changes.
Patch Information
No vendor advisory or patched version is listed in the NVD entry for CVE-2026-105040 at the time of publication. Operators of the Eilik backend should contact EnergizeLab for remediation guidance and apply the architectural fixes described above pending an official release. Monitor the NVD entry for CVE-2026-105040 for updates.
Workarounds
- Place the auth service behind a reverse proxy that strips userId, id, and similar identifier keys from request bodies on account update routes.
- Restrict access to the auth service to known client application origins and enforce short-lived tokens to reduce the window for exploitation.
- Temporarily disable self-service account update endpoints and route changes through an administrative workflow until a patched build is deployed.
# Example NestJS DTO hardening - whitelist allowed fields only
# main.ts
app.useGlobalPipes(new ValidationPipe({
whitelist: true,
forbidNonWhitelisted: true,
transform: true,
}));
# account.controller.ts - derive identifier from JWT, not body
@UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard)
@Patch('account')
update(@Req() req, @Body() dto: UpdateAccountDto) {
return this.accountService.update(req.user.sub, dto);
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

