Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105034 Overview
CVE-2026-105034 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the EnergizeLab Eilik NestJS auth service. The service issues valid device tokens for arbitrary robot serial numbers without requiring authentication. An unauthenticated remote attacker can request a token for any serial number and impersonate that device against the Eilik cloud services. The flaw is tracked under CWE-287: Improper Authentication.
Critical Impact
Any remote attacker who knows or guesses a robot serial number can obtain a device token and act as that robot against cloud backend services, enabling impersonation and integrity attacks against the device fleet.
Affected Products
- EnergizeLab Eilik robot companion device
- Eilik NestJS cloud authentication service
- EnergizeLab cloud backend services consuming device tokens
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-105034 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105034
Vulnerability Analysis
The Eilik cloud platform exposes a NestJS-based authentication service that mints device tokens on request. The endpoint responsible for issuing tokens accepts a robot serial number as input but does not verify that the requester possesses any device-bound secret, certificate, or prior enrollment credential. As a result, the service treats the serial number itself as both the identifier and the proof of identity.
An attacker who submits an arbitrary serial number receives a cryptographically valid token scoped to that device. The token is then accepted by downstream cloud services as evidence that the caller is the referenced robot. This collapses the device identity model to a lookup over a predictable identifier namespace.
The issue is categorized as CWE-287: Improper Authentication. The attack is network-reachable, requires no prior privileges, and no user interaction. Public proof-of-concept material is available in the GitHub PoC repository and additional context is published in the TakeOnMe GCVE analysis.
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing authentication check on the token issuance path. The NestJS auth service treats possession of a serial number as sufficient to receive a device credential. There is no device attestation, no shared secret challenge, and no binding between the token request and a previously enrolled device.
Attack Vector
The attack is remote and unauthenticated. An attacker sends an HTTP request to the auth service with a target serial number, receives a device token, and replays that token against the cloud API as the impersonated robot. Serial numbers may be enumerable or recoverable through packaging, device labels, mobile app traffic, or sequential guessing. Additional background is available in The Verge coverage of the Eiliko robot research.
The vulnerability does not require any exploit code beyond a standard HTTP client, which lowers the barrier to abuse at scale.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-105034
Indicators of Compromise
- Device token issuance requests to the Eilik auth service originating from IP addresses that are not associated with legitimate device networks or mobile client ranges.
- Multiple token requests for distinct serial numbers from the same source IP in a short time window, indicating enumeration.
- Concurrent sessions for a single serial number from geographically or network-distant endpoints.
- API calls to backend services using a device token from a source that has never previously connected as that device.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate token issuance events with subsequent device activity and flag tokens that are used from a different network path than the issuing request.
- Baseline normal issuance rates per source IP and alert on volumetric deviations consistent with serial number sweeping.
- Inspect NestJS auth service logs for requests that lack any secondary device identifier, client certificate, or mobile-app session context.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Centralize auth service, API gateway, and backend application logs in a security data lake for cross-service correlation.
- Alert on first-time token use for a serial number from a new ASN or user agent.
- Monitor for sequential or dictionary-style serial number request patterns across the token endpoint.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105034
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict the token issuance endpoint to require a device-bound secret, pre-shared key, or client certificate before returning a token.
- Rate limit the token endpoint per source IP and per serial number to blunt enumeration and mass impersonation.
- Rotate or invalidate existing device tokens and force re-enrollment with a stronger device attestation flow.
- Audit backend logs for anomalous device actions since the service was deployed and quarantine suspicious device identities.
Patch Information
No vendor patch identifier is listed in the NVD record at publication. Operators should track the EnergizeLab Eilik vendor advisories and the TakeOnMe GCVE analysis for remediation guidance and apply fixes as they become available.
Workarounds
- Terminate the vulnerable auth endpoint at an API gateway and require mutual TLS from devices until the backend enforces authentication.
- Place the token issuance service behind an allowlist of known device network ranges where feasible.
- Introduce server-side binding between serial numbers and a factory-provisioned secret, rejecting token requests that do not present the secret.
# Example NGINX gateway rule to enforce client certificate on the token endpoint
location /auth/device/token {
ssl_verify_client on;
ssl_client_certificate /etc/nginx/certs/device-ca.pem;
limit_req zone=token_zone burst=5 nodelay;
proxy_pass http://nestjs_auth_upstream;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

