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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-105033

CVE-2026-105033: EnergizeLab AI Station Auth Bypass Flaw

CVE-2026-105033 is an authentication bypass flaw in EnergizeLab AI Station RK3562 firmware that ships with default root credentials and enabled SSH, allowing attackers to gain full control. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-105033 Overview

The EnergizeLab AI Station built on the Rockchip RK3562 platform ships with hardcoded default root credentials and SSH enabled by default. An attacker with adjacent network access can authenticate as root over SSH and seize full control of the device. The weakness is tracked under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials and affects the shipped firmware image rather than a configurable deployment option. Because the credentials are embedded in the distributed firmware, every unit of the affected product line shares the same login, enabling trivial lateral movement across fleets of devices.

Critical Impact

An adjacent-network attacker can authenticate as root over SSH using default credentials shipped in the firmware image, obtaining complete control of the AI Station.

Affected Products

  • EnergizeLab AI Station (Rockchip RK3562 platform)
  • Shipped firmware image for the AI Station device
  • Associated SSH service enabled by default on the device

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-105033 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-105033

Vulnerability Analysis

The AI Station firmware image contains a hardcoded root account with a known password, and the embedded Linux distribution enables the OpenSSH daemon on first boot. Any party able to reach the device over its network segment can complete a standard SSH authentication exchange and receive a root shell. From there, the attacker inherits full read, write, and execute privileges over the operating system, model files, camera inputs, and any attached peripherals. The device can be repurposed as a pivot into adjacent networks, enlisted into a botnet, or used to tamper with AI inference outputs. Published reporting from The Verge documents real-world abuse of the credentials against companion robot hardware, and the recovered secrets have been catalogued in a public GitHub repository.

Root Cause

The root cause is a classic [CWE-798] violation. The vendor provisioned the firmware image with a static root password and did not force a credential rotation on first boot or during device enrollment. Because the password is identical across every shipped unit, extracting it from one device compromises all others.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires only adjacent network reachability to TCP port 22 on the device. The attacker runs an ssh root@<device-ip> command and supplies the known default password. No user interaction, phishing, or memory corruption primitive is needed. Successful authentication yields an interactive shell under UID 0.

No synthetic exploit code is included because the attack reduces to standard SSH authentication with publicly disclosed credentials. See the TakeOnMe GCVE Analysis for additional technical context.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105033

Indicators of Compromise

  • Successful SSH logins to the AI Station as root from any source other than a documented administrator workstation.
  • Unexpected outbound connections initiated by the device to internet hosts or internal segments it does not normally contact.
  • New SSH authorized keys, cron jobs, or systemd units added to the device filesystem after deployment.
  • Modification of inference model files, startup scripts, or /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow entries on the device.

Detection Strategies

  • Capture authentication events from the device auth.log or journalctl output and forward them to a central logging platform for correlation.
  • Baseline the device network behavior and alert on deviations such as outbound SSH, IRC, or non-standard HTTPS traffic.
  • Scan the local network for RK3562 devices still exposing TCP/22 and attempt the publicly known default credential as a controlled audit.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Place AI Station devices on an isolated VLAN and monitor the gateway for any traffic that leaves the segment.
  • Alert on first-seen SSH client IP addresses connecting to the device management interface.
  • Record and review process execution and file integrity on the device to catch persistence attempts.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105033

Immediate Actions Required

  • Change the default root password on every deployed AI Station and verify the change persists across reboots.
  • Disable password-based SSH authentication and require key-based login where operationally feasible.
  • Restrict network access to TCP/22 on the device using host or network ACLs so only authorized management hosts can connect.
  • Audit existing devices for unauthorized SSH keys, cron entries, and modified system binaries before trusting them in production.

Patch Information

No vendor patch or fixed firmware version is referenced in the NVD entry at the time of publication. Operators should contact EnergizeLab directly for firmware updates and track the referenced advisories, including the TakeOnMe GCVE Analysis, for remediation guidance.

Workarounds

  • Segment AI Station devices on a dedicated management VLAN with no direct internet egress.
  • Block inbound SSH at the network perimeter and permit it only from a jump host.
  • If SSH is not required for operations, disable the sshd service and remove it from the default runlevel.
  • Rotate the root credential and enforce unique per-device passwords stored in a vaulted secrets manager.
bash
# Example hardening steps once logged in to the device
passwd root
sed -i 's/^#\?PasswordAuthentication.*/PasswordAuthentication no/' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
sed -i 's/^#\?PermitRootLogin.*/PermitRootLogin prohibit-password/' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
systemctl restart sshd

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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