Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-104660 Overview
CVE-2026-104660 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.5 on Windows. The hMailServer service registers its Component Object Model (COM) classes without Distributed COM (DCOM) access or launch permissions and calls CoInitializeSecurity without a security descriptor. Any local interactive user, including users connected over Remote Desktop, can activate the classes and operate against the running service without providing hMailServer credentials. An attacker can read and write arbitrary files as the service account and queue mail from any sender. On a LocalSystem installation, file writes through Attachment.SaveAs yield code execution as SYSTEM.
Critical Impact
Local users without hMailServer credentials can read and write arbitrary files as the service account, achieving SYSTEM-level code execution on LocalSystem installations.
Affected Products
- Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.3 (Windows)
- Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.4 (Windows)
- Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.5 (Windows)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-08 - CVE-2026-104660 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-08 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-104660
Vulnerability Analysis
The hMailServer Windows service exposes COM classes that perform privileged file and mail operations. The service registers these classes without DCOM access or launch permissions and initializes COM security without a descriptor. Any interactive user on the host can activate hMailServer.Message, its Attachments and Attachment children, and hMailServer.FetchAccount inside the running service. The objects returned carry a credential object that never completed authentication.
The affected methods bypass authorization. Attachments.Add(path) and Attachment.SaveAs(path) perform no authorization check. Message.Save, Message.Copy, FetchAccount.AccountID, and FetchAccount.Save perform none through version 6.3.3. From 6.3.4 onward, these methods treat an unauthenticated holder as the server's own event-script host, which still grants privileged access. Objects obtained from an Application continue to behave the same way after a later Authenticate call on that Application fails.
Root Cause
The service does not impersonate the COM caller. Combined with the missing DCOM permissions and the absence of per-method authorization checks, any local user inherits the service account's privileges when invoking these COM methods. The design treats COM activation as implicit trust rather than requiring an authenticated hMailServer credential.
Attack Vector
An attacker logged in at the console or over Remote Desktop activates the exposed classes and calls the privileged methods directly. Attachments.Add reads any file the service account can read and returns the content, exposing confidential data. Attachment.SaveAs writes attacker-controlled bytes to any writable path, which produces SYSTEM code execution on LocalSystem installations through techniques such as writing to startup locations or service binaries. Message.Save queues outbound mail from arbitrary addresses, bypassing Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) checks. FetchAccount attaches a mail-fetch job to any mailbox.
No verified public exploit code is available. See the GitLab hMailServer Work Item #59 for the maintainer's technical description.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-104660
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected files written to system directories, startup folders, or service binary paths with timestamps correlating to hMailServer service activity.
- Outbound SMTP messages with sender addresses that do not match any configured, authenticated hMailServer account.
- New or modified FetchAccount entries attached to mailboxes that administrators did not provision.
- Interactive logon or Remote Desktop sessions from non-administrative users on hosts running the hMailServer service.
Detection Strategies
- Hunt for COM activation of hMailServer.Message, hMailServer.FetchAccount, and related ProgIDs by processes other than the hMailServer administrative tooling.
- Monitor child processes and file writes performed by the hMailServer service account, particularly to paths outside the mail store.
- Alert on hMailServer service writes to executable paths, scheduled task directories, or user profile Startup folders.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable Windows process creation auditing (Event ID 4688) and file auditing on sensitive directories writable by the hMailServer service account.
- Collect and review DCOM activation events to identify unexpected clients invoking hMailServer classes.
- Track SMTP queue entries and correlate sender identities against the set of authenticated hMailServer accounts.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-104660
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade hMailServer to version 6.3.6 or later, which addresses the missing authorization checks.
- Restrict interactive and Remote Desktop logon rights on hosts running the hMailServer service to trusted administrators only.
- Where feasible, run the hMailServer service under a dedicated low-privilege account rather than LocalSystem to limit the impact of arbitrary file writes.
Patch Information
The fix is included in hMailServer 6.3.6. See the GitLab hMailServer Release 6.3.6 notes and the GitLab hMailServer Work Item #59 issue for details on the authorization enforcement added to the COM surface.
Workarounds
- Remove interactive and Remote Desktop logon rights for non-administrative users on hMailServer hosts until the patch is applied.
- Apply explicit DCOM access and launch permissions on the hMailServer AppID to restrict COM activation to administrator accounts.
- Isolate the mail server on dedicated infrastructure so that only trusted operators can establish local sessions.
# Configuration example
# Restrict interactive logon via Group Policy (conceptual)
# User Rights Assignment -> Allow log on locally: Administrators only
# User Rights Assignment -> Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services: Administrators only
# Then upgrade the service:
# 1. Stop the hMailServer service
# 2. Install hMailServer 6.3.6
# 3. Start the hMailServer service and verify version in the Administrator console
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

