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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-104437

CVE-2026-104437: Zebra Consensus Divergence Vulnerability

CVE-2026-104437 is a consensus divergence flaw in Zebra that allows attackers to craft transactions accepted by Zebra but rejected by zcashd, creating blockchain splits. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-104437 Overview

CVE-2026-104437 is a consensus divergence vulnerability in the Zebra Zcash node implementation before version 4.4.0. The flaw resides in V5 transparent signature verification. Zebra computes a ZIP-244 digest for SIGHASH_SINGLE inputs that lack a corresponding output, rather than failing verification as the Zcash consensus rules require. Attackers can craft V5 transactions with fewer outputs than inputs that Zebra accepts and templates through getblocktemplate. The resulting blocks are rejected by zcashd, producing a consensus split between node implementations.

Critical Impact

An attacker can force a chain split between Zebra and zcashd nodes, undermining network integrity and block propagation across the Zcash network.

Affected Products

  • Zcash Foundation Zebra node, all versions before 4.4.0
  • Mining pools and services relying on Zebra getblocktemplate output
  • Zcash network participants running mixed Zebra and zcashd deployments

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-02 - CVE-2026-104437 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-104437

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability affects Zebra's implementation of ZIP-244 transaction signature hashing for V5 transparent inputs. The Zcash protocol specifies that when a transparent input uses the SIGHASH_SINGLE flag, the signature covers only the output at the same index as the input. If no corresponding output exists at that index, the signature verification must fail.

Zebra deviates from this rule. Instead of failing, it proceeds to compute a ZIP-244 digest for the mismatched input. This allows signatures to validate on transactions that zcashd would reject outright. The weakness is categorized under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature.

An attacker who exploits this behavior can submit malformed V5 transactions that Zebra treats as valid. Zebra then includes those transactions in block templates served via getblocktemplate. Miners using Zebra produce blocks containing the invalid transactions, which zcashd nodes reject. The result is a network partition between node implementations.

Root Cause

The root cause is incomplete enforcement of the ZIP-244 signature hashing rules for SIGHASH_SINGLE inputs. Zebra's verification path does not check whether an output exists at the index matching a SIGHASH_SINGLE input before computing the digest. The missing precondition check breaks consensus compatibility with the reference zcashd implementation.

Attack Vector

The attack is remote and unauthenticated. An attacker crafts a V5 transaction with more transparent inputs than outputs, using SIGHASH_SINGLE on an input index that has no matching output. The attacker broadcasts the transaction to the Zcash peer-to-peer network. Zebra nodes accept it into their mempool, and Zebra-based miners template it into candidate blocks. When those blocks propagate, zcashd nodes reject them, forcing a chain split.

No verified public exploit code is available. Technical details appear in the Zcash Foundation GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp and the VulnCheck advisory on Zebra.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-104437

Indicators of Compromise

  • V5 transactions in the mempool where the number of transparent outputs is less than the number of transparent inputs using SIGHASH_SINGLE.
  • Block templates generated by Zebra that are rejected by peer zcashd nodes with signature or consensus validation errors.
  • Divergent chain tips between co-located Zebra and zcashd instances tracking the same network.

Detection Strategies

  • Compare block acceptance between Zebra and zcashd nodes operating on the same network and alert on persistent disagreement.
  • Inspect V5 transactions for input and output count mismatches combined with SIGHASH_SINGLE sighash types.
  • Monitor mining pool logs for templated blocks that fail to propagate or are orphaned by the broader network.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Track the Zebra node version across all deployments and flag any instance running a release earlier than 4.4.0.
  • Correlate mempool admission events against reference zcashd validation outcomes to surface divergent acceptance.
  • Alert on sudden increases in orphaned blocks or reorganizations originating from Zebra-backed miners.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-104437

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all Zebra nodes to version 4.4.0 or later without delay.
  • Audit mining infrastructure that consumes getblocktemplate output from Zebra and halt block production until the upgrade is complete.
  • Verify consensus alignment with zcashd peers after upgrading by comparing recent block hashes at the chain tip.

Patch Information

The Zcash Foundation fixed the issue in Zebra 4.4.0. The patched release enforces that V5 transparent inputs using SIGHASH_SINGLE fail verification when no corresponding output exists at the input index, aligning behavior with zcashd and the ZIP-244 specification. Release notes and the full advisory are available in the Zcash Foundation GitHub Security Advisory.

Workarounds

  • Operators who cannot immediately upgrade should stop serving block templates from Zebra and switch mining operations to zcashd until patching completes.
  • Restrict Zebra's peer connections to trusted nodes to reduce exposure to crafted V5 transactions on the mempool.
  • Disable getblocktemplate on affected Zebra instances to prevent downstream miners from building on invalid templates.
bash
# Configuration example: verify Zebra version and upgrade
zebrad --version
# If version < 4.4.0, upgrade via your package manager or download from
# https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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