Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-104435 Overview
CVE-2026-104435 is a consensus-divergence vulnerability in the Zcash Foundation's Zebra node implementation. Zebra zebrad 4.4.0 and zebra-script 6.0.0 fail to enforce a ZIP-244 consensus rule. The affected versions accept V5 transparent inputs signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE that lack a corresponding output. An attacker can broadcast crafted V5 transactions containing more inputs than outputs. Zebra accepts these transactions while zcashd rejects them, producing a network consensus split between the two reference implementations. The weakness is classified under [CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature].
Critical Impact
Remote, unauthenticated attackers can trigger a chain split between Zebra and zcashd nodes, undermining Zcash network integrity and transaction finality.
Affected Products
- Zcash Foundation zebrad version 4.4.0
- Zcash Foundation zebra-script version 6.0.0
- Zcash network nodes operating the affected Zebra releases
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-02 - CVE CVE-2026-104435 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-10-02 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-104435
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw lives in Zebra's enforcement of ZIP-244, the Zcash consensus specification governing transaction signature validation for the V5 transaction format. ZIP-244 requires that any transparent input signed with the SIGHASH_SINGLE flag reference an output at the same index position. Zebra zebrad 4.4.0 and zebra-script 6.0.0 skip this check and treat the signature as valid even when no matching output exists.
Because zcashd enforces the rule correctly, the two implementations diverge on the validity of the same transaction. An attacker who mines or relays a crafted V5 transaction forces Zebra nodes down one chain while zcashd nodes follow another. The resulting consensus split degrades Zcash integrity, breaks transaction finality assumptions, and can be weaponized to double-spend across partitioned node populations.
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing validation branch in Zebra's V5 transparent signature verifier. The implementation does not check that an input signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE has an output at the matching index, violating the ZIP-244 specification. The behavior maps to [CWE-347] because the node accepts cryptographic signatures that should be rejected by consensus rules.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is network-based and does not require authentication or user interaction. An attacker constructs a V5 Zcash transaction with more transparent inputs than outputs, signs the extra inputs with SIGHASH_SINGLE, and broadcasts the transaction into the peer-to-peer network. Zebra nodes include the transaction in their mempool and in blocks they produce. zcashd nodes reject the same transaction and any block containing it, producing divergent chain tips.
No verified exploit code is publicly available. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8 and the VulnCheck Advisory on Zebra 4.4.0 for technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-104435
Indicators of Compromise
- V5 Zcash transactions in the mempool or blocks containing more transparent inputs than outputs with inputs signed using SIGHASH_SINGLE.
- Divergent block hashes at the same height between co-located Zebra and zcashd nodes.
- Mempool acceptance of a transaction on Zebra that is simultaneously rejected by a peered zcashd instance.
Detection Strategies
- Run a parallel zcashd reference node and compare best-block hashes against Zebra at each height to flag consensus divergence.
- Parse incoming V5 transactions and alert when transparent input count exceeds output count combined with SIGHASH_SINGLE usage.
- Monitor Zebra release notes and zebrad --version output across the fleet to identify any node running 4.4.0 or zebra-script 6.0.0.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Collect zebrad logs and peer rejection messages into a centralized log platform for correlation with chain-tip drift.
- Track reorg depth, orphan rate, and peer disconnects as leading indicators of a consensus split in progress.
- Instrument alerting on sudden drops in peer count between Zebra and zcashd nodes.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-104435
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory all Zebra nodes and identify any running zebrad 4.4.0 or zebra-script 6.0.0.
- Upgrade affected nodes to a fixed Zebra release as published in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8.
- Pair each production Zebra node with a zcashd reference node and alert on any divergence until patching completes.
Patch Information
The Zcash Foundation published fix guidance in GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8. Operators should move off zebrad 4.4.0 and zebra-script 6.0.0 to the patched versions referenced in that advisory and verify the deployed binary with zebrad --version after upgrade.
Workarounds
- Temporarily shut down affected Zebra nodes and route workloads through a zcashd node that enforces ZIP-244 correctly.
- Restrict peer connections to trusted nodes and drop V5 transactions with mismatched input and output counts at the network boundary where feasible.
- Delay reliance on Zebra block confirmations for high-value transactions until the patch is applied.
# Verify installed Zebra version and upgrade off vulnerable releases
zebrad --version
# If output reports 4.4.0 (or zebra-script 6.0.0), stop the service and upgrade
systemctl stop zebrad
# Install the patched release per the Zcash Foundation advisory, then restart
systemctl start zebrad
zebrad --version
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

