Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2025-54465 Overview
CVE-2025-54465 is a hard-coded credentials vulnerability [CWE-798] affecting the ZKTeco WL20 device. The firmware stores Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) credentials and broker endpoints in plaintext within the binary. An attacker with physical access to the device can extract the firmware image and recover the embedded credentials through static binary analysis. Once recovered, the credentials allow unauthorized access to the MQTT broker used by the device for telemetry and control messaging.
Critical Impact
An attacker who extracts the hard-coded credentials can authenticate to the MQTT broker, read device communications, and inject manipulated messages affecting WL20 operation.
Affected Products
- ZKTeco WL20 smart lock device firmware
- Devices sharing the same MQTT broker configuration as the WL20
- Deployments relying on the embedded MQTT endpoint for device-to-cloud communication
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-08-13 - CVE-2025-54465 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2025-54465
Vulnerability Analysis
The ZKTeco WL20 firmware embeds MQTT broker credentials and endpoint URIs directly into the device binary as plaintext strings. MQTT is a lightweight publish-subscribe messaging protocol commonly used in Internet of Things (IoT) deployments. Because the credentials are static and shared across devices of the same model, recovery from a single device compromises the authentication boundary for the entire fleet.
Exploitation requires physical access to the device. The attacker dumps the firmware through flash chip readout, UART, JTAG, or an over-the-air update capture. Standard binary analysis tools such as binwalk, strings, and disassemblers reveal the embedded credentials and broker hostnames. No cryptographic or runtime protection prevents extraction.
Successful exploitation yields confidentiality and integrity impact against MQTT traffic. The attacker can subscribe to topics used by the WL20 to observe operational data, publish forged messages to manipulate device behavior, and impersonate legitimate devices against the broker.
Root Cause
The root cause is a design flaw cataloged under [CWE-798]: Use of Hard-coded Credentials. The firmware developers embedded fixed authentication material rather than provisioning per-device credentials during manufacturing or first boot. Shared secrets across a product line collapse the attack surface, because recovery from one unit grants access to all units sharing the configuration.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is physical. The attacker obtains a WL20 device, extracts the firmware from onboard flash storage, and performs offline analysis to recover the plaintext MQTT username, password, and broker endpoint. With these values, the attacker connects to the broker from any network location and interacts with topics associated with WL20 devices. No source code or exploitation payload is required because the misuse relies on legitimate protocol behavior with stolen credentials. See the CERT-In Advisory CIVN-2025-0172 for vendor-coordinated details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2025-54465
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected MQTT client connections to the WL20 broker from IP addresses outside known device ranges.
- Duplicate client identifiers connecting concurrently to the broker, indicating credential reuse by an unauthorized party.
- Publish or subscribe activity on WL20 topics originating from untrusted autonomous system numbers or geographies.
- Firmware images with intact plaintext credential strings recoverable through strings on the binary.
Detection Strategies
- Enable MQTT broker authentication logging and alert on repeated authentications from new source IPs using the embedded credential.
- Correlate device telemetry gaps with simultaneous broker sessions sharing the same client identifier.
- Perform periodic firmware audits using binwalk and entropy analysis to confirm whether credentials remain in plaintext after updates.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward MQTT broker access logs to a centralized logging platform for retention and correlation.
- Monitor for anomalous publish rates or topic subscriptions that deviate from the device baseline.
- Track physical access events to deployed WL20 devices, including tamper switch triggers and maintenance activity.
How to Mitigate CVE-2025-54465
Immediate Actions Required
- Review the ZKTeco Security Bulletin and apply firmware updates issued by the vendor for the WL20.
- Rotate MQTT broker credentials and revoke the hard-coded account referenced by vulnerable firmware versions.
- Restrict physical access to deployed WL20 devices through tamper-evident enclosures and secured mounting.
- Segment the MQTT broker network so that only authorized device subnets can reach the broker port.
Patch Information
ZKTeco has published advisory information through the vendor security bulletin portal and CERT-In Advisory CIVN-2025-0172. Operators should confirm the fixed firmware version against the vendor bulletin and verify that updated builds no longer contain plaintext credentials by inspecting the image with strings and binwalk.
Workarounds
- Place the MQTT broker behind a Transport Layer Security (TLS) terminator that enforces client certificate authentication in addition to username and password.
- Apply broker-side Access Control Lists (ACLs) that restrict the hard-coded account to read-only or disabled status until firmware is updated.
- Deploy network-level allowlisting to accept MQTT connections only from known device source addresses.
- Isolate WL20 devices on a dedicated Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) with egress filtering to the broker endpoint only.
# Example Mosquitto ACL entry disabling the compromised account
# /etc/mosquitto/acl.conf
user wl20_default_account
topic deny #
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

