Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-94591 Overview
CVE-2026-94591 affects Armatura One, which stores database and message-broker credentials in an install configuration file. The product encrypts those credentials with AES-128-CBC when protection is enabled, but the key and initialization vector (IV) are hardcoded into the software and identical across every installation. An attacker who possesses the installation package can extract the fixed key and IV, then decrypt the stored credentials of any installation whose encrypted configuration file they obtain. This weakness is tracked under CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key.
Critical Impact
Recovery of hardcoded AES-128-CBC key material enables decryption of database and message-broker credentials across every Armatura One deployment.
Affected Products
- Armatura One (install configuration file component)
- Deployments relying on the embedded AES-128-CBC credential protection
- Any environment where the installation package and an encrypted configuration file are both accessible to an attacker
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-02 - CVE-2026-94591 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-94591
Vulnerability Analysis
Armatura One protects sensitive connection strings using symmetric AES-128-CBC encryption. The design intent is to prevent casual disclosure of database and message-broker credentials written to the install configuration file. The implementation, however, embeds both the symmetric key and the IV directly in the shipped software binaries.
Because the key and IV are static across every installation, the ciphertext produced by one deployment can be decrypted using material recovered from any other deployment of the same product. The cryptographic boundary therefore collapses to possession of the installer, which is widely distributable. This pattern matches [CWE-321] and defeats the confidentiality guarantee the control was intended to provide.
Successful decryption yields plaintext credentials for backend database services and the message broker. Those credentials typically enable lateral movement, data exfiltration, and tampering with queued operational messages.
Root Cause
The root cause is the use of a hard-coded cryptographic key and a fixed IV compiled into the product. AES-128-CBC remains algorithmically sound, but the key management model does not derive per-installation key material from an installation-specific secret, hardware-bound store, or operator-supplied passphrase.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires two artifacts: a copy of the installation package, which the attacker can obtain independently, and the encrypted configuration file from a target installation. The attack vector is local, since the attacker must read the configuration file from the target host or an accessible backup. No authentication to the Armatura One application is required. After extracting the embedded key and IV from the installer, the attacker decrypts the configuration file offline and recovers plaintext database and message-broker credentials.
No verified public proof-of-concept is listed in the enriched data. See the CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-274-01 and the GitHub CSAF Incident Report for authoritative technical context.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-94591
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected reads of the Armatura One install configuration file by non-service accounts or unknown processes.
- Copies of the encrypted configuration file appearing in user profile directories, archive files, or outbound transfers.
- New or anomalous authentications to the backend database or message broker using service credentials from unexpected source hosts.
- Presence of the Armatura One installer binary on hosts that are not provisioning systems.
Detection Strategies
- Monitor file-access telemetry for processes opening the install configuration file outside documented service accounts.
- Alert on successful logons to backend databases and the message broker from IP addresses outside the approved Armatura One application tier.
- Correlate installer package execution or extraction events with subsequent access to configuration files on production hosts.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable file integrity monitoring on the directory holding the install configuration file and on installer artifacts.
- Forward database and message-broker authentication logs to a centralized analytics platform for baseline deviation analysis.
- Review backup, snapshot, and ticketing systems for copies of the configuration file that could be exfiltrated.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-94591
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict filesystem permissions on the install configuration file to the service account only and deny read access to interactive users.
- Rotate all database and message-broker credentials that have ever been stored in Armatura One configuration files.
- Remove installer packages from production hosts and store them in access-controlled artifact repositories.
- Review backup media, images, and support bundles for exposed encrypted configuration files and purge or re-protect them.
Patch Information
The enriched data does not list a vendor-supplied fixed version. Consult the CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-274-01 and the GitHub CSAF Incident Report for vendor updates and remediation guidance as they are published.
Workarounds
- Place Armatura One hosts on a segmented network and restrict administrative access to a small, monitored jump-host population.
- Store database and broker credentials in an external secrets manager and reference them at runtime rather than persisting them in the install configuration file where feasible.
- Enforce least-privilege database and broker accounts so that recovery of credentials yields the minimum useful access.
- Monitor for unauthorized distribution of the installer package, which is the enabling artifact for offline decryption.
# Configuration example: restrict access to the install configuration file (Linux)
chown armatura:armatura /opt/armatura/one/config/install.conf
chmod 600 /opt/armatura/one/config/install.conf
auditctl -w /opt/armatura/one/config/install.conf -p rwa -k armatura_one_config
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

