Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-94584 Overview
CVE-2026-94584 is a race condition and thread-safety vulnerability in the web management daemon of Broadcom Brocade Fabric Operating System (FOS) versions before 10.0.1. The flaw occurs when the daemon handles concurrent user authentication requests through a multi-threaded execution pool. Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) components process stale or incorrect client IP addresses and switch context numbers under race conditions. This produces inaccurate audit records and can bypass access controls that rely on client IP attributes, such as Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) evaluation or Calling-Station-ID Access Control List (ACL) policies.
Critical Impact
Authenticated adjacent-network attackers can trigger inconsistent PAM state during concurrent logins, corrupting audit trails and bypassing IP-based access controls on Brocade FOS switches [CWE-362].
Affected Products
- Broadcom Brocade Fabric Operating System versions prior to 10.0.1
- Brocade SAN switches running vulnerable FOS releases
- Fabric management interfaces exposed via the web management daemon
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-08 - CVE-2026-94584 published to NVD
- 2026-10-14 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-94584
Vulnerability Analysis
The Brocade FOS web management daemon processes authentication requests across a multi-threaded worker pool. When multiple clients authenticate concurrently, shared state used by the PAM pipeline is not protected against interleaved thread execution. The result is that one thread can observe or write client-session attributes belonging to a different session.
Two attributes are directly affected: the client source IP address and the switch context number. Both values feed into downstream policy decisions and audit logging. When these values are mismatched against the actual request, the daemon logs the wrong source for an action and may apply policy intended for a different session.
In environments where AAA policies or Calling-Station-ID ACLs restrict management access by source IP, the race condition can allow a session to inherit the IP attributes of an authorized peer. This produces a conditional authorization bypass that depends on the attacker achieving the specific thread interleaving.
Root Cause
The root cause is a thread-safety defect [CWE-362] in the PAM integration layer of the web management daemon. Shared session context is accessed without adequate locking or thread-local isolation, creating a classic Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) window during authentication processing.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires an adjacent-network position with valid low-privilege credentials to the management interface. The attacker generates concurrent authentication requests to increase the probability of triggering the race. Success is probabilistic and depends on request timing, worker pool scheduling, and overall load on the daemon. No public proof-of-concept exploit is available, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
See the Broadcom Security Advisory 39158 for vendor technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-94584
Indicators of Compromise
- Audit log entries where the recorded Calling-Station-ID or client IP does not match the known source of the administrator session
- RADIUS or TACACS+ accounting records showing authentication events attributed to IP addresses that did not initiate traffic during that interval
- Successful management logins from source IPs that should be blocked by Calling-Station-ID ACL policy
- Bursts of concurrent authentication attempts to the FOS web management interface from a single adjacent host
Detection Strategies
- Correlate FOS audit logs with network flow telemetry to identify sessions whose logged source IP conflicts with observed packet sources
- Baseline normal concurrency on the management daemon and alert when parallel authentication rates deviate significantly
- Compare AAA server accounting records against switch-side audit logs to surface attribute mismatches
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward Brocade FOS syslog and AAA accounting data to a centralized analytics platform for cross-source correlation
- Monitor administrative access patterns on SAN management interfaces for repeated concurrent login attempts from the same adjacent subnet
- Track changes to switch configuration performed by sessions whose source attribution is inconsistent across log sources
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-94584
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Brocade Fabric OS to version 10.0.1 or later as published in Broadcom Security Advisory 39158
- Restrict management-plane access to a dedicated out-of-band network segment reachable only by authorized administrators
- Review AAA policies and Calling-Station-ID ACLs; do not treat them as a sole authorization control until patched
- Audit recent management session logs for IP attribute inconsistencies that may indicate exploitation attempts
Patch Information
Broadcom addressed the thread-safety defect in Brocade Fabric OS 10.0.1. Administrators should consult the Broadcom Security Advisory 39158 for the full list of fixed releases and upgrade guidance applicable to specific switch models.
Workarounds
- Limit the number of concurrent management sessions permitted against the FOS web management daemon
- Enforce source-IP restrictions at an upstream firewall or jump host rather than relying solely on in-switch Calling-Station-ID policies
- Disable the web management interface where command-line administration over SSH is sufficient for operational needs
- Require multi-factor authentication at the AAA layer so that spoofed IP context alone cannot grant access
# Configuration example
# Restrict management access upstream of the Brocade switch
# (example iptables rule on an administrative jump host network)
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -d <switch_mgmt_ip> --dport 443 \
-s <trusted_admin_subnet> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -d <switch_mgmt_ip> --dport 443 -j DROP
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

