Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-94265 Overview
CVE-2026-94265 affects the curl command-line tool and libcurl library when handling HTTP redirects that embed userinfo components. The vulnerability causes curl to retain HTTP Negotiate authentication state across redirects to hosts specified via username:password syntax. A malicious server can craft a redirect to an arbitrary third-party host and trigger curl to mint and send a Kerberos ticket using the client process's ambient identity. This behavior bypasses the domain-scoping protections normally enforced when --location-trusted is not set.
Critical Impact
Attackers controlling an HTTP endpoint can harvest Kerberos tickets tied to the victim's ambient identity, enabling credential theft against untrusted third-party hosts.
Affected Products
- curl (command-line tool)
- libcurl (library)
- Applications linking libcurl with HTTP Negotiate (SPNEGO/Kerberos) authentication enabled
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-94265 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-94265
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw resides in curl's HTTP redirect handling logic when HTTP Negotiate authentication (SPNEGO/Kerberos) is active. When curl follows a redirect to a URL that contains userinfo in the form https://user:pass@target.example/, it fails to properly reset the Negotiate authentication context tied to the original host. The authentication state persists and is reapplied against the redirect target.
This violates the implicit trust boundary that curl enforces when --location-trusted is absent. Normally, curl strips credentials when redirecting to a different host to prevent credential leakage. The userinfo component in the redirect URL confuses this scoping logic for the Negotiate scheme specifically. For additional context, see the curl security advisory for CVE-2026-94265 and HackerOne report #4040551.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper access control in redirect handling for the HTTP Negotiate authentication scheme. curl treats the presence of userinfo in a redirect target as sufficient grounds to continue authenticating, without validating that the target host remains within the original authentication scope. The Negotiate state machine does not reset when the host identity changes under these conditions.
Attack Vector
An attacker operates or compromises an HTTP server that a Negotiate-authenticated curl client contacts. The server responds with an HTTP 3xx redirect pointing to an attacker-controlled host, with the Location header formatted as https://arbitrary:userinfo@attacker.example/path. curl follows the redirect and generates a fresh Kerberos service ticket for the attacker host, derived from the current process's Kerberos credentials cache. The attacker captures the ticket and can replay or analyze it offline to impersonate the victim or extract identity material.
No verified proof-of-concept code is published. The vulnerability mechanism is described in prose in the curl advisory.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-94265
Indicators of Compromise
- Outbound Kerberos AS-REQ or TGS-REQ traffic from systems running curl workflows that correlate with HTTP redirects to unexpected hosts.
- HTTP 3xx responses from internal services containing Location headers with embedded userinfo components pointing to external domains.
- Unexpected service principal name (SPN) requests in Kerberos logs for hosts not part of the organization's trust boundary.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect HTTP proxy and web gateway logs for Location headers containing @ in the authority component when the redirect crosses host boundaries.
- Correlate curl process execution telemetry with subsequent Kerberos ticket requests to hosts outside the expected service inventory.
- Audit scripts and automation that invoke curl with --negotiate or -u : against external endpoints without --location-trusted explicitly denied.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose curl logging in CI/CD and server-side automation that uses Negotiate authentication, and ship logs to a central SIEM for review.
- Monitor Kerberos KDC logs for service tickets issued to SPNs that have no business justification.
- Alert on egress HTTPS connections initiated by service accounts immediately after a redirect-handling event.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-94265
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory systems and applications that invoke curl or link libcurl with HTTP Negotiate authentication enabled.
- Disable automatic redirect following (-L / CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION) in scripts that use --negotiate where redirects are not required.
- Restrict curl-based automation using Kerberos credentials to known, trusted internal endpoints via egress firewall rules.
Patch Information
Refer to the curl security advisory for CVE-2026-94265 and the machine-readable advisory JSON for the list of fixed versions and backport status. Update curl and libcurl to the patched release once published by the vendor or your distribution maintainer.
Workarounds
- Pass --max-redirs 0 or disable redirect following for any curl invocation that authenticates with --negotiate.
- Run curl workflows under a dedicated Kerberos principal with minimal service ticket privileges rather than a user's ambient identity.
- Explicitly validate redirect targets in wrapper scripts before re-invoking curl, rejecting any Location header whose authority contains userinfo.
# Configuration example: disable redirects for Negotiate-authenticated requests
curl --negotiate -u : --max-redirs 0 https://internal.example/resource
# Or follow redirects only when the target host is explicitly allowed
curl --negotiate -u : --location-trusted=false --max-redirs 5 \
--resolve allowed.example:443:10.0.0.5 https://internal.example/resource
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

