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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-86413

CVE-2026-86413: cURL Negotiate Authentication Bypass Flaw

CVE-2026-86413 is an authentication bypass flaw in cURL that causes credential leakage during Negotiate authentication redirects to unrelated origins. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-86413 Overview

CVE-2026-86413 affects curl when it performs an initial transfer using Negotiate authentication with an ambient user context and is instructed to follow HTTP redirects. Under these conditions, curl can forward credential details to a second, unrelated origin when the server returns a redirect to that origin. The flaw breaks the origin isolation that curl normally enforces for credentials, exposing authentication material intended for the original target to an untrusted host. The issue was reported through HackerOne and documented in the official curl security advisory.

Critical Impact

Negotiate credentials tied to an ambient user identity can leak to attacker-controlled origins through server-driven redirects, enabling unauthorized authentication against the second origin.

Affected Products

  • curl (command-line tool)
  • libcurl (library)
  • Applications and services linking against libcurl that use Negotiate authentication with redirect following enabled

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-86413 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-86413

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability sits in curl's redirect handling path when Negotiate (SPNEGO/Kerberos) authentication is active. Negotiate relies on an ambient user identity, typically a Kerberos ticket or Windows SSPI context bound to the logged-in user. When curl receives a redirect response from the first origin, it should scope these credentials strictly to the original host. Instead, curl can continue the authentication exchange toward the redirected origin, exposing credential material to a host the user never intended to authenticate to. This behavior enables credential-forwarding attacks whenever an attacker controls or compromises an endpoint capable of returning redirect responses.

Root Cause

The root cause is an authorization scoping defect [CWE-287 / CWE-522 class]: curl fails to treat ambient Negotiate credentials as origin-bound when transitioning between hosts during redirect following. Credentials that must stay tied to the original authentication target are instead re-used against the redirect destination.

Attack Vector

An attacker who controls a server that curl connects to, or who can inject a malicious redirect through a man-in-the-middle position, returns a redirect to an attacker-controlled origin. If the initial curl request used Negotiate authentication under an ambient user, curl initiates a Negotiate exchange with the attacker's origin, revealing credential details tied to that user identity. Automated jobs, scripts, and backend services that run curl under service accounts and follow redirects are most exposed. No code execution is required on the client; the attack is driven entirely by HTTP response handling.

// No verified exploitation code is published for CVE-2026-86413.
// Refer to the official curl advisory and HackerOne report #3993549
// for technical reproduction details.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-86413

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound Negotiate (SPNEGO) Authorization headers sent to unexpected or non-corporate destinations following a 3xx redirect.
  • Kerberos service ticket requests (TGS-REQ) for Service Principal Names (SPNs) that do not match the originally requested host.
  • curl or libcurl-based client processes initiating authenticated requests to newly observed external domains shortly after contacting an internal or trusted service.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect proxy and web gateway logs for HTTP 301/302/307/308 responses that redirect from internal services to external origins, correlated with subsequent authenticated requests.
  • Deploy host rules that identify curl command lines using --negotiate or -L/--location combined with user-controlled URLs.
  • Review application telemetry for libcurl-linked services whose redirect-following policy allows cross-origin transitions while Negotiate is enabled.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Monitor domain controller logs for anomalous Kerberos ticket requests originating from automation accounts.
  • Alert on curl or libcurl process executions that establish Negotiate sessions with external, non-allowlisted hosts.
  • Track egress HTTP traffic for WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate challenge-response flows crossing trust boundaries.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-86413

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade curl and libcurl to the fixed version listed in the cURL CVE-2026-86413 Documentation.
  • Audit all scripts, cron jobs, and services that invoke curl with Negotiate authentication and the -L or --location flag.
  • Rotate or re-scope service accounts and Kerberos credentials used by hosts suspected of leaking Negotiate material.

Patch Information

Refer to the vendor advisory at cURL CVE-2026-86413 Documentation and the machine-readable cURL CVE-2026-86413 JSON Data for the patched release version and commit identifiers. Technical reproduction details are available in HackerOne Report #3993549.

Workarounds

  • Disable redirect following by removing -L / --location from curl invocations, or by setting CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION to 0 in libcurl-based applications until patching is complete.
  • Restrict Negotiate authentication to specific hosts by using --resolve or explicit URL allowlists rather than following server-driven redirects.
  • Route curl traffic through an egress proxy that strips cross-origin redirects or blocks Negotiate Authorization headers destined for untrusted domains.
bash
# Configuration example: disable redirect following for Negotiate-authenticated calls
curl --negotiate -u : --no-location https://internal.example.corp/api/resource

# libcurl equivalent (C):
# curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HTTPAUTH, CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE);
# curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 0L);

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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