Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-93679 Overview
CVE-2026-93679 is a denial of service vulnerability in IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.12.2. The flaw stems from uncontrolled resource consumption during ZIP file extraction [CWE-400]. A remote authenticated attacker can submit a crafted archive that exhausts system resources during decompression. Successful exploitation disrupts availability of the Langflow service without affecting confidentiality or integrity.
Critical Impact
Authenticated attackers can degrade or disable IBM Langflow OSS instances by uploading maliciously crafted ZIP archives that trigger excessive resource consumption during extraction.
Affected Products
- IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.2
- Deployments exposing ZIP upload or flow import functionality
- Multi-tenant Langflow environments where any authenticated user can import flows
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-07 - CVE CVE-2026-93679 published to NVD
- 2026-10-07 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-93679
Vulnerability Analysis
IBM Langflow OSS accepts ZIP archives as part of its flow import and asset-handling workflows. The extraction routine does not enforce limits on decompressed size, file count, or compression ratio. A low-privileged authenticated user can submit a crafted archive, such as a decompression bomb, that expands to a disproportionately large payload. The server consumes excessive CPU, memory, or disk during extraction. This degrades service responsiveness or causes the process to crash, denying access to legitimate users.
Root Cause
The root cause is uncontrolled resource consumption [CWE-400] in the ZIP extraction logic. The implementation trusts attacker-supplied archive metadata and does not validate compression ratios or cap the total number of extracted entries. Without these controls, a small input file can produce an unbounded output footprint on disk and in memory.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access and valid credentials with permission to import or upload archives. The attacker crafts a ZIP file containing highly compressible data or a large number of nested entries. The attacker uploads the archive through the Langflow interface or API. The server attempts extraction and consumes resources until the operation fails or the host becomes unresponsive. No user interaction is required beyond the attacker's own authenticated session.
No verified public proof-of-concept code is available. See the IBM Support Advisory for vendor technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-93679
Indicators of Compromise
- Sudden spikes in CPU, memory, or disk usage on hosts running Langflow correlated with upload activity
- Langflow process crashes, out-of-memory kills, or restart loops following archive import requests
- Repeated POST requests to flow import or asset upload endpoints from a single authenticated session
- Temporary extraction directories growing to abnormal sizes before cleanup
Detection Strategies
- Monitor HTTP request logs for authenticated upload endpoints and flag archives whose compression ratio exceeds a safe threshold
- Alert on short-interval repeated import attempts from the same user or API token
- Correlate container or host resource saturation events with Langflow application logs for the extraction code path
Monitoring Recommendations
- Instrument Langflow with resource usage telemetry per request to identify outlier extraction operations
- Forward application and host metrics to a centralized analytics pipeline for anomaly detection
- Baseline normal archive sizes and extraction durations, then alert on statistical outliers
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-93679
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade IBM Langflow OSS to a fixed version as documented in the IBM Support Advisory
- Restrict import and upload permissions to trusted users until patching is complete
- Place Langflow behind a reverse proxy that enforces upload size limits and rate limiting
- Review audit logs for suspicious upload patterns from authenticated users
Patch Information
IBM has published remediation guidance in the IBM Support Advisory. Administrators should apply the vendor-recommended fixed release and validate that affected versions 1.0.0 through 1.12.2 are no longer in production.
Workarounds
- Disable or restrict ZIP import functionality for non-administrative accounts where feasible
- Enforce maximum upload size limits at the web server or ingress layer to bound extraction cost
- Run Langflow in resource-constrained containers with CPU, memory, and ephemeral storage quotas to contain impact
- Require multi-factor authentication on accounts with import privileges to reduce the attack surface
# Example nginx reverse proxy limits for Langflow uploads
http {
client_max_body_size 10m;
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=langflow_uploads:10m rate=5r/m;
server {
location /api/v1/flows/upload {
limit_req zone=langflow_uploads burst=2 nodelay;
proxy_pass http://langflow_backend;
}
}
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

