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CVE Vulnerability Database

CVE-2026-9359: Edimax EW-7438RPn RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2026-9359 is a remote code execution flaw in Edimax EW-7438RPn 1.28a caused by command injection in the formHwSet function. This post covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

CVE-2026-9359 Overview

CVE-2026-9359 is a command injection vulnerability [CWE-74] in the Edimax EW-7438RPn Wi-Fi range extender, firmware version 1.28a. The flaw resides in the formHwSet function within /goform/formHwSet, part of the device's POST request handler. Attackers can manipulate multiple parameters including Anntena, Mcs, regDomain, nic0Addr, nic1Addr, wlanAddr, wanAddr, wlanSSID, wlanChan, comd, initgain, txcck, and txofdm to inject operating system commands. The attack can be initiated remotely and a public exploit is available. The vendor was contacted but did not respond to the disclosure.

Critical Impact

Authenticated attackers can inject arbitrary commands through the formHwSet handler, gaining control over affected Edimax EW-7438RPn devices. The EPSS score is 1.058% (77.9 percentile).

Affected Products

  • Edimax EW-7438RPn Mini Wi-Fi Range Extender
  • Firmware version 1.28a
  • /goform/formHwSet POST Request Handler component

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-05-24 - CVE-2026-9359 published to NVD
  • 2026-05-26 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-9359

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability stems from improper neutralization of special elements in user-supplied input passed to the formHwSet handler. The handler accepts POST parameters intended for hardware configuration values such as antenna settings, MCS rates, regulatory domain, MAC addresses, SSID, and channel selection. Instead of validating or sanitizing these values, the function passes them into a system command context. Attackers append shell metacharacters to any of the affected parameters and the device executes the injected commands. The Common Weakness Enumeration classification [CWE-74] identifies this as improper neutralization of special elements in output used by a downstream component.

Root Cause

The root cause is unsanitized concatenation of POST parameter values into shell command strings within the formHwSet function. The firmware places trust in client-supplied configuration data without applying input validation, parameter type checking, or argument escaping. Range extenders frequently call out to busybox utilities for network and wireless configuration, which makes command interpolation a direct path to code execution. Edimax did not respond to disclosure attempts, so no fixed firmware addresses the underlying parsing logic.

Attack Vector

An attacker sends a crafted HTTP POST request to /goform/formHwSet with malicious shell syntax embedded in one of the vulnerable parameters. Because the device exposes its web interface on the LAN by default, any user with network access to the extender's management interface can issue the request. Devices exposed to the internet through misconfigured port forwarding or operating in default states broaden the reachable attack surface. Successful exploitation yields command execution with the privileges of the web server process, typically root on embedded Linux devices of this class.

No verified proof-of-concept code is reproduced here. Technical details and a public write-up are referenced in the Notion Resource Document and the VulDB Vulnerability #365322 entry.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-9359

Indicators of Compromise

  • POST requests to /goform/formHwSet containing shell metacharacters such as ;, |, `, $(), or && in any of the vulnerable parameters
  • Outbound network connections from the extender to unfamiliar hosts following configuration requests
  • Unexpected processes or persistence artifacts in the device's flash storage or /tmp filesystem
  • Web server log entries referencing the formHwSet endpoint from unfamiliar source IP addresses

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect HTTP traffic destined for the extender's management interface and alert on non-printable or shell-injection characters in formHwSet POST bodies
  • Baseline normal administrative source IPs and flag deviations targeting /goform/formHwSet
  • Correlate device configuration changes with subsequent outbound traffic patterns indicative of beaconing or tunneling

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward router and IDS logs to a centralized analytics platform and create rules covering the affected parameter names
  • Monitor DNS queries from IoT VLANs for low-reputation or newly registered domains
  • Track configuration drift on Edimax devices using periodic configuration backups and diff alerts

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-9359

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict the EW-7438RPn management interface to a dedicated administrative VLAN and block external access
  • Disable remote management features and ensure the device is not reachable from the public internet
  • Rotate the administrative password and audit recent logins to the device
  • Plan replacement for end-of-life Edimax hardware where no vendor patch is forthcoming

Patch Information

No vendor patch is available. Edimax did not respond to the disclosure submitted through VulDB. Operators should treat the device as unpatched and rely on compensating network controls until firmware addressing the formHwSet handler is released. Refer to the VulDB Submission #811540 for the original advisory and the VulDB CTI for #365322 for threat intelligence context.

Workarounds

  • Place the extender behind a firewall that blocks inbound HTTP/HTTPS traffic from untrusted segments
  • Segment IoT and consumer networking equipment from corporate endpoints and identity infrastructure
  • Deploy network intrusion prevention signatures that drop POST requests to /goform/formHwSet containing shell metacharacters
  • Replace the device with a supported model if the management interface must remain network-accessible
bash
# Example firewall rule to block external access to the extender management interface
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -d <extender_ip> --dport 80 -m iprange ! --src-range <admin_subnet> -j DROP
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -d <extender_ip> --dport 443 -m iprange ! --src-range <admin_subnet> -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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