Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-85245 Overview
CVE-2026-85245 is an information disclosure vulnerability in the Apache Camel Thrift data format component. The Thrift unmarshaller writes incoming data into the shared defaultInstance of the target type instead of a fresh object, and returns that shared instance as the exchange body. State written while processing one message persists on the object and becomes visible to every subsequent message using the same type. In multi-tenant routes, one party's data can be read while processing another party's message [CWE-488].
Affected versions include Apache Camel 4.0.0 through 4.18.4 and 4.19.0 through 4.22.0. See the Apache Camel CVE-2026-85245 Advisory for vendor details.
Critical Impact
Cross-tenant data disclosure in Apache Camel routes that use the Thrift data format, where fields from a prior message leak into a later exchange handled by the same route.
Affected Products
- Apache Camel 4.0.0 through 4.18.4 (4.18.x LTS stream)
- Apache Camel 4.19.0 through 4.22.0 (4.22.x LTS stream)
- Apache Camel deployments using the camel-thrift data format component
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-85245 published to NVD
- 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-85245
Vulnerability Analysis
The Apache Camel Thrift data format implements unmarshalling by reading bytes from the exchange and populating the Thrift-generated class's shared defaultInstance. Because Thrift generates a single static defaultInstance per type, that object is reused across every message in the JVM.
Two distinct failure modes result. First, Thrift's wire format does not transmit fields that match default values, so any field absent from the current payload retains the value written during the prior message. Second, concurrent exchanges reading or writing the same instance can observe partially populated state from another in-flight message.
In a Camel route that terminates a Thrift endpoint and serves multiple tenants or users, both modes expose data belonging to one sender to the processing path of another. The disclosure happens inside the message body itself, so downstream processors, loggers, and sinks all receive the leaked fields as if they were legitimate.
Root Cause
The root cause is Reuse of a Shared Resource Across Sessions [CWE-488]. The Thrift unmarshaller calls into the generated type's defaultInstance and returns that same reference instead of deserializing into a fresh copy. The shared object becomes a cross-exchange side channel.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network reachability to a Camel route consuming Thrift payloads and a multi-tenant processing model. An attacker sends a crafted Thrift message that omits selected optional fields. The route then processes a legitimate victim message through the same type, and the attacker's follow-up request reads back residual victim fields that remained on the shared instance. No authentication is required when the Thrift endpoint is exposed without an auth layer, which aligns with the network attack vector and high attack complexity reflected by the CVSS vector.
No verified public exploit code is available. See the Apache Camel JIRA Issue CAMEL-24442 and the fix in GitHub Pull Request #25823 for technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-85245
Indicators of Compromise
- Camel routes with unmarshal().thrift(...) or references to the camel-thrift data format on affected versions.
- Downstream processors or sinks receiving message bodies containing fields that do not correspond to the current request's sender or tenant identifier.
- Application logs showing field values persisting across sequential, unrelated requests to the same Thrift-backed route.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory running Apache Camel instances and extract the camel-core and camel-thrift versions from classpath or Maven dependency metadata.
- Grep route definitions and Java DSL for ThriftDataFormat, .thrift(, or dataFormats entries referencing Thrift.
- Instrument staging environments with correlation IDs per request and assert that unmarshalled bodies contain only fields set by the current message.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on tenant identifier mismatches between the authenticated session and the fields present in deserialized Thrift bodies.
- Monitor dependency scanners and software composition analysis output for org.apache.camel:camel-thrift versions below 4.18.5, 4.22.1, or 4.23.0.
- Track outbound data flows from Thrift-consuming routes for unexpected field combinations suggesting state carryover.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-85245
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Apache Camel to 4.23.0, 4.22.1, or 4.18.5 depending on the release stream in use.
- Audit all routes using the Thrift data format and restrict exposure of multi-tenant Thrift endpoints until patched.
- Rotate or invalidate any data assumed to have transited affected routes if cross-tenant disclosure is plausible in your environment.
Patch Information
The fix changes Thrift unmarshalling to deserialize into a fresh copy per exchange, so no state carries between messages. Patched versions are Apache Camel 4.23.0, 4.22.1 (4.22.x LTS), and 4.18.5 (4.18.x LTS). Review the fix in GitHub Pull Request #25823, the LTS backports in GitHub Pull Request #25940 and GitHub Pull Request #25942, and the Apache Camel CVE-2026-85245 Advisory.
Workarounds
- Immediately after the Thrift data format runs, copy the unmarshalled body into a new instance of the target type and replace the exchange body with that copy.
- Do not retain references to the returned object in processors, aggregators, or caches.
- Where feasible, isolate Thrift-consuming routes per tenant on separate JVMs so the shared defaultInstance cannot be reached by other tenants' traffic.
# Maven dependency upgrade example
<dependency>
<groupId>org.apache.camel</groupId>
<artifactId>camel-thrift</artifactId>
<version>4.23.0</version>
</dependency>
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

