Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-85243 Overview
CVE-2026-85243 is an Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value vulnerability [CWE-354] in the Apache Camel Crypto PGP component. The flaw affects Apache Camel versions 4.0.0 through 4.18.4 and 4.19.0 through 4.22.0. The unmarshal() method verified the modification detection code only when a message used an OpenPGP symmetrically encrypted integrity protected data packet. Messages using the older symmetrically encrypted data packet skipped integrity validation entirely, allowing an attacker who could rewrite messages in transit to tamper with ciphertext without detection.
Critical Impact
An attacker able to modify PGP-encrypted messages in transit can alter plaintext undetected because OpenPGP's CFB mode is malleable without a modification detection code.
Affected Products
- Apache Camel 4.0.0 through 4.18.4
- Apache Camel 4.19.0 through 4.22.0
- Apache Camel Crypto PGP component (camel-crypto-pgp)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-85243 published to NVD
- 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-85243
Vulnerability Analysis
The Apache Camel Crypto PGP component implements OpenPGP decryption through its unmarshal() method. The component verified the modification detection code (MDC) only when a message was wrapped in an OpenPGP Symmetrically Encrypted Integrity Protected Data packet (SEIPD, packet tag 18). When a message instead used the legacy Symmetrically Encrypted Data packet (SED, packet tag 9), the integrity check was skipped. The legacy packet carries no MDC, and OpenPGP's Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode is malleable without one.
The sender, or any attacker able to rewrite messages in transit, chose the packet type. That choice determined whether the receiver enforced integrity at all. The existing integrity option on the data format governed marshalling only. No decrypt-side counterpart existed, so a deployment could not require that incoming messages carry integrity protection.
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing policy enforcement on the decryption path. The component trusted the inbound packet type to drive validation behavior rather than requiring integrity protection as a receiver-side guarantee. This left authenticity dependent on the message producer's choice.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires a network-positioned attacker able to modify PGP-encrypted messages before they reach a vulnerable Camel route. The attacker crafts or rewrites a message so it uses the legacy SED packet, then alters ciphertext bits to produce controlled plaintext changes after decryption. Because CFB is malleable without an MDC, modifications propagate predictably and the receiver accepts the result as valid plaintext. See the Apache Camel CVE-2026-85243 Advisory for the full description.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-85243
Indicators of Compromise
- Inbound OpenPGP messages using the legacy Symmetrically Encrypted Data packet (tag 9) rather than the integrity protected variant (tag 18).
- Camel routes using camel-crypto-pgp on affected versions where unmarshalled payloads produce unexpected or malformed downstream processing.
- Application logs showing successful PGP unmarshal operations without any MDC verification events.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory running Apache Camel deployments and flag versions in the 4.0.0–4.18.4 and 4.19.0–4.22.0 ranges that load the camel-crypto-pgp component.
- Inspect PGP message headers at ingress to identify use of the legacy SED packet type and alert on any occurrence from untrusted senders.
- Correlate decryption events with downstream integrity failures in business logic to surface tampering attempts.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Log the packet type processed by each unmarshal() call in camel-crypto-pgp to produce an auditable record of integrity enforcement.
- Monitor Camel route configurations for changes to the requireIntegrityProtection and signatureVerificationOption settings after upgrade.
- Alert on routes that explicitly set requireIntegrityProtection=false so that downstream handlers treat decrypted content as unauthenticated.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-85243
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which includes the fix and introduces the requireIntegrityProtection option defaulting to true.
- Users on the 4.18.x LTS stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS stream should upgrade to 4.22.1.
- Audit all Camel routes that invoke camel-crypto-pgp unmarshal operations and verify that requireIntegrityProtection remains enabled.
- Pair requireIntegrityProtection with signatureVerificationOption set to a non-optional value when authenticity, not just confidentiality, is required.
Patch Information
Apache Camel 4.23.0, 4.22.1, and 4.18.5 contain the fix. The patch adds a requireIntegrityProtection option on the decrypt side that defaults to true and rejects messages that are not integrity protected. Note that signatureVerificationOption still defaults to optional, so a message carrying no signature is accepted; the two options together give a decrypted message authenticity and not only confidentiality. See GitHub Camel Pull Request #25848, GitHub Camel Pull Request #25944, GitHub Camel Pull Request #25946, and Apache JIRA Issue CAMEL-24441.
Workarounds
- For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, reject messages that do not use the integrity protected packet before they reach the data format.
- Routes that must interoperate with a sender still emitting the legacy packet should set requireIntegrityProtection=false after upgrading and treat the decrypted content as unauthenticated.
- Enforce ingress controls that validate message origin and transport integrity, reducing the opportunity for in-transit modification.
# Configuration example
# After upgrading to 4.23.0, 4.22.1, or 4.18.5, keep the default and
# ensure the decrypt-side policy requires integrity protection.
# requireIntegrityProtection=true (default)
# Pair with a non-optional signature verification policy when authenticity is required.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

