Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-82041 Overview
CVE-2026-82041 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in UTMStack versions before 11.2.16. The flaw resides in UTMIncidentCommandWebsocket.processCommand(), the handler mapped to the /command/{hostname} STOMP destination. The handler performs no role check and enforces no command allowlist before forwarding operator-supplied commands to monitored agents over gRPC.
Any authenticated user, regardless of assigned role, can send arbitrary operating system commands to any connected agent. Agent processes commonly run as root on Linux or SYSTEM on Windows, so successful exploitation yields high-privilege command execution on monitored endpoints across the environment.
Critical Impact
A low-privileged authenticated UTMStack user can execute arbitrary OS commands as root or SYSTEM on every monitored endpoint through the WebSocket command channel.
Affected Products
- UTMStack versions prior to 11.2.16
- UTMStack backend component exposing the /command/{hostname} STOMP WebSocket endpoint
- UTMStack monitoring agents receiving commands over gRPC
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-02 - CVE-2026-82041 published to NVD
- 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-82041
Vulnerability Analysis
UTMStack uses a Spring STOMP WebSocket channel to forward operator commands from the web UI to remote agents. The destination /command/{hostname} is handled by UTMIncidentCommandWebsocket.processCommand(), which accepts a hostname path variable and a command payload. The handler then relays the command to the targeted agent through a gRPC call.
The handler never consults the caller's role or group membership before dispatching the command. There is also no allowlist that constrains which commands are permitted. Because UTMStack agents execute received commands with the privileges of the agent process, typically root on Linux and SYSTEM on Windows, the authorization gap translates directly into high-privilege command execution on monitored hosts.
The impact extends beyond the UTMStack server itself. A single authenticated low-privilege account becomes an authenticated pivot point into every endpoint registered with the platform, affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of downstream systems.
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing authorization check in the STOMP message handler. Spring Security role annotations and command validation were absent from processCommand(), violating the principle of least privilege for an interface that triggers privileged actions on third-party systems.
Attack Vector
An attacker who holds any valid UTMStack account authenticates to the application, establishes a STOMP WebSocket session, and sends a message to /command/{hostname} targeting any agent known to the server. The supplied command is forwarded to the agent and executed by the agent process without further validation.
Patch Reference
The fix is included in UTMStack release v11.2.16 as part of commit 4e7a727, which addresses CVE-2026-82039 through CVE-2026-82045. The commit introduces additional validation across multiple services, including hardened query parameterization in UtmNetworkScanService and IDP hostname validation in IdentityProviderService.
// Excerpt from UtmNetworkScanService.java hardening
if (StringUtils.hasText(value)) {
if (prop == PropertyFilter.PORTS)
sb.append(" AND cast(port as string) LIKE :value");
else if (prop == PropertyFilter.ALIVE) {
sb.append(" AND %1$s = :value");
} else
sb.append(" AND lower(%1$s) LIKE :value");
}
javax.persistence.Query q = em.createQuery(query);
if (StringUtils.hasText(value)) {
if (prop == PropertyFilter.ALIVE) {
q.setParameter("value", Boolean.parseBoolean(value));
} else {
q.setParameter("value", "%" + value.toLowerCase() + "%");
}
}
Source: UTMStack Commit 4e7a727
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-82041
Indicators of Compromise
- WebSocket or STOMP SEND frames targeting the destination /command/{hostname} from UTMStack accounts that are not operations personnel.
- Unexpected processes spawned by the UTMStack agent service on monitored endpoints, especially shells such as sh, bash, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe.
- gRPC traffic from the UTMStack server to agents at times outside normal operator activity windows.
- UTMStack audit log entries showing command dispatch events tied to low-privileged user accounts.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect the UTMStack backend access logs for authenticated users invoking the /command/{hostname} STOMP destination and correlate against expected role membership.
- Deploy endpoint behavioral monitoring to flag child processes spawned by the UTMStack agent binary that do not match the agent's normal command set.
- Baseline gRPC command traffic volumes between the UTMStack server and each agent, and alert on deviations.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Centralize UTMStack application logs and agent process telemetry to allow cross-correlation of command dispatch and command execution events.
- Enable alerting on authentication from UTMStack accounts followed by STOMP command activity within a short time window.
- Review account inventories for stale or shared low-privilege accounts that could be abused to reach the vulnerable endpoint.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-82041
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade all UTMStack deployments to version 11.2.16 or later without delay.
- Rotate credentials for any UTMStack account that may have been exposed, prioritizing shared or service accounts.
- Audit UTMStack users and remove or disable accounts that do not require access.
- Review agent process logs and endpoint telemetry for any unauthorized command execution preceding the upgrade.
Patch Information
The vendor fix is published as UTMStack Release v11.2.16 with the corresponding source change in UTMStack Commit 4e7a727. Additional context is available in the Vulncheck Advisory on UTMStack.
Workarounds
- Restrict network access to the UTMStack web interface and WebSocket endpoint to trusted administrator networks only.
- Place a reverse proxy or WAF in front of UTMStack that blocks STOMP SEND frames to /command/{hostname} for non-administrative sessions.
- Reduce agent privileges where feasible so that command execution does not run as root or SYSTEM.
- Enforce multi-factor authentication on all UTMStack accounts to raise the cost of credential-based access.
# Example: restrict access to UTMStack web/WebSocket port with nftables
nft add rule inet filter input tcp dport 443 ip saddr != 10.0.10.0/24 drop
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

