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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-82039

CVE-2026-82039: UTMStack SQL Injection Vulnerability

CVE-2026-82039 is a SQL injection flaw in UTMStack that enables authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands with DBA privileges. This article covers the technical details, affected versions, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-82039 Overview

CVE-2026-82039 is a SQL injection vulnerability [CWE-89] in UTMStack versions before 11.2.16. The flaw resides in the UtmAssetGroupService.searchQueryBuilder() method, which concatenates user-supplied assetType and groupName parameters into a native PostgreSQL query using String.format(). Authenticated attackers can send crafted requests to the GET /api/utm-asset-groups/searchGroupsByFilter endpoint to execute arbitrary SQL statements. Because the backend connection runs with database administrator privileges, exploitation enables full database read access, data modification, and potential filesystem access through PostgreSQL extensions.

Critical Impact

Authenticated attackers can execute arbitrary SQL with DBA privileges, exposing all stored security telemetry and credentials, and potentially pivoting to the underlying host filesystem.

Affected Products

  • UTMStack versions prior to 11.2.16
  • UTMStack backend UtmAssetGroupService component
  • UTMStack REST API endpoint /api/utm-asset-groups/searchGroupsByFilter

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-02 - CVE-2026-82039 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-82039

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability exists in UTMStack's asset group search functionality. The searchQueryBuilder() method in UtmAssetGroupService constructs a native PostgreSQL query by passing attacker-controlled values directly into String.format(). The resulting query string is executed through em.createQuery() without parameter binding.

Because the assetType and groupName parameters are inserted unsanitized, an authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL fragments. The injected SQL inherits the privileges of the application database role, which is configured as a PostgreSQL DBA. This grants read access to every table, write access for data tampering, and the ability to invoke privileged functions such as COPY or pg_read_server_files.

Root Cause

The root cause is unsafe query construction through string formatting rather than parameterized queries. The affected code path uses String.format(sb.toString(), prop.getPropertyName(), prop.getFromTable(), value.toLowerCase(), prop.getJoinTable()) to build a query containing a LIKE '%...%' clause populated with raw user input. No input validation or escaping is applied before the value reaches the SQL string.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the UTMStack API and valid authenticated credentials with low privilege. The attacker issues a GET request to /api/utm-asset-groups/searchGroupsByFilter containing malicious assetType or groupName query parameters. The injected payload terminates the intended LIKE expression and appends attacker-controlled SQL, which PostgreSQL executes with DBA privileges.

The following patch excerpt from commit 4e7a727 demonstrates the fix pattern applied to the related UtmNetworkScanService, replacing format-string concatenation with named parameters:

java
// Vulnerable pattern (before patch)
sb.append(" AND lower(%1$s) LIKE '%%%3$s%%'");
String query = String.format(sb.toString(), prop.getPropertyName(),
    prop.getFromTable(), value.toLowerCase(), prop.getJoinTable());
return em.createQuery(query)...

// Patched pattern (after fix)
sb.append(" AND lower(%1$s) LIKE :value");
String query = String.format(sb.toString(), prop.getPropertyName(),
    prop.getFromTable(), null, prop.getJoinTable());
javax.persistence.Query q = em.createQuery(query);
if (StringUtils.hasText(value)) {
    q.setParameter("value", "%" + value.toLowerCase() + "%");
}

Source: GitHub UTMStack Commit 4e7a727

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-82039

Indicators of Compromise

  • Requests to /api/utm-asset-groups/searchGroupsByFilter containing SQL metacharacters such as single quotes, --, UNION, SELECT, or ; in the assetType or groupName parameters.
  • PostgreSQL server logs showing unexpected UNION, COPY, or pg_read_server_files statements originating from the UTMStack application role.
  • Spikes in response size or latency for the searchGroupsByFilter endpoint, indicating data exfiltration via blind or union-based injection.

Detection Strategies

  • Enable PostgreSQL statement logging (log_statement = 'all') on the UTMStack database and alert on queries referencing system catalogs like pg_shadow, pg_authid, or information_schema from the application user.
  • Deploy a web application firewall rule that inspects query parameters sent to /api/utm-asset-groups/* for SQL injection signatures.
  • Review authentication logs for low-privileged UTMStack accounts issuing anomalous volumes of asset group search requests.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Centralize UTMStack application and PostgreSQL logs in a SIEM and build correlation rules linking authenticated API requests to subsequent high-privilege SQL operations.
  • Monitor outbound network connections from the UTMStack database host for signs of data exfiltration following suspicious search requests.
  • Baseline normal query shapes against the asset group tables and alert on deviations such as subqueries, stacked statements, or filesystem function calls.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-82039

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade UTMStack to version 11.2.16 or later, which replaces the vulnerable String.format() construction with parameterized queries.
  • Rotate all credentials, API keys, and secrets stored within the UTMStack database, assuming they may have been exposed.
  • Audit UTMStack user accounts and revoke access for any accounts that are not actively required, reducing the authenticated attack surface.

Patch Information

The vendor released a fix in UTMStack v11.2.16 referenced in commit 4e7a727c3b8d8e2ad020d3b4f982a6d085dbecdd. The patch converts native query construction to use JPA named parameters via setParameter(), eliminating unsafe string interpolation. See the GitHub UTMStack Release v11.2.16 and the VulnCheck SQL Injection Advisory for full details.

Workarounds

  • Restrict network access to the UTMStack management interface using firewall rules or VPN gating until the patch is applied.
  • Deploy a reverse proxy or WAF rule that blocks requests to /api/utm-asset-groups/searchGroupsByFilter containing SQL metacharacters in the assetType or groupName parameters.
  • Reduce the PostgreSQL privileges granted to the UTMStack application role where feasible, limiting the blast radius of a successful injection.
bash
# Example NGINX rule to block obvious SQLi payloads to the vulnerable endpoint
location /api/utm-asset-groups/searchGroupsByFilter {
    if ($args ~* "(\'|--|;|union\s+select|/\*|xp_|pg_read_server_files)") {
        return 403;
    }
    proxy_pass http://utmstack_backend;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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