Skip to main content
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-80344

CVE-2026-80344: Apache Camel AS2 Component SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-80344 is a Server-Side Request Forgery flaw in Apache Camel AS2 component that allows attackers to force the server to make unauthorized requests to internal systems. This article covers technical details, affected versions from 4.0.0 to 4.22.0, impact assessment, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-80344 Overview

CVE-2026-80344 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability [CWE-918] in the Apache Camel AS2 component. The flaw affects Apache Camel versions 4.0.0 through 4.18.4 and 4.19.0 through 4.22.0. The AS2 receiver accepts an asynchronous Message Disposition Notification (MDN) destination address directly from an inbound message and uses that address verbatim as the destination for outbound receipts. A remote AS2 partner can therefore direct the Camel instance to connect to arbitrary hosts, including internal network targets. Where MDN delivery is configured with credentials, those credentials are presented to the attacker-chosen destination.

Critical Impact

Remote attackers can coerce the Camel AS2 receiver to initiate outbound HTTP connections to internal services and may leak MDN delivery credentials to attacker-controlled hosts.

Affected Products

  • Apache Camel 4.0.0 through 4.18.4
  • Apache Camel 4.19.0 through 4.22.0
  • Deployments using the camel-as2 component for AS2 message processing

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-80344 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-80344

Vulnerability Analysis

The camel-as2 component implements the AS2 protocol for business-to-business message exchange. The AS2 specification allows a sender to request that the Message Disposition Notification be returned asynchronously to a URL the sender provides in the inbound message headers. The vulnerable implementation extracts that URL and uses it directly as the destination for the outbound receipt.

The receiver performs no validation that the supplied destination belongs to the configured partner, matches an allow-list, or resides outside the deployment's internal network. A remote partner can therefore choose any host the Camel instance can reach. This includes internal services such as cloud metadata endpoints, management interfaces, and other systems reachable only from inside the deployment network perimeter.

The impact extends beyond outbound request initiation. When MDN delivery is configured with authentication credentials, the camel-as2 component attaches those credentials to the forged outbound request. The attacker-controlled destination receives valid credentials that may authorize access to protected AS2 partner endpoints.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing input validation on an attacker-controlled destination field. The AS2 receiver treats the inbound asynchronous MDN address as trusted configuration rather than untrusted partner input. No URL constraint, host allow-list, or network boundary check is applied before the receipt connection is established.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires only the ability to send an AS2 message to the vulnerable receiver. The attacker crafts an inbound AS2 message with an asynchronous MDN return address pointing to an internal service or an attacker-controlled host. The receiver processes the message and initiates an outbound connection to the attacker-specified URL, carrying any configured MDN delivery credentials. See the Apache Camel CVE-2026-80344 Advisory and the fix in Apache Camel Pull Request #25637 for technical details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-80344

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP or HTTPS connections from the AS2 receiver to hosts outside the configured partner endpoint list.
  • MDN delivery attempts targeting internal IP ranges, cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254, or loopback addresses.
  • Authentication events on internal services originating from the AS2 receiver host that do not match normal partner traffic patterns.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect camel-as2 logs for asynchronous MDN delivery entries and correlate the destination URL against the configured partner endpoint list.
  • Monitor egress traffic from AS2 receiver hosts and alert on connections to internal RFC1918 ranges or cloud metadata services.
  • Review inbound AS2 message headers for Receipt-Delivery-Option values pointing to unexpected hosts.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose logging on the camel-as2 component to capture inbound asynchronous MDN requests and outbound receipt destinations.
  • Forward Camel application logs and host network telemetry to a centralized SIEM for correlation of AS2 processing with outbound connections.
  • Baseline normal MDN delivery destinations per partner and alert on deviations.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-80344

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Apache Camel to 4.23.0, 4.18.5, or 4.22.1 depending on your release stream.
  • Audit MDN delivery credential configuration and rotate any credentials that may have been exposed to untrusted hosts.
  • Restrict outbound network connectivity from the AS2 receiver to the specific hosts of legitimate AS2 partners.

Patch Information

Apache Camel 4.23.0 fixes the issue by constraining the asynchronous MDN destination rather than taking it verbatim from the inbound message. Users on the 4.18.x LTS stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. See the fix commits in Apache Camel Pull Request #25637, Pull Request #25763, and Pull Request #25764. Tracking is available in Apache Camel JIRA Issue CAMEL-24417.

Workarounds

  • Restrict outbound connectivity from the AS2 receiver using firewall or egress proxy rules that only permit traffic to known partner endpoints.
  • Remove or scope MDN delivery credentials so they are valid only for configured partner hosts and not reusable against other services.
  • Place the AS2 receiver in a network segment that cannot reach internal management interfaces or cloud metadata endpoints.
bash
# Example egress restriction using iptables to limit AS2 receiver outbound traffic
# Replace partner.example.com with your actual AS2 partner hostnames
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner camel -d partner.example.com -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner camel -d 169.254.169.254 -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner camel -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner camel -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.