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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-78163

CVE-2026-78163: Apache Camel Docling Component SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-78163 is a Server-Side Request Forgery flaw in Apache Camel Docling component that enables attackers to fetch remote resources or access local files. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-78163 Overview

CVE-2026-78163 affects the Apache Camel Docling component. The DoclingProducer interprets a String message body based on its prefix, implicitly selecting between a remote URL fetch, a local filesystem read, or a temporary file write. No endpoint option exists to pin the component to a single interpretation. An attacker who places controlled text into a message body that a route forwards into a Docling endpoint can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), path traversal [CWE-22], or disclosure of sensitive information. The flaw affects Apache Camel from 4.15.0 before 4.18.5 and from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.

Critical Impact

Attackers can coerce routes into fetching attacker-chosen URLs or reading arbitrary local files, exposing internal services and sensitive filesystem content.

Affected Products

  • Apache Camel 4.15.0 through 4.18.4 (fixed in 4.18.5)
  • Apache Camel 4.19.0 through 4.22.0 (fixed in 4.22.1)
  • Apache Camel 4.14.x and earlier (end of life, no fix provided)

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-78163 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-78163

Vulnerability Analysis

The DoclingProducer class dispatches on the shape of the incoming String body rather than on an explicit endpoint option. A body starting with http:// or https:// is handed to Docling as a remote URL. A body starting with / or containing a backslash is read from the local filesystem. Any other content is written to a temporary file and converted as document content.

Route authors cannot pin the component to a single interpretation. A route intended to convert arbitrary text can silently become a remote fetcher or local file reader whenever the inbound text begins with one of those prefixes. The only guard on the derived value is a size check, and that check is wrapped in an existence test. A path that resolves to nothing, or to a pseudo-file reporting a size of zero, bypasses the check entirely.

Five call sites reach the two sinks. The CLI mode appends the value as the final positional argument of the docling subprocess. The docling-serve mode passes the value either to HttpSource for backend fetching or to Files.readAllBytes for base64 encoding and upload.

Root Cause

The component selects behavior through implicit prefix inspection on the exchange body. Unlike the Camel header namespace, the exchange body is never filtered by a HeaderFilterStrategy. No opt-in flag or endpoint option gates the SSRF or filesystem sinks. The size guard is also conditional on existence, which lets non-existent or zero-size pseudo-files pass unchecked.

Attack Vector

A sender able to place text into a message that a route forwards into a Docling endpoint can reach both sinks. Supplying a body prefixed with http:// or https:// triggers an outbound request to an attacker-chosen URL, enabling SSRF against internal services. Supplying a body prefixed with / or containing a backslash triggers a filesystem read, enabling path traversal and disclosure of sensitive files readable by the Camel process. Exploitation requires only that external input reach the Docling route body, with no deployment opt-in required.

See the Apache Camel Security Advisory for CVE-2026-78163 and Apache Camel JIRA Issue CAMEL-24422 for technical details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-78163

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP or HTTPS requests from Camel JVMs to unexpected destinations, especially internal RFC1918 ranges or cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254.
  • Camel process reads of sensitive filesystem paths such as /etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ, or application secrets directories.
  • docling subprocess invocations where the final positional argument is a URL or absolute path derived from untrusted input.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect Camel route definitions for Docling endpoints that receive bodies originating from external transports such as HTTP, JMS, or Kafka without explicit type conversion.
  • Correlate egress network telemetry from Camel hosts with route execution logs to identify body-driven URL fetches.
  • Audit filesystem access logs for the Camel service account to flag reads outside the expected document working directory.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable Camel exchange logging with body type and prefix captured for all Docling routes.
  • Alert on HttpSource calls or Files.readAllBytes invocations originating from the Docling code path with input not matching a known allowlist.
  • Monitor the docling-serve backend for unexpected URL fetches not initiated by the application workflow.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-78163

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue.
  • If running the 4.22.x stream, upgrade to 4.22.1.
  • If running the 4.18.x stream, upgrade to 4.18.5.
  • Migrate 4.14.x and earlier deployments to a supported release, as those branches reached end of life before the fix.

Patch Information

The fix is tracked in Apache Camel JIRA Issue CAMEL-24422 and delivered through Pull Request #25596, Pull Request #25733, and Pull Request #25744. Fixed versions are 4.18.5, 4.22.1, and 4.23.0.

Workarounds

  • Do not route message bodies that originate outside the deployment into a Docling endpoint.
  • Pass the document through a typed body such as File, byte[], or InputStream so prefix interpretation never applies.
  • Alternatively, set the CamelDoclingInputFilePath header explicitly to a trusted path and ensure the body is not a String.
  • Apply network egress controls on Camel hosts to block outbound requests to internal ranges and cloud metadata endpoints.
bash
# Configuration example
# Convert the inbound body to a typed form before the Docling endpoint
# so that String prefix dispatch cannot occur.
from("direct:ingest")
  .convertBodyTo(byte[].class)
  .setHeader("CamelDoclingInputFilePath", constant("/var/app/trusted/input.pdf"))
  .to("docling:convert");

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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