Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-77967 Overview
CVE-2026-77967 affects the Botslab G980H dash camera firmware. The device accepts a reusable authentication value without adequately verifying its freshness or association with the requesting client. An unauthenticated attacker on an adjacent network can capture a valid authentication value and replay it from another client to establish an authenticated session. Successful exploitation grants access to privileged device functionality.
The weakness is tracked under CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay and was published to the National Vulnerability Database on 2026-09-24. CISA tracks the issue in advisory ICSA-26-267-01.
Critical Impact
Adjacent-network attackers can hijack authenticated sessions and reach privileged dash camera functions without any user interaction or credentials.
Affected Products
- Botslab G980H dash camera firmware
- See the CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-267-01 for specific affected firmware versions
- Vendor overview available at BotsLab
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-24 - CVE-2026-77967 published to NVD
- 2026-09-25 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-77967
Vulnerability Analysis
The Botslab G980H firmware implements an authentication scheme that reuses a single credential-equivalent value across sessions. The firmware does not bind this value to the originating client, nor does it enforce freshness through nonces, timestamps, or sequence numbers. Any party that observes the value on the wire can present it later to the device and be treated as the legitimate client.
Because the attack vector is adjacent network, the attacker must share a logical broadcast domain with the device or its paired companion app. In practice, this means the attacker is on the same Wi-Fi network, Bluetooth piconet, or vehicle hotspot used to communicate with the camera.
Once the replayed value is accepted, the attacker inherits the privileges of the original session. This exposes the camera's privileged functionality to an unauthenticated adversary with no user interaction required.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper authentication design classified under CWE-294. The firmware treats a static or long-lived authentication token as sufficient proof of identity. It omits the challenge-response, session binding, or cryptographic freshness controls that would make a captured value useless on replay.
Attack Vector
The attacker performs the following high-level steps. First, position on the adjacent network segment used by the camera and its control client. Second, passively capture traffic between the legitimate client and the camera to recover the reusable authentication value. Third, submit that value from a separate client to establish an authenticated session and invoke privileged device operations.
No authentication, no user interaction, and no elevated privileges are required for exploitation. See the GitHub CSAF File for the structured advisory data.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-77967
Indicators of Compromise
- Duplicate authentication tokens observed from two or more distinct client MAC or IP addresses within a short window
- Unexpected privileged API calls to the dash camera from clients that have never previously paired with it
- Session establishment events originating from untrusted devices on the vehicle hotspot or shared Wi-Fi network
Detection Strategies
- Capture and inspect traffic on the network segment shared with the camera to identify reuse of the same authentication value by multiple endpoints
- Alert on authentication success events from client fingerprints that do not match the enrolled companion-app device
- Correlate wireless association logs with camera session logs to flag sessions established from newly joined clients
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor the SSID and BSSID used by the camera for unauthorized client associations
- Log all configuration-change and privileged-function invocations on the device for later review
- Review vendor firmware release notes and the CISA ICS Advisory for updated indicators
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-77967
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict the wireless network the camera connects to so that only trusted, enrolled client devices can associate
- Disable the camera's wireless interface when it is not actively being configured or paired
- Review camera activity for any sessions initiated from unknown clients and revoke pairings that cannot be attributed
Patch Information
Refer to the CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-267-01 and the Botslab vendor page for firmware updates and remediation guidance. At the time of publication, no fixed firmware version is listed in the enriched NVD record.
Workarounds
- Segment the dash camera onto an isolated SSID or VLAN that is not shared with personal devices or guest clients
- Avoid pairing or administering the camera over public, vehicle-shared, or untrusted Wi-Fi networks
- Limit physical and wireless proximity to the device during pairing to reduce the window for traffic capture
# Example: isolate the camera on a dedicated SSID with client isolation enabled
# (syntax varies by access point vendor)
set wireless.camera_ssid.isolate=1
set wireless.camera_ssid.encryption=wpa3
set wireless.camera_ssid.access_list=<trusted_client_mac>
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

