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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-74225

CVE-2026-74225: U-Boot DHCPv6 Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

CVE-2026-74225 is a buffer overflow vulnerability in U-Boot that allows local network attackers to corrupt memory during netboot. This post explains the technical details, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-74225 Overview

CVE-2026-74225 is an out-of-bounds memory access vulnerability in Das U-Boot bootloader versions before 2026.10-rc5. The flaw resides in the dhcp6_parse_options() function within net/dhcpv6.c, which fails to validate the length of SERVERID and CLIENTID options received in DHCPv6 packets. An attacker on the local network can send crafted DHCPv6 ADVERTISE or REPLY packets during a netboot sequence to corrupt memory and crash the bootloader. The vulnerability is tracked under [CWE-787] (Out-of-bounds Write) and affects embedded systems that rely on U-Boot for network-based booting.

Critical Impact

Adjacent-network attackers can crash the bootloader and corrupt memory on embedded devices during DHCPv6 netboot, disrupting boot integrity.

Affected Products

  • Das U-Boot bootloader versions prior to 2026.10-rc5
  • Embedded systems and appliances using U-Boot DHCPv6 netboot
  • Firmware images built from v2026.07 and earlier releases containing net/dhcpv6.c

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-29 - CVE-2026-74225 published to NVD
  • 2026-09-29 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-74225

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability exists in the DHCPv6 client parsing routine in net/dhcpv6.c. When U-Boot processes a DHCPv6 ADVERTISE or REPLY message, it iterates through option headers and handles the DUID-bearing options DHCP6_OPTION_CLIENTID and DHCP6_OPTION_SERVERID. The parser trusts the option_len field supplied by the sender without bounding it against the internal DUID buffer size. This trust extends to a memcmp() against the local DUID and to subsequent copies that use option_len as a size parameter.

Because U-Boot runs in a pre-OS environment without memory protection, an out-of-bounds read or write can overwrite adjacent stack or heap structures. The result is corruption of bootloader state and a crash mid-boot, preventing the device from progressing to the operating system.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing input validation on attacker-controlled length fields. RFC 8415 §11.1 specifies that a DUID is a 2-octet type field plus at most 128 octets, giving a maximum of 130 bytes. U-Boot's original code did not enforce this ceiling before invoking memcmp(option_ptr, sm_params.duid, option_len) or before recording the server DUID for later use.

Attack Vector

An attacker on the same layer-2 network as the target device sends a malicious DHCPv6 ADVERTISE or REPLY packet containing a CLIENTID or SERVERID option with an oversized length field. During a netboot handshake, the target U-Boot instance processes the packet and performs an unbounded memory operation, corrupting bootloader memory.

c
// Patched excerpt from net/dhcpv6.c bounding DUID option lengths
switch (ntohs(option_hdr->option_id)) {
case DHCP6_OPTION_CLIENTID:
    if (option_len == sizeof(sm_params.duid) &&
        !memcmp(option_ptr, sm_params.duid, option_len)) {
        debug("CLIENT ID FOUND and MATCHES\n");
        sm_params.rx_status.client_id_match = true;
    } else {
        debug("CLIENT ID DOESN'T MATCH\n");
    }
    break;
case DHCP6_OPTION_SERVERID:
    if (option_len > DHCP6_DUID_MAX_LEN) {
        debug("SERVER ID too long\n");
        break;
    }
    sm_params.rx_status.server_id_found = true;
    sm_params.rx_status.server_uid_ptr = (uchar *)option_hdr;

Source: U-Boot commit 20209a62bc8565fc1e040882bc03c71ff0d73076

The patch introduces DHCP6_DUID_MAX_LEN (130 bytes) in net/dhcpv6.h and enforces both an exact-length check for CLIENTID and an upper bound for SERVERID before further processing.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-74225

Indicators of Compromise

  • DHCPv6 ADVERTISE or REPLY packets containing Option 1 (CLIENTID) or Option 2 (SERVERID) with option-length values exceeding 130 bytes.
  • Unexpected bootloader crashes, resets, or watchdog reboots occurring during PXE or netboot phases on U-Boot-based devices.
  • Rogue DHCPv6 servers on the local segment responding to solicitations from embedded devices.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect DHCPv6 traffic at network chokepoints for malformed DUID option lengths using packet captures or IDS signatures.
  • Correlate device boot logs with switch-port DHCPv6 activity to identify anomalous bootloader crashes tied to specific source MAC addresses.
  • Enable DHCPv6 snooping on managed switches to log and rate-limit responses reaching netboot clients.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Log all DHCPv6 server advertisements observed on VLANs that host embedded devices, and alert on unauthorized responders.
  • Monitor console and serial output from U-Boot devices for repeated boot failures that coincide with DHCPv6 traffic.
  • Track firmware inventory to identify devices still running U-Boot versions prior to 2026.10-rc5.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-74225

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade affected devices to U-Boot 2026.10-rc5 or later, which includes the DHCP6_DUID_MAX_LEN bounds check.
  • Restrict DHCPv6 traffic on segments hosting netboot devices to authorized servers only.
  • Where firmware updates are pending, disable DHCPv6-based netboot and fall back to a trusted local boot source.

Patch Information

The fix is contained in upstream commit 20209a62bc8565fc1e040882bc03c71ff0d73076 ("net: dhcp6: bound received DUID option lengths"). The patch adds #define DHCP6_DUID_MAX_LEN 130 in net/dhcpv6.h and enforces length validation for both CLIENTID and SERVERID options in dhcp6_parse_options(). See the VulnCheck advisory for additional context.

Workarounds

  • Disable IPv6 netboot in the U-Boot environment and use IPv4 DHCP or static configuration until firmware can be updated.
  • Deploy DHCPv6 guard or ACLs on access switches to block untrusted DHCPv6 server messages from reaching embedded clients.
  • Isolate netboot traffic on a dedicated management VLAN with strict layer-2 filtering.
bash
# Example: disable network boot in U-Boot environment and set static bootcmd
setenv bootdelay 0
setenv bootcmd 'run mmcboot'
setenv ipv6_autoconf off
saveenv
reset

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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