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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-114379

CVE-2026-114379: EKKOLearnAI ekko-studio RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2026-114379 is a remote code execution flaw in EKKOLearnAI ekko-studio affecting versions up to 1.0.6 through file inclusion in the Media Generation API. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-114379 Overview

CVE-2026-114379 is a file inclusion vulnerability in EKKOLearnAI ekko-studio versions up to 1.0.6. The flaw resides in the saveGeneratedImages function within packages/server/src/modules/studio/controllers/media.ts, part of the Media Generation API component. Attackers can manipulate the output_path argument to perform file inclusion attacks over the network. Exploitation requires low-privilege authenticated access but no user interaction. The weakness is tracked as [CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path]. EKKOLearnAI has published commit 1d42459c292f89e412f7f6243829e7fed2e85bf5 to remediate the issue.

Critical Impact

Remote authenticated attackers can control file paths processed by the Media Generation API, enabling unauthorized file read or write operations against the ekko-studio server.

Affected Products

  • EKKOLearnAI ekko-studio versions up to and including 1.0.6
  • Component: Media Generation API (packages/server/src/modules/studio/controllers/media.ts)
  • Function: saveGeneratedImages

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114379 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-114379

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability affects the saveGeneratedImages function in the ekko-studio server. The function accepts an output_path argument from client input and uses it to construct file system paths without sufficient validation. This behavior matches CWE-73, where external input controls a file path used by the application. An authenticated attacker can submit a crafted output_path to influence where generated media is written or which files the server includes during processing.

Because the Media Generation API is reachable over the network, the attacker does not need local access. The exploitation path requires low-level privileges and no user interaction. Successful exploitation can lead to limited integrity and availability impact on the server by causing files to be written to unintended locations or included from attacker-controlled paths.

Root Cause

The root cause is the absence of path canonicalization and allowlist validation on the output_path parameter inside saveGeneratedImages. Trusting a client-controlled path for file operations gives attackers direct control over the file system target used by the Media Generation API handler.

Attack Vector

The attack is executed remotely over the network against the ekko-studio API. An authenticated user issues a request to the media generation endpoint and supplies a crafted output_path value referencing a sensitive directory, a traversal sequence, or an unexpected file. The server then performs file operations against that path during the media save routine.

typescript
// Patch excerpt from commit 1d42459c292f89e412f7f6243829e7fed2e85bf5
// File: packages/server/src/modules/studio/controllers/media.ts
 function buildApiUrl(baseUrl: string, pathWithV1: string): string {
   const base = (baseUrl || 'https://api.apikey.fan/v1').replace(/\/+$/, '')
   const apiPath = pathWithV1.startsWith('/') ? pathWithV1 : `/${pathWithV1}`
-  if (base.endsWith('/v1') && apiPath.startsWith('/v1/')) return `${base}${apiPath.slice(3)}`
+  if (!apiPath.startsWith('/v1/')) return `${base}${apiPath}`
+
+  const providerPath = apiPath.slice(3)
+  if (base.endsWith('/v1')) return `${base}${providerPath}`
+  try {
+    const pathname = new URL(base).pathname.replace(/\/+$/, '')
+    // Match provider catalog API roots; plain proxy prefixes still need /v1.
+    if (/\/(?:v\d+(?:beta)?|openai)$/.test(pathname)) return `${base}${providerPath}`
+  } catch {
+    // Keep the legacy /v1 default for non-standard base URL strings.
+  }
   return `${base}${apiPath}`
 }

Source: GitHub Commit 1d42459. The patch tightens path construction logic for provider base URLs used by the media controller.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114379

Indicators of Compromise

  • Requests to ekko-studio media generation endpoints containing ../, absolute paths, or unusual file extensions in the output_path field.
  • Unexpected files created outside the configured media storage directory on the ekko-studio server.
  • Application errors in server logs referencing saveGeneratedImages with denied or malformed path operations.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect HTTP request bodies to the Media Generation API for output_path values that do not match the expected media directory prefix.
  • Correlate authenticated session identifiers with file system write events on the ekko-studio host to identify abnormal paths.
  • Compare the deployed ekko-studio version string against 1.0.6 and verify presence of commit 1d42459c292f89e412f7f6243829e7fed2e85bf5.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose logging on the ekko-studio API gateway and capture the full output_path parameter for post-event analysis.
  • Monitor file system activity in directories adjacent to the configured media output path for new or modified files.
  • Alert on process writes initiated by the ekko-studio Node.js process targeting paths outside the application data directory.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114379

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade ekko-studio to a release containing commit 1d42459c292f89e412f7f6243829e7fed2e85bf5 or apply the patch directly to packages/server/src/modules/studio/controllers/media.ts.
  • Restrict network access to the ekko-studio API to trusted users and internal networks until the patch is applied.
  • Audit existing accounts and rotate credentials for any user that could reach the Media Generation API.

Patch Information

EKKOLearnAI resolved the issue in commit 1d42459c292f89e412f7f6243829e7fed2e85bf5. Additional context is tracked in GitHub Issue #3319 and GitHub Pull Request #3404. The vulnerability record is also catalogued in VulDB CVE-2026-114379.

Workarounds

  • Place the ekko-studio service behind a reverse proxy that strips or rejects output_path parameters containing traversal sequences or absolute paths.
  • Run the ekko-studio Node.js process under a dedicated unprivileged user with write access limited to the intended media directory.
  • Apply filesystem-level controls such as AppArmor, SELinux, or container read-only mounts to prevent writes outside the media storage path.
bash
# Example: restrict ekko-studio writes using a dedicated user and directory
sudo useradd --system --home /var/lib/ekko-studio --shell /usr/sbin/nologin ekko
sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/ekko-studio/media
sudo chown -R ekko:ekko /var/lib/ekko-studio
sudo chmod 750 /var/lib/ekko-studio/media

# Run the service as the ekko user with a read-only root filesystem (systemd)
# /etc/systemd/system/ekko-studio.service
# [Service]
# User=ekko
# Group=ekko
# ProtectSystem=strict
# ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/ekko-studio/media
# NoNewPrivileges=true

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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