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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111679

CVE-2026-111679: Ekko Studio Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111679 is an authorization bypass flaw in Ekko Studio that lets authenticated users disable login rate limiters and clear lockouts. This post covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111679 Overview

CVE-2026-111679 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in Ekko Studio through version 0.7.36. The flaw exists in the /api/auth/locked-ips endpoint, which fails to restrict access to privileged administrative functions. Any authenticated user, including non-super_admin accounts, can list and clear server-wide login lockouts. Attackers send DELETE requests without an ip parameter to invoke the unlockAll() function, disabling the login rate limiter. This enables sustained password guessing attacks against super_admin accounts without triggering lockout defenses.

Critical Impact

Authenticated low-privilege users can disable the server-wide login rate limiter, enabling unrestricted password brute-force attacks against administrator accounts.

Affected Products

  • Ekko Studio versions through 0.7.36
  • packages/server/src/modules/studio/controllers/auth.ts (vulnerable controller)
  • packages/server/src/modules/studio/routes/auth.ts (unprotected route definition)

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111679 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-21 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111679

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the authentication controller logic exposed through the /api/auth/locked-ips route. The endpoint handles both GET requests (to list currently locked IP addresses) and DELETE requests (to clear lockouts). The route handler enforces authentication but omits a role check against the super_admin privilege level. When a DELETE request arrives without an ip query parameter, the controller invokes the unlockAll() function, which clears every entry in the server-wide login lockout table.

This defeats the login rate limiter, which is the primary control preventing automated credential guessing. An attacker holding any valid low-privilege session can continuously flush lockouts while a parallel worker attempts passwords against super_admin accounts. The result is unbounded brute-force capacity against the highest-privilege identities in the system.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing authorization check on a privileged administrative action. The route definition in routes/auth.ts registers the handler behind an authenticated middleware chain but does not require the super_admin role. The controller code itself does not re-verify the caller's role before executing unlockAll(), violating defense-in-depth principles for sensitive security controls.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the Ekko Studio API and valid credentials for any non-privileged account. The attacker performs the following high-level steps:

  • Authenticate to Ekko Studio as any low-privilege user to obtain a valid session.
  • Issue a DELETE request to /api/auth/locked-ips with no ip parameter.
  • The server executes unlockAll(), clearing all active login lockouts.
  • Launch or resume password-guessing attempts against super_admin accounts.
  • Repeat the DELETE call periodically to keep the rate limiter effectively disabled.

Reference patch commit from the upstream project: EKKOLearnAI/ekko-studio commit e65030bf.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111679

Indicators of Compromise

  • DELETE requests to /api/auth/locked-ips originating from non-super_admin user sessions.
  • Sudden drops in the count of locked IP entries without corresponding administrative activity.
  • Clusters of failed login attempts against super_admin accounts that never produce a lockout event.
  • Repeated access to /api/auth/locked-ips from the same session within short time windows.

Detection Strategies

  • Alert on any HTTP DELETE to /api/auth/locked-ips where the authenticated principal's role is not super_admin.
  • Correlate authentication failure spikes with API calls that reset lockout state in the same time window.
  • Baseline normal administrative traffic to the auth management endpoints and flag deviations.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose audit logging on all /api/auth/* endpoints, capturing user identity, role, request method, and parameters.
  • Forward Ekko Studio application and web server logs to a centralized analytics platform for correlation.
  • Monitor the ratio of failed login attempts to generated lockouts; a growing gap suggests lockout bypass activity.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111679

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Ekko Studio beyond version 0.7.36 once the vendor publishes a fixed release referencing CVE-2026-111679.
  • Audit application logs for prior DELETE /api/auth/locked-ips requests from non-administrative users.
  • Force password rotation on all super_admin accounts and review their recent authentication history.
  • Enforce multi-factor authentication on every super_admin identity to blunt residual brute-force risk.

Patch Information

The upstream project tracks the issue in GitHub issue 3057 and references commit e65030bf. The vulnerable code paths are documented in the auth controller source and the auth routes source. Additional analysis is available in the VulnCheck Security Advisory.

Workarounds

  • Block /api/auth/locked-ips at a reverse proxy or Web Application Firewall for all requests not originating from administrative source networks.
  • Restrict access to the Ekko Studio management interface using network segmentation and VPN-only connectivity.
  • Lower the overall account lockout threshold and extend lockout duration for super_admin accounts to reduce the window for brute-force success.
  • Temporarily disable low-privilege user self-registration until the fixed version is deployed.
bash
# Example reverse proxy rule (nginx) to restrict the vulnerable endpoint
location = /api/auth/locked-ips {
    allow 10.0.0.0/8;    # admin management network
    deny all;
    proxy_pass http://ekko_studio_backend;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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