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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-114121

CVE-2026-114121: Electron Framework Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-114121 is an authentication bypass flaw in Electron framework that allows untrusted content to launch external applications by misattributing protocol URL requests. This article covers technical details, affected versions, security impact, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-114121 Overview

CVE-2026-114121 is an origin validation vulnerability [CWE-346] in Electron, the framework for building cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML, and CSS. Requests to open external protocol URLs could be attributed to a document other than the one that initiated them. The requestingUrl value passed to session.setPermissionRequestHandler could identify trusted content for a launch requested by untrusted content. Applications that grant openExternal based on the requesting origin and allow untrusted content to open or navigate windows could permit untrusted content to launch OS-registered external applications. The issue is fixed in Electron versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.5.

Critical Impact

Untrusted web content loaded in an Electron application can impersonate a trusted origin and trigger launches of external OS-registered handlers, bypassing origin-based openExternal permission checks.

Affected Products

  • Electron versions prior to 42.11.3
  • Electron versions prior to 43.7.0
  • Electron versions prior to 44.3.0 and prior to 45.0.0-alpha.5

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114121 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-114121

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in how Electron attributes external protocol permission requests to a document. When content invokes shell.openExternal or triggers navigation to an external protocol URL, Electron forwards the request to the application via session.setPermissionRequestHandler. The handler receives a details object containing requestingUrl, which developers commonly use to allow or deny launches based on origin.

Before the fix, requestingUrl was populated from the last committed URL of the receiving RenderFrameHost rather than the initiator of the navigation. If untrusted content caused a trusted frame to navigate or open a window to an external protocol URL, the handler received the trusted frame's URL as requestingUrl. Policy decisions based on this value could therefore be made against the wrong origin.

Root Cause

The root cause is incorrect origin attribution [CWE-346] in electron_browser_client.cc and electron_permission_manager.cc. The code set requestingUrl using render_frame_host->GetLastCommittedURL() without checking whether the request originated from a different document. The fix threads the navigation initiator and initiating origin through HandleExternalProtocolInUI and allows the caller to pre-populate requestingUrl so the permission handler receives the true initiator.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires an Electron application that (1) exposes a permission handler granting openExternal based on origin and (2) permits untrusted content to open or navigate windows containing trusted content. The attacker loads untrusted content, causes a trusted window to be navigated to an attacker-controlled external protocol URL, and the application grants the launch believing the trusted origin requested it.

text
// Patch excerpt — shell/browser/electron_browser_client.cc
 void HandleExternalProtocolInUI(
     const GURL& url,
     content::WeakDocumentPtr document_ptr,
+    const std::optional<WebContentsPermissionHelper::ExternalProtocolRequester>&
+        initiator,
+    const std::optional<url::Origin>& initiating_origin,
     content::WebContents::OnceGetter web_contents_getter,
     bool has_user_gesture,
     bool is_primary_main_frame,

// Patch excerpt — shell/browser/electron_permission_manager.cc
-  details.Set("requestingUrl", render_frame_host->GetLastCommittedURL().spec());
-  details.Set("isMainFrame", render_frame_host->GetParent() == nullptr);
+  if (!details.Find("requestingUrl")) {
+    details.Set("requestingUrl",
+                render_frame_host->GetLastCommittedURL().spec());
+  }
+  if (!details.Find("isMainFrame")) {
+    details.Set("isMainFrame", render_frame_host->GetParent() == nullptr);
+  }

Source: GitHub Electron Commit 25057643

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114121

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected launches of OS-registered protocol handlers (for example ms-*:, mailto:, custom URI schemes) initiated by Electron applications.
  • Child process creation by an Electron application launching external programs with URL arguments that did not originate from user interaction.
  • Permission handler logs showing requestingUrl values from trusted origins immediately following loads of untrusted content in child windows.

Detection Strategies

  • Audit application source for session.setPermissionRequestHandler and session.setPermissionCheckHandler logic that bases openExternal decisions on requestingUrl or requestingOrigin.
  • Instrument the permission handler to log the handler frame URL alongside requestingUrl and alert on mismatches between the two.
  • Enumerate deployed Electron runtime versions across the fleet and flag any application running a version older than 42.11.3, 43.7.0, or 44.3.0.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Monitor process-creation telemetry for Electron parent processes spawning browsers, mail clients, or custom protocol handlers with suspicious URL arguments.
  • Track outbound navigations to non-HTTP(S) schemes from embedded webContents and correlate with the originating document.
  • Capture and retain Electron application permission handler decisions in centralized logs for post-incident review.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114121

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade bundled Electron to 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, or 45.0.0-alpha.5 and ship updated application builds to end users.
  • Review setPermissionRequestHandler implementations and deny openExternal by default, allow-listing only specific schemes and origins.
  • Restrict the ability of untrusted content to navigate or open windows containing trusted content by setting appropriate webPreferences and window-open handlers.

Patch Information

The fix was shipped in Electron v42.11.3, v43.7.0, v44.3.0, and v45.0.0-alpha.5. Technical details and remediation guidance are published in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-997q-gvvc-jwmx. Associated pull requests include #53682, #53696, #53697, #53698, and #53699.

Workarounds

  • Deny all openExternal permission requests from untrusted origins and require explicit user confirmation via an in-app prompt rendered by the main process.
  • Disable nativeWindowOpen behaviors or override webContents.setWindowOpenHandler to prevent untrusted content from navigating trusted windows.
  • Enforce a strict Content Security Policy and sandbox: true on BrowserWindow instances that render untrusted content to limit cross-document navigation primitives.
bash
# Example hardened permission handler (main process)
session.defaultSession.setPermissionRequestHandler((webContents, permission, callback, details) => {
  if (permission !== 'openExternal') return callback(false);
  const allowed = ['https://trusted.example.com'];
  const origin = (() => { try { return new URL(details.requestingUrl).origin; } catch { return ''; } })();
  callback(allowed.includes(origin));
});

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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