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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-113800

CVE-2026-113800: Electron Framework Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-113800 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Electron Framework affecting permission checks for HID and USB devices in iframes. This allows untrusted cross-origin iframes to gain unauthorized device access. This article covers technical details, affected versions, security impact, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-113800 Overview

CVE-2026-113800 affects the Electron framework, which is used to build cross-platform desktop applications with JavaScript, HTML, and CSS. The vulnerability resides in the WebHID and WebUSB permission handling logic. When hid or usb permission checks originate from an iframe, Electron passes the top-level frame's origin to setPermissionCheckHandler instead of the requesting frame's origin. Applications that delegate device access to cross-origin untrusted iframes using origin-based authorization logic may therefore grant device access intended only for the top-level page [CWE-346: Origin Validation Error].

Critical Impact

A cross-origin untrusted iframe can receive WebHID or WebUSB device permissions that the application intended to grant only to the embedding top-level page.

Affected Products

  • Electron versions prior to 42.11.3
  • Electron versions prior to 43.7.0
  • Electron versions prior to 44.3.0 and prior to 45.0.0-alpha.5

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-113800 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-113800

Vulnerability Analysis

Electron's permission model grants, checks, and revokes WebHID and WebUSB device permissions on a per-document basis. The application receives the requesting document's origin through setPermissionCheckHandler to make authorization decisions. The vulnerability stems from HidService and WebUsbServiceImpl being constructed with the primary main frame's origin instead of the requesting frame's origin.

This mismatch means that when a cross-origin iframe triggers delegate calls such as CanRequestDevicePermission, HasDevicePermission, RevokeDevicePermission, IsFidoAllowedForOrigin, or AdjustProtectedInterfaceClasses, the handler receives the top-level page's origin. An application using origin-based logic to allow or deny device access will treat the iframe's request as if it came from the top-level document.

Root Cause

In upstream Chromium, device permissions are delegated via Permissions Policy and keyed on the primary main frame's origin. Electron, however, keys permissions per requesting document. The services were constructed using render_frame_host->GetMainFrame()->GetLastCommittedOrigin(), which does not match Electron's per-document permission model when the request originates from a sub-frame.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires an Electron application to delegate hid or usb to a cross-origin, untrusted iframe through Permissions Policy, and to rely on origin-based logic in its permission check handler. A malicious or compromised embedded frame can then request HID or USB device access and be evaluated as the trusted top-level origin, receiving access to connected devices such as security keys, authenticators, or peripherals.

text
// Patch from Electron: construct services with the requesting frame's origin
// Source: https://github.com/electron/electron/commit/22de0a3a06cfd3174fc6c59c3810ab5e1c91bf1a

diff --git a/content/browser/hid/hid_service.cc b/content/browser/hid/hid_service.cc
--- a/content/browser/hid/hid_service.cc
+++ b/content/browser/hid/hid_service.cc
@@ HidService::HidService(RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host)
     : HidService(render_frame_host,
                  /*service_worker_version=*/nullptr,
-                 render_frame_host->GetMainFrame()->GetLastCommittedOrigin()) {}
+                 render_frame_host->GetLastCommittedOrigin()) {}

Source: GitHub Commit 22de0a3

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-113800

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected WebHID or WebUSB device enumeration events originating from embedded cross-origin frames within an Electron application.
  • Permission grant records in application logs where the recorded origin does not match the originating document's actual URL.
  • Access attempts to FIDO/U2F security keys or privileged USB interface classes from embedded third-party content.

Detection Strategies

  • Audit application code for calls to session.setPermissionCheckHandler and session.setDevicePermissionHandler that make allow/deny decisions based solely on details.origin.
  • Review Permissions Policy headers and <iframe allow="hid; usb"> directives that delegate device permissions to untrusted origins.
  • Inventory deployed Electron runtimes across endpoints and flag versions earlier than 42.11.3, 43.7.0, or 44.3.0.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Monitor process and child-process telemetry for Electron applications invoking HID or USB device APIs in unexpected contexts.
  • Correlate renderer frame origin with permission handler outcomes in application logs to detect origin mismatches.
  • Track installed Electron application versions via software inventory to identify unpatched builds.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-113800

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Electron to 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, or 45.0.0-alpha.5 and rebuild affected applications.
  • Remove hid and usb from Permissions Policy delegations to any untrusted cross-origin iframes until patched builds are deployed.
  • Review setPermissionCheckHandler implementations and reject device permission requests when the embedding frame chain contains untrusted origins.

Patch Information

The fix is tracked in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-fw47-9c62-h3vw and shipped in the v42.11.3, v43.7.0, v44.3.0, and v45.0.0-alpha.5 releases. The patches construct HidService and WebUsbServiceImpl with the requesting frame's origin so that CanRequestDevicePermission, HasDevicePermission, RevokeDevicePermission, and related delegate calls receive the same origin under which grants are stored.

Workarounds

  • Disable WebHID and WebUSB entirely in setPermissionCheckHandler and setDevicePermissionHandler for any session that loads untrusted content.
  • Enforce frame-ancestor and sandbox restrictions on iframes, and avoid granting hid or usb via <iframe allow="..."> to third-party origins.
  • Validate the full frame ancestor chain in permission handlers rather than relying only on the reported details.origin.
bash
# Verify installed Electron version in a project
npx electron --version

# Upgrade to a patched release line
npm install --save-dev electron@42.11.3
# or
npm install --save-dev electron@43.7.0
# or
npm install --save-dev electron@44.3.0

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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