Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-114087 Overview
CVE-2026-114087 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in Trigger.dev self-hosted Docker Compose deployments before version 4.5.6. The flaw exists because deployments using default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example ship with a hardcoded MAGIC_LINK_SECRET. Any unauthenticated attacker can forge valid magic link tokens and log in as any email address. After gaining access, attackers can reach Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse backends using default credentials from runner containers on the infrastructure network. The weakness is tracked under CWE-653: Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization and compromises all tenant data in the affected deployment.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated remote attackers can impersonate any user and gain full access to Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse datastores holding tenant data.
Affected Products
- Trigger.dev self-hosted Docker Compose deployments before 4.5.6
- Deployments using default MAGIC_LINK_SECRET from hosting/docker/.env.example
- Runner containers reaching Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse with default credentials
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114087 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-114087
Vulnerability Analysis
Trigger.dev issues magic link authentication tokens signed with a secret value stored in MAGIC_LINK_SECRET. In self-hosted Docker Compose deployments, operators frequently copy hosting/docker/.env.example without rotating the included defaults. Because the example file ships with a hardcoded signing secret, every deployment that reuses it signs tokens with the same known key. An attacker who obtains or guesses this public value can mint tokens for arbitrary email addresses and complete the magic link flow as any user, including administrators.
After authentication, the attacker inherits the trust boundary of a valid tenant. Runner containers on the infrastructure network connect to Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse using additional default credentials shipped in the same example configuration. This chain yields full read and write access to tenant data, job history, and secrets stored by the platform. For technical context see the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x and the VulnCheck Advisory.
Root Cause
The root cause is reliance on a publicly known default secret for a security-critical signing operation. The example environment file commits a usable MAGIC_LINK_SECRET instead of forcing operators to generate one at install time. Default credentials for Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse compound the issue by removing isolation between application and data tiers [CWE-653].
Attack Vector
Attack is network-based and requires no authentication or user interaction. An attacker locates an internet-reachable Trigger.dev self-hosted instance, forges a magic link token signed with the known default secret for a target email address, and submits it to the login endpoint. Once authenticated, lateral access to Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse is reachable from runner containers that use the same default credential set.
No verified public exploit code is available. See the vendor advisory for technical details.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-114087
Indicators of Compromise
- Successful magic link logins without a preceding user-initiated request, especially for administrator email addresses.
- Authentication events originating from unfamiliar IP addresses or geographies for privileged tenant accounts.
- Outbound connections from runner containers to Postgres, Redis, or ClickHouse at unusual times or volumes.
Detection Strategies
- Audit the running configuration and verify that MAGIC_LINK_SECRET does not match the string committed in hosting/docker/.env.example.
- Compare Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse credentials against the defaults in the Trigger.dev example file and flag any match.
- Review application logs for magic link token verification events to identify tokens signed with the default secret.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on new or unexpected administrator sessions and privilege changes in Trigger.dev tenants.
- Monitor east-west traffic between runner containers and datastore services for anomalous queries or bulk reads.
- Enable authentication logging on Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse to capture unexpected client sources.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114087
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Trigger.dev self-hosted Docker Compose deployments to version 4.5.6 or later.
- Rotate MAGIC_LINK_SECRET to a cryptographically random value and invalidate existing sessions and magic link tokens.
- Rotate all Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse credentials and remove any defaults inherited from hosting/docker/.env.example.
- Review authentication and database logs for evidence of unauthorized access during the exposure window.
Patch Information
Trigger.dev addressed the issue in version 4.5.6. Patch and configuration guidance is published in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x. Operators must both upgrade and rotate secrets, because an upgrade alone does not invalidate credentials that remain unchanged from the example file.
Workarounds
- Replace every secret in the deployment .env file with randomly generated values before starting services.
- Restrict access to the Trigger.dev web interface using a reverse proxy, VPN, or IP allowlist until patching and rotation complete.
- Segment runner containers from datastore services so that compromised runners cannot reach Postgres, Redis, or ClickHouse with default credentials.
# Configuration example: generate strong replacement secrets
openssl rand -hex 32 # use output as MAGIC_LINK_SECRET
openssl rand -hex 32 # use output as SESSION_SECRET
openssl rand -base64 24 # use output for Postgres, Redis, ClickHouse passwords
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

