Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-114077 Overview
CVE-2026-114077 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in Trigger.dev versions before 4.5.6. The flaw resides in the createDeploymentBackgroundWorkerV4 function, which resolves a WorkerDeployment by friendlyId alone. The function fails to scope lookups by environment, project, or organization. An attacker holding only a valid API key for their own environment can POST to the deployment background-workers endpoint using a victim's deployment ID. This re-points an in-progress deployment to a worker in the attacker's environment, enabling cross-tenant hijacking.
Critical Impact
Any authenticated tenant can hijack in-progress deployments across tenant boundaries, redirecting background workers to attacker-controlled code paths.
Affected Products
- Trigger.dev versions prior to 4.5.6
- Self-hosted Trigger.dev deployments running the affected createDeploymentBackgroundWorkerV4 code path
- Multi-tenant Trigger.dev installations exposing the deployment background-workers API endpoint
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114077 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-114077
Vulnerability Analysis
Trigger.dev is a background job and workflow orchestration platform supporting multi-tenant deployments. The vulnerability is classified as [CWE-639] Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The createDeploymentBackgroundWorkerV4 function accepts a deployment identifier from the request and resolves the corresponding WorkerDeployment record using only the friendlyId field. No additional tenant-scoping checks validate that the deployment belongs to the caller's environment, project, or organization.
Because friendlyId values are discoverable or guessable identifiers, an attacker who learns a victim deployment's ID can bind an attacker-controlled background worker to that deployment. The in-progress deployment then executes code paths registered in the attacker's environment under the victim's deployment context.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing object-level authorization. The lookup query retrieves the deployment record without filtering by the caller's tenant context derived from the API key. The authenticated identity is validated at the transport layer but not re-checked against the target resource's ownership before the write operation proceeds.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires a valid Trigger.dev environment API key, which any registered tenant possesses. The attacker sends an HTTP POST request to the deployment background-workers endpoint with the victim's deployment friendlyId and a worker definition from the attacker's own environment. The server resolves the deployment without checking ownership and associates the attacker's worker with the victim's deployment. No exploitation code is published; see the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-2gvw-9968-v578 and the VulnCheck Advisory for Trigger.dev for additional technical context.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-114077
Indicators of Compromise
- POST requests to the deployment background-workers endpoint where the authenticated API key's environment does not match the target deployment's environment.
- WorkerDeployment records whose associated background worker references a project or organization different from the deployment's owning tenant.
- Unexpected changes to in-progress deployments shortly after they are initiated by the legitimate tenant.
Detection Strategies
- Review application logs for calls into createDeploymentBackgroundWorkerV4 and correlate the authenticated environment ID with the resolved deployment's environment ID.
- Audit database records to identify deployments linked to workers from mismatched environments or organizations.
- Alert on any API client that references deployment friendlyId values outside its own tenant scope.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose audit logging on all deployment lifecycle endpoints and ship the logs to a centralized SIEM for cross-tenant correlation.
- Baseline normal API-key-to-tenant access patterns and alert on deviations such as requests referencing foreign deployment identifiers.
- Monitor for anomalous worker registrations occurring during the deployment transition window.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114077
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Trigger.dev to version 4.5.6 or later on all self-hosted and managed instances.
- Rotate environment API keys for any tenant suspected of unauthorized access or whose deployments were modified unexpectedly.
- Audit historical WorkerDeployment records for cross-tenant worker associations and roll back affected deployments.
Patch Information
Trigger.dev version 4.5.6 fixes the authorization bypass by scoping WorkerDeployment resolution to the caller's environment, project, and organization. Refer to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-2gvw-9968-v578 for the full fix details and upgrade guidance.
Workarounds
- Restrict network access to the deployment background-workers endpoint to trusted internal callers where feasible.
- Reduce the issuance scope of environment API keys and shorten key rotation intervals until patching is complete.
- Monitor and manually review all deployment background-worker creation events until the upgrade is deployed.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

