Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-113678 Overview
CVE-2026-113678 is a symlink following vulnerability [CWE-59] in Froxlor server administration software before version 2.3.15. The flaw resides in the Statistics::makeChownWithNewStats function and is reachable through the root-run traffic cron. Authenticated customers can replace the goaccess statistics directory inside their document root with a symbolic link. When the traffic cron executes chown -R as root, it follows the symlink and transfers ownership of arbitrary host directories to the attacker. This hand-off of root-owned trees enables full root privilege escalation on the host.
Critical Impact
Authenticated Froxlor customers can escalate to root on the hosting server by abusing symlink following in the traffic cron, resulting in complete system compromise.
Affected Products
- Froxlor versions prior to 2.3.15
- Froxlor 2.3.14 (confirmed vulnerable source reference)
- Deployments relying on the root-run traffic/goaccess cron
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-113678 published to NVD
- 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-113678
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability exists in Froxlor's HTTP statistics processing path at lib/Froxlor/Http/Statistics.php. The makeChownWithNewStats routine recursively changes ownership of the goaccess statistics directory inside each customer's document root. Because the traffic cron runs as root and uses chown -R without symlink containment, any symbolic link planted by the customer is traversed. The attacker-controlled target then receives the customer's UID and GID, granting read, write, and execute control over sensitive files such as /etc/shadow, /root/.ssh, or systemd unit directories. From there, an attacker can modify authentication files, drop SUID binaries, or hijack scheduled jobs to gain a root shell.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing symlink containment during recursive ownership changes performed by a privileged cron. Froxlor trusted the directory layout inside the customer's home even though the customer owns the parent and can swap entries between cron runs. The fix hardens path validation so normalized paths are compared consistently and prevents fopen('w') and chown from escaping the configured directory.
Attack Vector
An authenticated low-privileged Froxlor customer logs into their account and navigates to their document root on disk. They remove the existing goaccess statistics directory and replace it with a symlink pointing to any root-owned path on the host. On the next scheduled traffic cron execution, the root process recursively chowns the symlink target to the customer's UID, yielding ownership of system files that can be weaponized for privilege escalation.
// Patch excerpt: lib/Froxlor/Cron/Http/Php/Fcgid.php
public function getStarterFile()
{
- $starter_filename = FileDir::makeCorrectFile($this->getConfigDir() . '/php-fcgi-starter');
+ // the customer owns $configdir's contents (though not $configdir itself), so a filename
+ // inside it could have been replaced with a symlink since the last run - re-validate so
+ // the fopen('w')/chown in createStarterFile() can't follow it outside of $configdir
+ $configdir = $this->getConfigDir();
+ $starter_filename = FileDir::makeCorrectFile($configdir . '/php-fcgi-starter', $configdir);
return $starter_filename;
}
// Source: https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/0805a7e16a223d528b51d8cacfaff54217b9d8f8
// Patch excerpt: lib/Froxlor/FileDir.php - normalized path validation
- $fixed_homedir = self::makeCorrectDir($fixed_homedir);
- $to_check = explode("/", substr($filename, strlen($fixed_homedir)), -1);
+ $fixed_homedir = rtrim(preg_replace('#/+#', '/', self::makeCorrectDir($fixed_homedir)), '/') . '/';
+ $filename_to_check = preg_replace('#/+#', '/', $filename);
+ $to_check = explode("/", substr($filename_to_check, strlen($fixed_homedir)), -1);
$check_dir = substr($fixed_homedir, 0, -1);
// Symlink check
foreach ($to_check as $sub_dir) {
// Source: https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/0805a7e16a223d528b51d8cacfaff54217b9d8f8
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-113678
Indicators of Compromise
- Symbolic links inside customer document roots pointing outside the customer home, especially where goaccess statistics directories should reside.
- Unexpected ownership changes on root-owned paths such as /etc, /root, or /var after a traffic cron run.
- New or modified SUID binaries or SSH authorized_keys entries following statistics processing.
Detection Strategies
- Audit customer document roots for symlinks whose targets escape the customer home directory tree.
- Monitor Froxlor traffic cron executions for chown -R operations on paths that resolve outside expected directories.
- Correlate filesystem ownership changes with Froxlor cron job start and stop events in system logs.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable Linux auditd rules on chown, fchownat, and symlinkat syscalls originating from Froxlor cron processes.
- Alert on any ownership transition of files in /etc, /root, /usr, or /var to non-root UIDs.
- Track Froxlor version strings across managed hosts to confirm all instances have reached 2.3.15 or later.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-113678
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Froxlor to version 2.3.15 or later on all hosting servers without delay.
- Review every customer document root for pre-planted symlinks and remove suspicious entries before the next cron run.
- Rotate credentials and inspect /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, and SSH key files for unauthorized changes.
Patch Information
The fix is delivered in Froxlor 2.3.15 via commit 0805a7e. The patch adds symlink containment to the traffic and fcgid crons and normalizes path comparisons in FileDir. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-vwjv-x8ff-4cvv and the Vulncheck advisory for full details.
Workarounds
- Temporarily disable the Froxlor traffic cron until the host is upgraded to 2.3.15.
- Disable goaccess statistics generation for customer accounts to remove the vulnerable code path.
- Restrict customer shell and SFTP access to prevent crafting of malicious symlinks between cron runs.
# Example: disable the Froxlor traffic cron until patched
sudo systemctl stop froxlor-cron.timer
sudo systemctl disable froxlor-cron.timer
# After upgrading to 2.3.15, re-enable:
# sudo systemctl enable --now froxlor-cron.timer
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

