Skip to main content
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-113677

CVE-2026-113677: Froxlor Authorization Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-113677 is an authorization bypass flaw in Froxlor that lets authenticated customers delete reseller-provisioned domains. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-113677 Overview

CVE-2026-113677 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in Froxlor, an open-source server management panel. Versions from 0.10.0 before 2.3.15 fail to enforce ownership checks in the SubDomains.delete API command. Authenticated customers can supply a main domain id and delete reseller-provisioned main domains that they do not own. The flaw bypasses a web UI restriction (domains_cantdeletemaindomain) that is enforced only client-side in the admin panel. Successful exploitation orphans virtual host entries, DNS records, and subdomain records tied to the deleted domain. It also decrements the subdomains_used counter below zero, granting the attacker additional subdomain allowance beyond the configured quota.

Critical Impact

Authenticated low-privilege customers can delete reseller-owned main domains through the API, causing hosting service disruption and quota bypass.

Affected Products

  • Froxlor server management panel versions 0.10.0 through 2.3.14
  • Fixed in Froxlor 2.3.15
  • Deployments exposing the Froxlor API to authenticated customer accounts

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-113677 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-113677

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the SubDomains.delete API endpoint located in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/SubDomains.php. Froxlor's SubDomains.get() method returns both subdomains and main domains (those with parentdomainid = 0) owned by a customer, because customer views need to display details for assigned main domains. The deletion handler reused the same lookup logic without validating whether the resolved record was a subdomain. As a result, a customer could invoke the API, pass a main domain id, and trigger domain removal despite the UI blocking the action with domains_cantdeletemaindomain.

The deletion executes the full teardown routine: it removes vhost configuration, cleans DNS records, decrements the customer's subdomains_used counter, and purges associated subdomain records that depend on the parent domain. Because the counter decrement runs unconditionally, deleting a main domain causes subdomains_used to go negative, allowing the attacker to provision subdomains beyond their reseller-assigned quota.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing authorization check [CWE-862]. The deletion path trusted the shared lookup helper and never asserted that the target record had a non-zero parentdomainid for non-admin callers. Ownership for main domains belongs to the admin or reseller that provisioned them, not the customer the domain is assigned to.

Attack Vector

An attacker needs valid customer credentials and API access. The attacker enumerates assigned main domain ids via SubDomains.get, then calls SubDomains.delete with a main domain id. No user interaction is required and complexity is low.

php
// Security patch in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/SubDomains.php
// get needed customer info to reduce the subdomain-usage-counter by one
$customer = $this->getCustomerData();

// SubDomains.get() also returns main domains (parentdomainid = 0) owned by the customer
// (needed to show e.g. domain details), but customers must never be able to delete their
// main domain through here - it's not theirs to delete, an admin/reseller assigned it and
// owns the domains_used quota it counts against; the UI already blocks this
// (customer_domains.php: domains_cantdeletemaindomain), enforce it here too
if (!$this->isAdmin() && $result['parentdomainid'] == '0') {
    Response::standardError('domains_cantdeletemaindomain', '', true);
}

if (!$this->isAdmin() && $result['caneditdomain'] == 0) {
    throw new Exception("You cannot edit this resource", 405);
}

Source: Froxlor Commit 078e3f4b

Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails

Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.

Stop Identity Attacks

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-113677

Indicators of Compromise

  • Froxlor API audit log entries showing SubDomains.delete calls from non-admin customer accounts targeting ids whose parentdomainid = 0
  • Sudden disappearance of vhost configuration files or DNS zone files for reseller-provisioned main domains
  • subdomains_used counter values below zero in the Froxlor database panel_customers table
  • Unexplained removal of child subdomain records associated with a deleted parent domain

Detection Strategies

  • Query the Froxlor database for customers where subdomains_used < 0, which indicates abuse of the deletion flow
  • Review API access logs for SubDomains.delete requests and correlate the supplied domain id against the panel_domains.parentdomainid field
  • Alert when non-admin API tokens issue destructive domain operations outside normal maintenance windows

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose API logging in Froxlor and forward logs to a central SIEM for retention and correlation
  • Monitor file system changes under the vhost configuration directory and DNS zone directories for unexpected deletions
  • Track database integrity by scheduling periodic reconciliation jobs between panel_domains and generated vhost or zone files

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-113677

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Froxlor to version 2.3.15 or later, which enforces the authorization check in SubDomains.delete
  • Audit the panel_customers.subdomains_used column and reset any negative values to a correct count
  • Review API logs since the upgrade window to identify any main domain deletions performed by customer accounts
  • Restore removed vhost, DNS, and subdomain records from backups where unauthorized deletions are confirmed

Patch Information

The fix is included in Froxlor Release 2.3.15. The patch adds a server-side check that rejects SubDomains.delete calls from non-admin users when the target record has parentdomainid = 0. Technical details are described in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-pp2f-frcg-w8rv and the VulnCheck Advisory.

Workarounds

  • Restrict API access to admin accounts only until the upgrade is applied, by disabling API keys for customer accounts in the Froxlor settings
  • Place the Froxlor administration interface behind an IP allowlist or VPN to reduce the exposure surface for authenticated API abuse
  • Apply the upstream patch manually by editing lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/SubDomains.php to add the parentdomainid check shown in the vendor commit
bash
# Upgrade Froxlor to the patched release
cd /var/www/froxlor
git fetch --tags
git checkout 2.3.15
php bin/froxlor-cli froxlor:integrity-check --fix
systemctl reload php-fpm nginx

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.