Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-113676 Overview
CVE-2026-113676 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in Froxlor, an open-source server administration panel. Versions from 0.10.0 before 2.3.15 contain a flaw in the Admins.get API command that permits identifier confusion between the id and loginname parameters. A reseller account can supply their own loginname paired with another admin's numeric id to retrieve that admin's full record. Disclosed data includes contact email addresses, IP allow-lists, resource limits, internal notes, and login history. The weakness is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Critical Impact
Any authenticated reseller can read sensitive details of every other admin account in the panel, exposing operational metadata and credentials-adjacent information.
Affected Products
- Froxlor server management panel versions 0.10.0 through 2.3.14
- Deployments exposing the Froxlor API endpoint to reseller users
- Hosting environments relying on Froxlor for multi-tenant administration
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-113676 published to NVD
- 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database
- Froxlor 2.3.15 - Vendor releases patched version containing commit 981400f
Technical Details for CVE-2026-113676
Vulnerability Analysis
The Admins.get API command in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php accepts two optional identifiers: a numeric id and a string loginname. The pre-patch authorization check used a logical OR between these parameters when deciding whether a reseller could proceed. A reseller without the change_serversettings privilege passed the gate as long as either value matched their own identity.
The downstream SQL query, however, was driven by the id parameter alone. An attacker could therefore submit their own loginname to satisfy the authorization check while supplying any other admin's id to retrieve that record. The result is a horizontal privilege escalation against the admin tier of the panel.
The exposed row includes contact email, IP allow-lists, resource and quota limits, administrative notes, and login history timestamps. This information supports reconnaissance for follow-on account takeover attempts, phishing, or IP-based filter evasion.
Root Cause
The authorization logic conflated two independent identifiers and treated matching either one as sufficient proof of identity. Because the SQL lookup trusted id exclusively, the loginname branch of the OR permitted an attacker-controlled id to pass unchecked.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires an authenticated reseller account and network access to the Froxlor API. The attacker issues a single API request to Admins.get, setting loginname to their own account and id to the numeric identifier of a target admin. The response returns the target's full record.
// Patch: lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php
$ln_optional = $id > 0;
$loginname = $this->getParam('loginname', $ln_optional, '');
// a reseller (no change_serversettings) may only fetch their own record. Reject the
// request if either identifier that was actually supplied does not match their own
// identity - a mismatched id paired with the caller's own loginname (or vice versa)
// used to pass this gate on the OR below, and the query afterwards is driven by id
// alone, which let a reseller read any other admin's full row by id
if ($this->isAdmin() && $this->getUserDetail('change_serversettings') != 1
&& (($id > 0 && $id != $this->getUserDetail('adminid')) || (!empty($loginname) && $loginname != $this->getUserDetail('loginname')))) {
throw new Exception("Not allowed to execute given command.", 403);
}
if ($this->isAdmin() && ($this->getUserDetail('change_serversettings') == 1 || ($this->getUserDetail('adminid') == $id || $this->getUserDetail('loginname') == $loginname))) {
$result_stmt = Database::prepare("
SELECT * FROM `" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "`
Source: Froxlor commit 981400f. The patch adds an explicit rejection when the supplied id or loginname does not match the caller's own identity, closing the OR gap.
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-113676
Indicators of Compromise
- API requests to Admins.get where the supplied id and loginname parameters resolve to different admin accounts.
- Reseller sessions issuing repeated Admins.get calls iterating sequential numeric id values.
- Access-log entries from reseller IP addresses retrieving admin records they do not own.
Detection Strategies
- Review Froxlor API access logs for Admins.get invocations originating from reseller accounts that lack the change_serversettings privilege.
- Correlate the authenticated session identity with the id parameter in each request and flag mismatches.
- Audit database query logs for SELECT * FROM panel_admins statements tied to reseller session contexts.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward Froxlor web and application logs to a centralized logging platform and alert on Admins.get enumeration patterns.
- Baseline normal reseller API behavior and alert when a single account queries multiple distinct admin identifiers in a short window.
- Monitor for outbound notification traffic to unexpected contact email addresses, which may indicate harvested data in use.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-113676
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Froxlor to version 2.3.15 or later, which contains the fix in commit 981400f.
- Rotate reseller credentials and review which accounts hold API access.
- Audit admin records for exposed metadata such as IP allow-lists and update them where disclosure poses risk.
Patch Information
The fix is published in Froxlor release 2.3.15. Technical details are available in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-m7gc-8c8g-4f89 and the VulnCheck advisory. The patched check rejects any Admins.get call where the supplied identifier does not match the caller's own adminid or loginname.
Workarounds
- Restrict Froxlor API access to trusted management networks using firewall rules or a reverse proxy allow-list.
- Temporarily revoke API privileges from reseller accounts until the upgrade is applied.
- Place the Froxlor administrative interface behind an authenticated VPN or bastion host to reduce external exposure.
# Upgrade Froxlor to the patched release
cd /var/www/froxlor
git fetch --tags
git checkout 2.3.15
# Verify the installed version
grep -R "VERSION" lib/Froxlor/Froxlor.php | head -n 1
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

