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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-112112

CVE-2026-112112: BIRD Routing Daemon Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-112112 is an authentication bypass flaw in CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon that allows BGP peers to inject unauthorized FlowSpec rules. This post covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-112112 Overview

CVE-2026-112112 is an IPv6 FlowSpec validation bypass in the CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon. An established Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) peer can inject FlowSpec rules that match destinations outside the address space authorized by the unicast-route validation procedure. BIRD fails to reject a destination prefix component with a nonzero offset, contrary to RFC 8956 section 5. It instead validates a reconstructed prefix with zero-filled skipped bits, even though the original FlowSpec component can match a broader set of IPv6 addresses. When export policy permits, the rule can propagate to downstream peers and cause unauthorized traffic filtering or redirection.

Critical Impact

An authenticated BGP peer can bypass FlowSpec validation on the flow6 channel, injecting rules that affect address space beyond what the peer is authorized to advertise.

Affected Products

  • CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon v2.20.0
  • CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon v3.4.0
  • BIRD deployments with validation enabled on an IPv6 flow6 channel

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-18 - CVE-2026-112112 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-112112

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw is an improper input validation issue classified under [CWE-1284], affecting how BIRD validates FlowSpec destination prefix components received over BGP. RFC 8956 section 5 requires that FlowSpec rules be validated against unicast routes advertised by the same peer. The validation procedure must consider the full address range a FlowSpec component can match. BIRD's implementation strips the offset metadata and reconstructs the prefix with zero-filled skipped bits before validation.

This reconstruction causes the validated prefix to represent a narrower, zero-anchored range than the FlowSpec rule actually matches. A peer that holds a legitimate unicast route for a narrow prefix can therefore pass validation for a FlowSpec rule that acts on a much broader IPv6 destination set. See the implementation lines at BIRD v2.20.0 rt-table.c and BIRD v3.4.0 rt-table.c.

Root Cause

The root cause is the handling of IPv6 FlowSpec destination components with a nonzero offset. RFC 8956 requires that such components be rejected during validation. BIRD instead accepts them and validates a synthesized prefix with the skipped high-order bits set to zero. The behavioral mismatch between the validated prefix and the enforcing prefix lets the rule evade the unicast-route authorization check described in RFC 8956 Section 5.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires an established BGP session with a BIRD speaker that has the flow6 channel enabled with validation. The attacker advertises a legitimate unicast IPv6 route for a prefix they control, then advertises a FlowSpec rule whose destination component carries a nonzero offset. BIRD accepts the rule after validating the zero-filled reconstruction. If export policy allows redistribution, downstream peers receive and enforce the rule, filtering or redirecting traffic for addresses the originating peer never had authority over.

The fix is published in BIRD commit 7cf75587, which corrects the validation path to reject nonzero-offset destination components.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-112112

Indicators of Compromise

  • FlowSpec NLRI (Network Layer Reachability Information) received on a flow6 channel containing an IPv6 destination prefix component with a nonzero offset field.
  • Accepted FlowSpec rules whose destination range exceeds any unicast IPv6 prefix the originating peer has advertised.
  • Unexpected downstream traffic filtering or redirection matching broader IPv6 ranges than any peer should control.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect BIRD routing tables for installed flow6 rules and cross-reference each rule's destination range against the originating peer's accepted unicast prefixes.
  • Capture BGP updates with a traffic analyzer and decode FlowSpec component type 1 (destination prefix) to flag any nonzero offset values on IPv6 sessions.
  • Audit configuration for flow6 channels where import policies accept FlowSpec from external peers without strict prefix-list anchoring.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Alert on new FlowSpec rules propagated to downstream peers that reference IPv6 destinations outside documented customer or peer address allocations.
  • Log and review BIRD daemon messages related to FlowSpec validation decisions during BGP session establishment and route refresh events.
  • Correlate traffic engineering changes with FlowSpec rule installation timestamps to detect unauthorized redirection events.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-112112

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade BIRD to a release that includes commit 7cf75587, which rejects IPv6 FlowSpec destination components with nonzero offsets.
  • Audit all BGP peers permitted to send FlowSpec on flow6 channels and remove any that are not strictly trusted.
  • Review currently installed flow6 rules and withdraw any whose destination range cannot be mapped to an authorized peer prefix.

Patch Information

The upstream fix is available in the CZ.NIC BIRD repository as commit 7cf75587b6f38b87849fe192bf5dfd124b7702bc. The vulnerable validation logic resides in nest/rt-table.c on both the v2.20.0 and v3.4.0 branches. Operators should rebuild from a patched tag or wait for a vendor-packaged release that incorporates the commit.

Workarounds

  • Disable the flow6 channel on BGP sessions with peers that do not require IPv6 FlowSpec exchange.
  • Apply strict import filters on flow6 channels that only accept FlowSpec rules whose destination prefix matches a pre-approved allowlist tied to each peer.
  • Restrict export policies so that FlowSpec received from external peers is not redistributed to downstream networks until the daemon is patched.
bash
# Example BIRD import filter restricting flow6 to an allowlist
filter flow6_in_strict {
  if net ~ [ 2001:db8:customer::/48{48,64} ] then accept;
  reject;
}

protocol bgp peer_v6 {
  flow6 {
    import filter flow6_in_strict;
    export none;
  };
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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