Skip to main content
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-49943

CVE-2026-49943: BIRD Routing Daemon Buffer Overflow Flaw

CVE-2026-49943 is a stack-based buffer overflow in BIRD Internet Routing Daemon through version 2.19.0 that can crash the daemon. This article covers the technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-49943 Overview

CVE-2026-49943 is a stack-based buffer overflow [CWE-121] in the CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon through version 2.19.0. The flaw resides in the as_path_match() function in nest/a-path.c, which uses a fixed-size stack array of 2048 + 1 pm_pos entries. The parse_path() routine expands Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) AS_PATH segments from received UPDATE messages without enforcing a matching capacity limit. An established BGP peer can transmit an AS_PATH containing more than 2048 expanded Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) and crash the daemon.

Critical Impact

An authenticated BGP peer can trigger a stack buffer overflow that terminates the BIRD routing daemon, disrupting route propagation across the affected network.

Affected Products

  • CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon versions through 2.19.0
  • Deployments with RFC 8654 BGP Extended Messages enabled
  • BIRD instances using filter expressions evaluating AS path masks (for example, bgp_path ~ [= ... =])

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-06-02 - CVE-2026-49943 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-06-02 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-49943

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability stems from a mismatch between two related code paths handling BGP AS_PATH attributes in BIRD. The as_path_match() function allocates a fixed stack buffer sized for 2049 pm_pos entries. The companion parse_path() function expands AS_PATH segments from incoming BGP UPDATE messages without bounding the expansion to that capacity. When RFC 8654 BGP Extended Messages are enabled, peers can send AS_PATH attributes far larger than the legacy 4096-byte ceiling, producing more than 2048 expanded ASNs.

Filter expressions that evaluate AS path masks, such as bgp_path ~ [= ... =], invoke the vulnerable matching path. The expansion writes beyond the fixed stack buffer, corrupting adjacent stack memory and crashing the daemon. The reporter notes the supplier does not consider a fix a priority, arguing operators should already reject routes carrying unusually long attributes.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing capacity enforcement in parse_path() relative to the static buffer size assumed by as_path_match(). The function lacks a bounds check tying the expanded ASN count to the 2049-entry buffer in nest/a-path.c.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires an established BGP session, so the attacker must control a peer or compromise an upstream router. The target BIRD instance must have RFC 8654 Extended Messages negotiated and a filter referencing an AS path mask. The attacker then advertises a route whose AS_PATH expands to more than 2048 ASNs, triggering the overflow during filter evaluation and crashing the daemon.

No verified public proof-of-concept code is available. See the GitLab Bird Project News and the CZ.NIC Bird Project for upstream technical context.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-49943

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected termination or repeated restarts of the bird daemon process on routers running version 2.19.0 or earlier
  • BGP session resets correlated with receipt of UPDATE messages containing oversized AS_PATH attributes
  • Core dumps from BIRD showing stack corruption within as_path_match() or parse_path() frames

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect BGP telemetry for UPDATE messages whose AS_PATH attribute exceeds operational norms, particularly those with more than 2048 ASNs
  • Monitor for sessions that negotiate RFC 8654 Extended Messages and subsequently exchange AS_PATH attributes larger than 4096 bytes
  • Correlate daemon crashes with peer activity to identify the originating session

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose BGP UPDATE logging on BIRD instances to capture attribute lengths and peer identities
  • Forward bird process exit events and core dumps to a centralized logging pipeline for correlation
  • Track BGP session uptime metrics and alert on flap patterns aligned with received long-path advertisements

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-49943

Immediate Actions Required

  • Audit BIRD configurations for filter expressions using AS path mask matching, such as bgp_path ~ [= ... =], and remove or rewrite them where feasible
  • Disable RFC 8654 BGP Extended Messages on sessions that do not strictly require them to cap AS_PATH attribute size
  • Apply inbound AS_PATH length limits at the BGP peer level to reject advertisements with abnormally long paths

Patch Information

The supplier has stated that a fix is not being prioritized, citing the expectation that operators reject routes with unusually long attributes. Track upstream changes through the GitLab Bird Project News for any future remediation.

Workarounds

  • Enforce a maximum AS_PATH length using inbound filters that discard routes exceeding a conservative ASN count well below 2048
  • Restrict BGP peering to trusted neighbors and apply strict prefix and attribute policies on external sessions
  • Avoid enabling Extended Messages capability on sessions where peers do not require AS_PATH attributes beyond the legacy size limit
bash
# Example BIRD filter snippet to reject overly long AS_PATHs
filter reject_long_aspath {
    if bgp_path.len > 256 then reject;
    accept;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.