Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-112012 Overview
CVE-2026-112012 is a stack out-of-bounds read and write vulnerability in libtta through version 2.3. The flaw resides in the tta_decoder_process_stream() and tta_decoder_process_frame() functions, which fail to reject TTA (True Audio) files declaring a zero channel count. When a crafted .tta file is decoded, the decorrelation routine accesses cache[-1] using stream-derived values, corrupting adjacent stack memory in the host decoding application. The issue is tracked as [CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write].
Critical Impact
An attacker who convinces a user to open a malicious .tta audio file can trigger stack memory corruption in any application that embeds libtta, potentially leading to crashes or further exploitation.
Affected Products
- libtta versions through 2.3
- Applications and media players that embed the TTA (True Audio) codec library
- Downstream distributions packaging the libtta codec
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-18 - CVE-2026-112012 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-112012
Vulnerability Analysis
The TTA codec operates on channel-interleaved sample buffers. During decoding, libtta iterates across declared channels and applies a decorrelation step that references the previous channel's cache entry. When the header-provided channel count is zero, loop indexing and pointer arithmetic produce a negative index into the cache buffer. The decoder then reads and writes stream-derived values at cache[-1], which lies outside the stack-allocated array. See the VulnCheck advisory on libtta and the HackMD overflow write analysis for additional detail.
Root Cause
Header validation inside tta_decoder_process_stream() and tta_decoder_process_frame() never rejects a zero nch (channel count) field. The decoder treats the channel count as a trusted input and uses it to drive loop bounds and offset calculations. The affected code is visible in the project's source at the libtta.c decoding routine.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires local user interaction. An attacker crafts a .tta file with the channel count field set to zero and delivers it through any channel a target application accepts: email attachments, file shares, or web downloads. When the user opens the file in a player that links libtta, the decoder performs an out-of-bounds read and write on the stack. The attacker-controlled bytes written come from the input stream, giving a path toward influencing decoder state and adjacent stack variables.
No verified public proof-of-concept exploit code is available at this time. See the GitHub project repository for source references.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-112012
Indicators of Compromise
- .tta audio files whose header declares a channel count (nch) of zero, which is invalid for legitimate TTA streams
- Unexpected crashes or stack-corruption signatures in processes that load libtta (for example, SIGSEGV or stack-canary violations)
- Delivery of .tta files from untrusted sources via email, chat, or web downloads
Detection Strategies
- Deploy file-format validators that parse TTA headers and quarantine samples where nch == 0 before they reach decoder processes
- Enable AddressSanitizer or stack protection in test and triage environments to surface out-of-bounds access during media processing
- Correlate media-player process crashes with recent .tta file open events in endpoint telemetry
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on repeated crashes of audio processing applications that have libtta in their loaded module list
- Monitor inbound email and web gateways for .tta attachments and log their source
- Track installed versions of applications that bundle libtta to prioritize patching
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-112012
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory applications that statically or dynamically link libtta and identify versions at or below 2.3
- Block or filter .tta attachments at mail and web gateways until downstream applications are patched
- Instruct users to avoid opening .tta files from untrusted sources
Patch Information
At the time of publication, no fixed release of libtta has been identified in the referenced advisories. Monitor the upstream libtta repository and the SourceForge TTA project page for updates. Downstream vendors that bundle the codec should validate the header's channel count field and reject streams where nch == 0 before invoking the decoder.
Workarounds
- Apply an input filter in front of the decoder that rejects any TTA stream with a zero channel count
- Run media decoders under sandboxing (for example, seccomp or AppArmor profiles) to limit the blast radius of stack corruption
- Disable automatic preview or thumbnailing of .tta files in file managers and media libraries
# Example: block .tta attachments at a Postfix gateway via header_checks
# /etc/postfix/header_checks
/^Content-(Disposition|Type).*name\s*=\s*"?[^"]+\.tta"?/ REJECT TTA attachments blocked pending CVE-2026-112012 patch
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

