Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-112011 Overview
CVE-2026-112011 is an integer overflow vulnerability [CWE-190] in libtta through version 2.3. The flaw resides in the tta_decoder_init_get_info() function and triggers a heap buffer overflow on 32-bit builds. Attackers craft a malicious .tta audio file with a sample rate of 1 and a large samples header field. These unvalidated values cause the seek table allocation calculation to wrap, producing an undersized buffer that is subsequently overflowed. The result is memory corruption and application crashes in software that embeds libtta for True Audio playback or decoding.
Critical Impact
A crafted .tta file processed by a vulnerable 32-bit application causes heap memory corruption, leading to denial of service and potential further exploitation.
Affected Products
- libtta through version 2.3 (32-bit builds)
- Applications linking the TTA (True Audio) decoding library
- Downstream media players and audio processing tools bundling vulnerable libtta releases
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-18 - CVE-2026-112011 published to NVD
- 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-112011
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability lives in tta_decoder_init_get_info(), which computes the size of the seek table buffer from attacker-controlled header fields in a .tta container. On 32-bit builds, the multiplication of the samples value against per-frame metadata overflows the size_t width when the sample rate is set to 1 and samples is large. The arithmetic wraps to a small value, so the heap allocation succeeds with a buffer far smaller than the decoder expects. The decoder then writes seek table entries beyond the allocation boundary, corrupting adjacent heap metadata and user data.
Exploitation requires a user to open or process a crafted file through an application linking libtta. The impact is primarily availability loss through crashes, though heap corruption on 32-bit targets can escalate depending on allocator state and surrounding objects.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing validation of header-derived sizing fields before allocation. The decoder trusts the sample_rate and samples fields from the file header and uses them directly in buffer size arithmetic. Without bounds checks or overflow-safe multiplication, a sample rate of 1 combined with a large samples value produces a wrapped allocation size on 32-bit platforms. See the VulnCheck Advisory: libtta Integer Overflow and the HackMD Analysis: libtta Overflow for the detailed arithmetic path.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is local and requires user interaction. An attacker delivers a crafted .tta file through email attachments, web downloads, removable media, or shared storage. When a user opens the file in a vulnerable player or passes it to a batch audio tool, the decoder parses the malicious header and triggers the overflow. No authentication is required. Reference source lines are available in the libtta source at lines 473-485 and lines 602-616.
// No verified exploit code is published. See the HackMD analysis
// and VulnCheck advisory for the overflow computation details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-112011
Indicators of Compromise
- .tta files with a header sample_rate field equal to 1 combined with an abnormally large samples value
- Unexpected crashes or heap corruption reports from processes linking libtta after opening audio files
- Media player or audio pipeline segmentation faults correlated with newly introduced .tta content
Detection Strategies
- Scan file repositories and mail gateways for .tta files and inspect header fields using a parser that enforces sane sample_rate and samples bounds
- Enable address sanitizer or heap integrity checks (for example, glibc MALLOC_CHECK_) in test environments to surface overflows during triage
- Hunt for process crash telemetry where the faulting module matches libtta or applications known to statically link it
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor endpoint crash logs (Windows Error Reporting, coredumpctl, macOS ReportCrash) for repeated faults in audio-processing binaries
- Track inbound file transfers that deliver .tta extensions to workstations, particularly on 32-bit systems and legacy media kiosks
- Alert on media applications spawning crash handlers shortly after opening files from untrusted sources
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-112011
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory applications that bundle or dynamically link libtta, prioritizing 32-bit builds and legacy audio software
- Block or quarantine untrusted .tta files at email and web gateways until bundled libraries are updated
- Restrict execution of 32-bit media applications on systems that do not require them
Patch Information
No fixed version is listed in the NVD entry at the time of publication. Monitor the libtta GitHub project and the SourceForge TTA project for an updated release that adds overflow-safe arithmetic and header field validation in tta_decoder_init_get_info().
Workarounds
- Prefer 64-bit builds of applications that link libtta, since the overflow arithmetic manifests on 32-bit size types
- Pre-validate .tta headers with a sanitizer that rejects files where sample_rate is 1 or samples exceeds realistic bounds for the file size
- Sandbox audio decoders in restricted processes (seccomp, AppContainer, or equivalent) to limit the impact of heap corruption
# Example: identify .tta files reaching user workstations for review
find /home -type f -iname '*.tta' -printf '%p %s\n' 2>/dev/null
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

