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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111931

CVE-2026-111931: Coder Open Redirect Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111931 is an open redirect flaw in Coder that lets attackers redirect users to malicious sites through unsanitized URL paths. This post covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111931 Overview

CVE-2026-111931 is an open redirect vulnerability in Coder, an open-source platform for provisioning remote development environments. The flaw resides in the handleAPIKeySmuggling function within the workspace app proxy. Affected versions range from 2.0.0 up to (but not including) 2.34.8. The vulnerability stems from unsanitized use of r.URL.Path values, allowing attackers to craft links on trusted workspace app subdomains with paths beginning with double slashes. These paths are interpreted as scheme-relative redirects, sending victims to attacker-controlled destinations. The weakness is tracked as CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site.

Critical Impact

Attackers can abuse trusted Coder workspace subdomains to redirect authenticated users to phishing sites, undermining trust and enabling credential theft.

Affected Products

  • Coder versions 2.0.0 through 2.34.7
  • Coder workspace app proxy component (handleAPIKeySmuggling)
  • Deployments exposing workspace app subdomains to end users

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-17 - CVE-2026-111931 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111931

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability lives in the handleAPIKeySmuggling handler in the Coder workspace app proxy. The handler consumes the incoming request path via r.URL.Path and uses it to construct a redirect target without validating that the destination is same-origin. When a path begins with //attacker.example, browsers interpret the Location header value as a scheme-relative URL. The browser inherits the current scheme (HTTPS) and treats attacker.example as the destination host.

Because the redirect originates from a legitimate workspace app subdomain, users see a trusted hostname in the initial link. Standard phishing defenses that rely on domain inspection fail. The attacker uses the redirect to land users on a cloned login page or malicious payload under their own control.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing validation of user-controlled path input before using it to construct a redirect response. The handleAPIKeySmuggling function does not normalize leading slashes or confirm the target resolves to an internal path. Scheme-relative URLs (//host/path) bypass naive checks that only look for http:// or https:// prefixes.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires user interaction. An attacker crafts a URL on a legitimate Coder workspace app subdomain where the path portion begins with //attacker-domain/. The victim clicks the link, often delivered via email, chat, or a shared workspace artifact. The Coder proxy issues an HTTP redirect that the browser resolves to the attacker's domain. From there, the attacker executes credential harvesting, OAuth consent abuse, or malware delivery. The vulnerability does not require authentication on the attacker side and does not expose data directly on the Coder instance. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-98qx-9p2x-c4wh and the VulnCheck Advisory for Coder Open Redirect for additional technical context.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111931

Indicators of Compromise

  • Access log entries on workspace app subdomains showing request paths beginning with // followed by an external hostname
  • HTTP 302 or 307 responses from Coder with Location headers pointing to third-party domains
  • Outbound referrer traffic from workspace app subdomains to unrelated external hosts

Detection Strategies

  • Parse Coder access logs for URI paths matching the regex ^//[^/]+ and alert on non-empty matches
  • Correlate redirect responses from the Coder proxy with destination hostnames outside the organization's allowlist
  • Flag email, chat, or ticket content containing links to Coder subdomains whose paths begin with double slashes

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Ingest Coder proxy and reverse-proxy logs into a central SIEM and retain Location header values
  • Monitor DNS resolution patterns from user endpoints following clicks on Coder workspace URLs
  • Track user reports of unexpected redirects originating from Coder-hosted links

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111931

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all Coder deployments to version 2.34.8 or later
  • Audit workspace app subdomain access logs for suspicious double-slash paths since 2.0.0 was deployed
  • Notify users of the phishing risk associated with any Coder-hosted link received before patching

Patch Information

The fix is included in Coder 2.34.8. The patched handleAPIKeySmuggling function sanitizes r.URL.Path so leading-slash sequences cannot produce scheme-relative redirects. Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-98qx-9p2x-c4wh for the complete fix commit and upgrade notes.

Workarounds

  • Place a reverse proxy in front of Coder that rejects request paths beginning with //
  • Restrict workspace app subdomain exposure to internal networks until the upgrade is applied
  • Educate developers and users to inspect full redirect destinations before entering credentials
bash
# Example NGINX rule to block scheme-relative path traversal attempts
if ($request_uri ~ "^//") {
    return 400;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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