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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111608

CVE-2026-111608: Jeepay Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111608 is an authentication bypass flaw in Jeepay that allows merchant users to delete other merchants' division receivers through insecure direct object reference. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111608 Overview

CVE-2026-111608 is an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in Jeepay payment platform through version 3.2.9. The flaw resides in the merchant division receiver delete API, where the application validates ownership against the wrong database column. Authenticated merchant users holding the ENT_DIVISION_RECEIVER_DELETE permission can delete profit-sharing receivers belonging to other merchants. Exploitation requires an attacker to own a receiver group whose id matches the victim's receiver id, making the attack conditional but still viable within multi-tenant deployments. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.

Critical Impact

Authenticated merchants can delete other merchants' profit-sharing receivers, disrupting payment distribution workflows across tenant boundaries.

Affected Products

  • Jeepay payment platform versions up to and including 3.2.9
  • jeepay-merchant module, specifically MchDivisionReceiverController
  • Multi-tenant deployments exposing the division receiver management API

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111608 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111608

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability affects the division receiver delete endpoint in the Jeepay merchant controller. Division receivers represent profit-sharing recipients configured by merchants for payment splitting. The delete handler is intended to verify that the requesting merchant owns the receiver record being deleted. Instead, the authorization check compares the authenticated merchant's identity against the receiver group id rather than the receiver record ownership, creating a cross-tenant authorization gap.

An attacker authenticated to a merchant account and holding the ENT_DIVISION_RECEIVER_DELETE permission can submit a delete request specifying a victim's receiver recordId. If the attacker owns a receiver group whose numeric id happens to match the victim's receiver id, the ownership predicate evaluates true and the deletion proceeds. The condition is probabilistic but trivially increased by creating additional receiver groups until an id collision occurs.

Root Cause

The root cause is an authorization check performed against the wrong column during the delete flow. The query filters receivers using an identifier that belongs to a different entity (receiver group) rather than validating that the receiver record's merchant identifier matches the authenticated session. See the vulnerable code in MchDivisionReceiverController.java for the exact logic.

Attack Vector

The attacker authenticates as a legitimate merchant with division receiver delete privileges. The attacker enumerates or creates receiver groups to obtain group id values. The attacker then issues a DELETE request to the division receivers API with a target recordId corresponding to a victim's receiver. When the group id matches the targeted receiver id, the server deletes the victim's record. Further technical analysis is documented in the HackMD write-up and the VulnCheck advisory.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111608

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected deletion events in the t_mch_division_receiver table affecting receivers not owned by the acting merchant
  • Division receiver delete API calls where the request recordId does not correlate with records tied to the authenticated mchNo
  • Merchant accounts creating unusually large numbers of receiver groups in a short window, suggesting id collision brute-forcing

Detection Strategies

  • Instrument the division receiver delete endpoint to log the authenticated merchant identifier alongside the resolved record owner, and alert on mismatches
  • Correlate HTTP DELETE requests against /api/divisionReceivers/* with downstream SQL deletes to confirm authorized cross-referencing
  • Run periodic integrity audits comparing receiver records to their owning merchant and flag orphaned or unexpectedly removed entries

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable application-layer audit logging for all mutating operations against division receiver resources
  • Monitor administrative dashboards for abnormal merchant complaints about missing profit-sharing receivers
  • Baseline normal delete volume per merchant and alert on statistical outliers

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111608

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict assignment of the ENT_DIVISION_RECEIVER_DELETE permission to trusted merchant operators until a patch is applied
  • Review the t_mch_division_receiver table for unauthorized deletions and restore records from backup where necessary
  • Place a web application firewall rule in front of the division receivers delete endpoint to enforce per-merchant request validation

Patch Information

No fixed version is listed in the NVD entry at the time of publication. Operators should monitor the Jeepay GitHub repository for releases after 3.2.9 and apply any security update that corrects the ownership predicate in MchDivisionReceiverController to match on the receiver's owning merchant identifier.

Workarounds

  • Revoke the ENT_DIVISION_RECEIVER_DELETE role from all non-essential merchant users
  • Apply a hotfix to the delete handler so the SQL predicate validates mchNo on the receiver record itself, not on the receiver group
  • Front the merchant API with a reverse proxy that enforces resource ownership checks before passing requests to the application
bash
# Example reverse-proxy guard: deny delete requests where the recordId
# does not belong to the authenticated merchant session
location ~ ^/api/divisionReceivers/ {
    if ($request_method = DELETE) {
        access_by_lua_file /etc/nginx/lua/verify_receiver_ownership.lua;
    }
    proxy_pass http://jeepay_merchant_backend;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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