Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111607 Overview
CVE-2026-111607 is an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in Jeepay versions through 3.2.9. The flaw resides in the MchPayInterfaceConfigController.saveOrUpdate endpoint, which fails to validate that the supplied infoId belongs to the authenticated merchant. Any merchant user holding the default ENT_MCH_PAY_CONFIG_ADD permission can submit another merchant's infoId and overwrite that merchant's payment channel configuration. Successful exploitation lets attackers replace signing keys, certificates, and fee rates. This breaks or redirects the victim merchant's payment processing. The vulnerability is tracked under [CWE-639] (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key).
Critical Impact
Authenticated merchants can tamper with other merchants' payment credentials and fee configurations, enabling payment disruption or fund redirection.
Affected Products
- Jeepay versions up to and including 3.2.9
- jeepay-merchant module, specifically MchPayInterfaceConfigController
- Deployments granting the default ENT_MCH_PAY_CONFIG_ADD permission
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111607 published to NVD
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111607
Vulnerability Analysis
Jeepay is an open-source payment gateway written in Java. The merchant console exposes an API that lets a merchant create or update payment interface configurations for the channels they operate. The saveOrUpdate handler in MchPayInterfaceConfigController accepts an infoId parameter from the request body and uses it to locate the target configuration record. The handler does not confirm the record's owning mchNo matches the authenticated session's merchant number before writing changes.
An attacker only needs a legitimate merchant account with the default ENT_MCH_PAY_CONFIG_ADD role. By substituting a victim merchant's infoId, the attacker causes the server to persist attacker-supplied payment channel data under the victim's account. This bypass is a classic cross-tenant authorization failure in a multi-tenant SaaS payment platform.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing object-level ownership validation. The controller trusts the client-supplied identifier and relies on request-level permission checks ([CWE-639]) rather than enforcing that the target infoId belongs to the caller's mchNo. Permission checks confirm what action is allowed but not against which object.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the merchant API and valid, low-privilege merchant credentials. No user interaction is needed. An attacker enumerates or guesses a victim infoId, submits a POST request to the saveOrUpdate endpoint, and overwrites the configuration with crafted values. Attackers can swap signing keys, upload substitute certificates, or alter fee rates to disrupt settlement or redirect flows. See the GitHub Code Review and the HackMD Cross Merchant Authz Analysis for the full technical walkthrough.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-111607
Indicators of Compromise
- Audit log entries where the infoId modified by MchPayInterfaceConfigController.saveOrUpdate resolves to a mchNo different from the caller's session mchNo.
- Unexpected changes to payment channel signing keys, merchant certificates, or fee rate fields outside normal change windows.
- Payment processing failures, signature validation errors, or settlement discrepancies reported by downstream payment providers.
Detection Strategies
- Instrument the saveOrUpdate handler to log the authenticated mchNo, the target record's mchNo, and the submitted infoId for every call, then alert on mismatches.
- Deploy database triggers or application-layer hooks on the t_mch_pay_passage (and related) tables to flag writes where the updating session's merchant does not own the row.
- Hunt in access logs for a single merchant account issuing requests referencing a wide range of sequential or non-owned infoId values.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Baseline normal rates of payment configuration changes per merchant and alert on outliers.
- Forward application and database audit events to a centralized analytics platform to correlate cross-tenant anomalies.
- Monitor payment provider webhooks for sudden surges in signature or certificate validation failures tied to specific merchants.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111607
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict exposure of the Jeepay merchant console to trusted networks until a fixed version is deployed.
- Review and reduce assignment of the ENT_MCH_PAY_CONFIG_ADD permission to the minimum set of trusted merchant users.
- Rotate any signing keys and certificates that may have been tampered with on affected merchant accounts.
- Audit the payment configuration tables for records whose last modifier does not match the owning mchNo.
Patch Information
At time of publication, Jeepay 3.2.9 is the latest reviewed release and remains affected. Monitor the upstream Jeepay repository and the VulnCheck Advisory on IDOR for the fixed version. Operators maintaining private forks should add an ownership check in saveOrUpdate that loads the existing record by infoId and rejects the request when its mchNo differs from the session's mchNo.
Workarounds
- Add a reverse proxy or WAF rule that inspects POST requests to the merchant pay configuration endpoint and blocks payloads where infoId references records not owned by the session merchant (requires session-aware inspection).
- Temporarily revoke the ENT_MCH_PAY_CONFIG_ADD permission from all merchant roles and perform configuration changes administratively until a patched build is deployed.
- Enable strict database-level row ownership checks via stored procedures or application-side policy enforcement before any update to payment configuration tables.
# Example reverse-proxy guard (pseudocode) to block cross-merchant writes
# Place in front of /api/mch/payConfigs saveOrUpdate route
location /api/mch/payConfigs {
access_by_lua_block {
local session_mch = ngx.var.cookie_mchNo
local body = ngx.req.get_body_data()
local info_id = body and body:match('"infoId"%s*:%s*"([^"]+)"')
if info_id and not owns(session_mch, info_id) then
ngx.exit(403)
end
}
proxy_pass http://jeepay_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

