Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111604 Overview
CVE-2026-111604 is a broken access control vulnerability in eladmin through version 2.7, an open-source Spring Boot management system. The flaw resides in the user update and delete handlers of the /api/users REST endpoint. Write operations in UserController.java fail to enforce department-based data scope checks that read operations apply. A department-scoped user manager holding user:edit or user:del permissions can modify or delete accounts belonging to other departments. The issue is tracked under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.
Critical Impact
Authenticated low-tier administrators can disable, reassign, alter, or delete arbitrary user accounts across the entire tenant, bypassing the department isolation model.
Affected Products
- eladmin versions up to and including 2.7
- eladmin-system module (UserController.java)
- Deployments relying on department-scoped role separation
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111604 published to NVD
- 2026-10-21 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111604
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability stems from inconsistent authorization enforcement between read and write paths in the eladmin user management API. Read handlers in UserController apply a department data-scope filter so that managers only see users within their own organizational subtree. The corresponding PUT /api/users and DELETE /api/users handlers at lines 118–152 skip this scope check. They validate only the role permission string, not the relationship between the acting user's department and the target user's department.
An attacker with user:edit or user:del can therefore submit any numeric user id in the request body or path. The service layer processes the operation against the full user table rather than the caller's scoped subset. This grants horizontal privilege escalation across tenant boundaries defined by department.
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing data-scope predicate in write operations. The repository query used by the update and delete paths does not append the dept_id constraint that the list query uses. Authorization is treated as a binary role check rather than a per-record ownership check, which is the pattern classified under CWE-639.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires a valid authenticated session for an account holding user:edit or user:del. The attacker enumerates target user identifiers through legitimate list views, OSINT, or sequential guessing. They then issue a PUT /api/users request with the target id and modified fields such as enabled, deptId, roles, or email, or a DELETE /api/users/{id} request. The server executes the request without verifying the target's department against the caller's scope. See the HackMD technical write-up and the VulnCheck advisory for request-level detail.
No verified public exploit code is available. Refer to the vulnerable UserController source for the affected handlers.
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-111604
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected PUT /api/users or DELETE /api/users requests where the target user's deptId differs from the authenticated caller's deptId.
- Audit log entries showing user record modifications performed by non-super-admin accounts against users in foreign departments.
- Sudden account disablement, role reassignment, or deletion events clustered within a short interval and sourced from a single lower-tier administrator session.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate application audit logs with the organization's department hierarchy to flag cross-scope writes against /api/users.
- Add server-side logging that records both the acting principal's deptId and the target record's deptId for every write, then alert on mismatches.
- Review historical access logs for enumeration patterns against sequential user IDs on the /api/users endpoint.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward eladmin application and reverse-proxy logs to a centralized analytics platform and build detections on cross-department write events.
- Baseline normal volumes of user update and delete operations per administrator and alert on deviations.
- Monitor for privilege or role changes applied to privileged accounts, especially elevation to roles containing admin or super identifiers.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111604
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict the user:edit and user:del permissions to trusted top-level administrators until a patched build is deployed.
- Place /api/users behind an application gateway or WAF rule that blocks write methods for non-administrative roles.
- Audit all user accounts for unauthorized department reassignment, role elevation, or disablement that occurred prior to remediation.
Patch Information
At the time of publication, no fixed release had been identified in the NVD entry. Monitor the eladmin GitHub repository for new releases and commits addressing the UserController write handlers. Apply a local patch that injects a department data-scope check into the update and delete service methods, mirroring the predicate used by the list query.
Workarounds
- Modify UserController.update and UserController.delete to resolve the target user's deptId and reject the request when it falls outside the caller's DataScope.
- Reassign department-manager accounts to a role that excludes user:edit and user:del, delegating user lifecycle changes to a single global administrator role.
- Deploy a reverse-proxy policy that inspects request bodies and rejects /api/users write requests referencing user IDs outside the caller's department allowlist.
# Example nginx policy restricting user write operations to an admin network
location /api/users {
limit_except GET {
allow 10.0.10.0/24; # administrator management subnet
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://eladmin_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

