Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-106705 Overview
CVE-2026-106705 is an improper access control vulnerability [CWE-284] in ELADMIN (eladmin-mp) versions up to 2.7. The flaw resides in the role management module, specifically the PUT /api/roles/menu endpoint handled by RoleController.updateRoleMenu. The endpoint authorizes requests by comparing the target role's level with the caller's minimum level, but fails to validate the granted menu set or block a caller from modifying its own role. A logged-in non-administrative user holding the delegated roles:edit permission can submit their own role identifier along with an arbitrary list of menu identifiers, granting themselves elevated privileges.
Critical Impact
Authenticated low-privilege users can escalate to administrative access by rewriting the menu bindings of their own role, resulting in full compromise of application confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Affected Products
- ELADMIN (eladmin-mp) versions up to and including 2.7
- Deployments exposing the /api/roles/menu endpoint to delegated administrators
- Applications assigning the roles:edit permission to non-admin roles
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-106705 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-106705
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability affects the role-to-menu assignment workflow in ELADMIN. The RoleController.updateRoleMenu handler receives a role identifier and a list of menu identifiers from the request body. Before persisting changes, the controller performs a single authorization check: it compares the level of the target role against the minimum level available to the caller.
This check prevents a caller from modifying roles that outrank them, but it does not prevent a caller from modifying their own role. It also does not constrain which menus may appear in the submitted list. As a result, any menu identifier in the system — including menus reserved for administrators — can be bound to the attacker's role.
The outcome is horizontal and vertical privilege escalation driven entirely through legitimate API usage. No injection, memory corruption, or authentication bypass is required.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing authorization logic in RoleController.updateRoleMenu. The handler relies on role-level comparison alone and omits two checks: a self-modification guard that would reject requests where the target role equals the caller's own role, and a menu whitelist that would restrict the submitted menu identifiers to those the caller is already permitted to assign.
Attack Vector
An attacker authenticates to the ELADMIN interface using an account whose role includes the delegated roles:edit permission. The attacker then issues a PUT request to /api/roles/menu containing their own role identifier and a list of privileged menu identifiers enumerated from the application. The server accepts the update, binds the new menus to the attacker's role, and the attacker gains access to administrative functionality on the next session refresh.
For technical details, see the GitHub CVE Analysis Document and the ELADMIN project repository.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-106705
Indicators of Compromise
- PUT requests to /api/roles/menu where the submitted roleId matches the role bound to the authenticated session.
- Role records whose associated menu bindings expand suddenly to include administrative menus not previously granted.
- Audit log entries showing non-admin accounts invoking RoleController.updateRoleMenu outside of normal change-management windows.
Detection Strategies
- Instrument application logs to record the caller identity, caller role, target roleId, and submitted menu identifiers for every call to the role-menu endpoint.
- Compare pre- and post-change menu sets for role updates and alert when administrative menus are added by non-administrator principals.
- Review account provisioning for any non-admin role that holds the roles:edit permission and flag it for monitoring.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward ELADMIN application and web server logs to a centralized analytics platform for correlation of self-referential role edits.
- Baseline normal /api/roles/menu activity by user and role, then alert on deviations such as new administrative menu bindings or unusual request frequency.
- Monitor subsequent authenticated activity from accounts that have modified their own role for access to high-value endpoints.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-106705
Immediate Actions Required
- Revoke the roles:edit permission from all non-administrator roles until a patched version is deployed.
- Audit existing role-to-menu assignments and remove any administrative menus bound to lower-privilege roles.
- Restrict network exposure of the ELADMIN management interface to trusted administrative networks.
Patch Information
At the time of publication, no fixed version is referenced in the NVD entry for CVE-2026-106705. Track the ELADMIN project repository for an upstream patch and apply it as soon as it becomes available. Any fix should add a self-modification guard in RoleController.updateRoleMenu and validate submitted menu identifiers against the caller's assignable scope.
Workarounds
- Apply a reverse-proxy or Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule that blocks PUT /api/roles/menu requests where the request body roleId equals the authenticated user's own role.
- Reduce the number of accounts holding the roles:edit permission to the smallest set required for operations.
- Enforce multi-step approval for role or menu changes through an out-of-band change management workflow until the application is patched.
# Example NGINX snippet to block PUT /api/roles/menu at the perimeter
# until trusted administrators can be allow-listed by source IP.
location = /api/roles/menu {
limit_except GET {
allow 10.0.0.0/24; # admin management subnet
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://eladmin_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

