Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111384 Overview
CVE-2026-111384 is a memory exhaustion vulnerability in the Nezha monitoring dashboard affecting versions 1.0.0 through releases prior to 2.3.15. The flaw resides in the file manager WebSocket endpoint /api/v1/ws/file/:id, where the fmStream handler never calls SetReadLimit on the WebSocket connection. This leaves inbound message size unbounded. An authenticated user holding file manager scopes can submit a single oversized binary WebSocket message, forcing gorilla/websocket to buffer the entire frame in memory. The result is an out-of-memory (OOM) kill of the dashboard process, which terminates all agent monitoring across the deployment. The weakness is classified under [CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling].
Critical Impact
A single authenticated request to the file manager WebSocket endpoint can OOM-kill the Nezha dashboard, dropping monitoring for every connected agent.
Affected Products
- Nezha monitoring dashboard versions 1.0.0 through 2.3.14
- Deployments exposing /api/v1/ws/file/:id to authenticated users with file manager scopes
- Self-hosted Nezha instances prior to the 2.3.15 security release
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111384 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111384
Vulnerability Analysis
The Nezha dashboard exposes a file manager over a WebSocket endpoint at /api/v1/ws/file/:id. The server-side handler, fmStream, upgrades the HTTP connection and relays I/O between the client and an attached file manager session. The handler never invokes SetReadLimit on the upgraded gorilla/websocket connection. By default, this leaves the maximum inbound message size unbounded. An authenticated client with file manager scopes can transmit a single binary WebSocket frame whose declared payload size is arbitrarily large. The underlying library allocates a buffer sized to the incoming frame before the I/O relay reads the data, consuming all available heap memory. When the Go runtime cannot satisfy further allocations, the host operating system issues an OOM kill against the dashboard process. Because all agent heartbeats and telemetry streams terminate when the dashboard dies, monitoring coverage across the fleet is lost until the service restarts.
Root Cause
The root cause is the absence of a bounded read limit on the file manager WebSocket connection. The maintainers acknowledged this in the patch by introducing a 1 MiB cap aligned with the official client's upload chunk size.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the dashboard and authenticated credentials carrying file manager scopes. No user interaction is required beyond issuing the WebSocket request. The attack impacts availability only; confidentiality and integrity are unaffected.
// Patch excerpt from cmd/dashboard/controller/fm.go
// The official file-manager client uploads in 1 MiB WebSocket messages. Cap
// each complete message at that protocol boundary so gorilla/websocket cannot
// buffer an attacker-sized frame before the IO stream relay sees it.
const fileManagerWebSocketInputLimit int64 = 1024 * 1024
type websocketReadLimiter interface {
SetReadLimit(limit int64)
}
func limitFileManagerWebSocketInput(conn websocketReadLimiter) {
conn.SetReadLimit(fileManagerWebSocketInputLimit)
}
Source: GitHub Commit 36b742a
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111384
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected dashboard process termination with OOM kill events in dmesg or systemd journal logs referencing the Nezha binary.
- Sudden simultaneous disconnection of all monitored agents without a corresponding deployment or restart event.
- WebSocket upgrade requests to /api/v1/ws/file/:id followed immediately by abnormal memory growth in dashboard metrics.
Detection Strategies
- Alert on Linux kernel OOM-killer messages that target the Nezha dashboard process.
- Correlate agent mass-disconnect events in monitoring logs with authenticated WebSocket sessions against the file manager endpoint.
- Inspect reverse proxy access logs for authenticated clients establishing /api/v1/ws/file/:id sessions outside of expected administrative windows.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Instrument the dashboard host with resident set size (RSS) and heap utilization metrics, and alert on sharp spikes.
- Enforce request size limits at the reverse proxy layer and log any WebSocket frames exceeding the configured ceiling.
- Track authentication events for file manager scopes and review which accounts exercise them.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111384
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Nezha dashboard installations to version 2.3.15 or later, which enforces the 1 MiB WebSocket read limit.
- Audit all accounts carrying file manager scopes and revoke access for identities that do not require it.
- Restrict exposure of the dashboard to trusted networks or place it behind an authenticating reverse proxy with request size caps.
Patch Information
The fix is delivered in commit 36b742a7e9a81ed782363dd19efd77b7030fbd0f, which introduces limitFileManagerWebSocketInput and calls SetReadLimit on the WebSocket connection with a 1 MiB cap. Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-7242-982f-83p9 and the VulnCheck Advisory for Nezha for full remediation guidance.
Workarounds
- Place a reverse proxy such as nginx in front of the dashboard and enforce client_max_body_size and WebSocket frame size limits.
- Temporarily disable the file manager feature or block routing to /api/v1/ws/file/:id until the patch is applied.
- Reduce the memory headroom available for abuse by containerizing the dashboard with strict MemoryMax limits so systemd restarts the service rapidly on OOM.
# Example nginx configuration to cap WebSocket frames in front of Nezha
location /api/v1/ws/file/ {
client_max_body_size 1m;
proxy_read_timeout 60s;
proxy_pass http://nezha_dashboard;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

