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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111184

CVE-2026-111184: NoMachine Named Pipe Privilege Escalation

CVE-2026-111184 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in NoMachine Device Service caused by incorrect named pipe permissions. Attackers can exploit this to execute code as SYSTEM. This article covers technical details, impact analysis, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111184 Overview

CVE-2026-111184 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in NoMachine remote desktop software. The flaw resides in the NoMachine Device Service, which assigns incorrect permissions to a named pipe used for inter-process communication. A low-privileged local attacker can interact with the pipe to execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM. The weakness is classified under CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource. The issue was reported through the Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative under tracking identifier ZDI-CAN-31213 and published as advisory ZDI-26-773.

Critical Impact

Successful exploitation gives a standard user full SYSTEM-level code execution on the affected Windows host, breaking the local trust boundary.

Affected Products

  • NoMachine (Device Service component on Windows)
  • Specific affected versions not enumerated in the published NVD record
  • Refer to the Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-26-773 for vendor-confirmed version ranges

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-111184 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-10-22 - NVD record last modified
  • ZDI-CAN-31213 - Original Zero Day Initiative submission identifier (advisory ZDI-26-773)

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111184

Vulnerability Analysis

The NoMachine Device Service runs as a privileged Windows service and exposes a named pipe for client communication. The service creates this pipe with a security descriptor that grants excessive access rights to unprivileged users. Any authenticated local user can therefore open the pipe and submit messages that the service processes with SYSTEM privileges. The flaw does not require network access, user interaction, or elevated credentials to trigger.

Attackers chain this primitive with the service's existing message handlers to perform privileged operations such as writing files, loading libraries, or spawning processes outside of their original security context. The result is a reliable local-to-SYSTEM escalation path on affected installations.

Root Cause

The root cause is a Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) applied to the named pipe that includes an overly permissive Access Control Entry (ACE). Instead of restricting write or control access to administrative accounts, the pipe accepts connections from the Everyone or Authenticated Users group. This design decision in the Device Service initialization code violates the principle of least privilege described in CWE-732.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires prior local code execution as a low-privileged user. The attacker enumerates named pipes on the system, identifies the NoMachine Device Service endpoint, and connects using standard Windows API calls such as CreateFile against the \\.\pipe\ namespace. Once connected, the attacker issues service-specific requests that the Device Service executes with its own SYSTEM token. The detailed message format and gadget selection are documented in the Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-26-773. No public proof-of-concept exploit is listed in the NVD record at time of publication.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111184

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected child processes of the NoMachine Device Service executable running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
  • Non-administrative user sessions opening handles to NoMachine-owned named pipes under \\.\pipe\
  • New services, scheduled tasks, or persistence artifacts created immediately after NoMachine service activity by a non-admin account

Detection Strategies

  • Audit named pipe creation and connection events using Sysmon Event ID 17 (PipeEvent create) and Event ID 18 (PipeEvent connect) filtered on NoMachine pipe names
  • Alert on process creation where the parent is the NoMachine Device Service binary and the child is cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, or other living-off-the-land binaries
  • Correlate low-privileged user activity with subsequent SYSTEM-context process launches on the same host within a short time window

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable Windows Advanced Audit Policy for Object Access and File Share to capture pipe handle requests
  • Forward endpoint telemetry including process lineage and token elevation events to a centralized analytics platform for correlation
  • Baseline normal NoMachine Device Service behavior so deviations in child process creation stand out

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111184

Immediate Actions Required

  • Inventory all Windows endpoints and servers running NoMachine and prioritize patching based on exposure
  • Restrict interactive and remote logon rights on hosts with NoMachine installed to reduce the pool of users able to exploit the flaw
  • Monitor the Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-26-773 and NoMachine's official downloads page for the fixed release

Patch Information

The NVD record and ZDI advisory do not list a specific fixed version in the data available at publication time. Administrators should consult NoMachine's security announcements and apply the vendor-supplied update that addresses the Device Service named pipe permission issue referenced as ZDI-CAN-31213.

Workarounds

  • Stop and disable the NoMachine Device Service on systems that do not require the remote device functionality until a patch is applied
  • Limit local account provisioning on NoMachine hosts to trusted administrators to shrink the attack surface for local escalation
  • Apply application allowlisting to block unauthorized binaries from executing on hosts where NoMachine is installed
bash
# Example: temporarily disable the NoMachine Device Service on Windows (run as Administrator)
sc.exe stop "nxservice"
sc.exe config "nxservice" start= disabled

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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