Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2024-7253 Overview
CVE-2024-7253 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability affecting NoMachine remote desktop software on Windows. The flaw resides in nxnode.exe, which loads a library from an unsecured file system location. A low-privileged local attacker who can place a malicious DLL in the search path can gain code execution in the context of SYSTEM. The vulnerability maps to [CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element] and was reported through the Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-24039. NoMachine has issued guidance in its knowledge base article TR07V11184.
Critical Impact
Successful exploitation grants full SYSTEM privileges on affected Windows hosts, allowing attackers to install persistent malware, disable security tooling, and move laterally.
Affected Products
- NoMachine for Windows (versions prior to the fix referenced in TR07V11184)
- NoMachine Enterprise Desktop
- NoMachine Enterprise Server and Terminal Server editions on Windows
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-11-22 - CVE-2024-7253 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in the NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-7253
Vulnerability Analysis
The nxnode.exe process in NoMachine runs with elevated privileges and loads a dependent library without specifying a fully qualified, trusted path. Windows resolves the library name through its standard DLL search order, which includes directories writable by less privileged users in certain configurations. When the loader finds a planted DLL earlier in the search sequence than the legitimate module, the planted code is mapped into the privileged process. The attacker-supplied DllMain executes in the security context of nxnode.exe, which is NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. This pattern is a textbook DLL hijacking (also known as DLL preloading) issue tied to an unsafe search path.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper control of the DLL search path within the NoMachine node service. The vulnerable binary relies on relative library resolution rather than passing absolute paths or using LoadLibraryEx with safe search flags such as LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32. Combined with directory permissions that allow local users to write to a directory in the search order, this yields a reliable escalation primitive.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires local, authenticated access with the ability to execute code at low privilege. The attacker stages a malicious DLL whose filename matches the library expected by nxnode.exe in a directory that precedes the legitimate location in the search order. When nxnode.exe initializes or restarts, Windows loads the attacker DLL into the privileged process, executing arbitrary code as SYSTEM. No user interaction or network reachability is required. Public proof-of-concept exploit code is not available at time of writing; see the Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-24-1042 for additional technical context.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-7253
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected DLL files appearing in directories referenced by nxnode.exe or in the NoMachine installation path writable by non-administrative users.
- nxnode.exe loading modules from paths outside the standard NoMachine installation directory or System32.
- New child processes spawned by nxnode.exe running as SYSTEM without a matching administrative action.
Detection Strategies
- Monitor Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) for nxnode.exe loading DLLs from user-writable directories.
- Alert on file creation events (Sysmon Event ID 11) that drop .dll files into NoMachine binary paths from non-SYSTEM users.
- Correlate low-privileged logon sessions with subsequent SYSTEM-level process creation originating from nxnode.exe.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Baseline the set of DLLs normally loaded by nxnode.exe and alert on deviations.
- Audit NTFS permissions on the NoMachine installation directory and any auxiliary directories in the DLL search path.
- Collect endpoint telemetry centrally so loader events and privilege transitions can be joined across time.
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-7253
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade NoMachine to the version documented in the vendor knowledge base article NoMachine Technical Reference TR07V11184.
- Inventory Windows systems running NoMachine and prioritize patching multi-user, kiosk, and jump-host deployments.
- Restrict interactive logon on hosts running NoMachine to trusted administrative users where business requirements allow.
Patch Information
NoMachine has published remediation guidance in knowledge base article TR07V11184. Administrators should apply the fixed release referenced in that advisory and the corresponding Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-24-1042. After upgrading, restart the NoMachine services to ensure the patched nxnode.exe binary is loaded.
Workarounds
- Tighten directory ACLs so that non-privileged users cannot write to any directory in the nxnode.exe DLL search path.
- Enforce application control (for example, Windows Defender Application Control or AppLocker) to block unsigned DLLs from loading into NoMachine processes.
- Remove unnecessary local accounts and limit RDP or console access on servers hosting NoMachine until patches are deployed.
# Example: audit write permissions on the NoMachine installation directory
icacls "C:\Program Files (x86)\NoMachine"
# Remove inherited write permissions for non-administrative principals
icacls "C:\Program Files (x86)\NoMachine" /inheritance:r
icacls "C:\Program Files (x86)\NoMachine" /grant:r "BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)F" "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F" "BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)RX"
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

